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Introduction
This dissertation is entitled "Defining the Republic" because it is a
comparison of the definitions of what specifically the newly-founded
republic of the United States should be like between the views of
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.

I have chosen to compare

these two Founders because they could agree on the form of
government they wanted for the United States, namely the Constitution,
but once they attained their goal, they became bitter political enemies
since they could not agree on how to implement the Constitution they
had both worked so hard to obtain.

That is, they had conflicting

definitions of, and expectations for, what the republic of the United States
would be like.
Hamilton and Madison were not the only two Founders with
conflicting definitions of what the United States should be. Anyone who
looks at the conflict over ratification of the Constitution will see a wide
variety of visions. Also, the political conflicts beginning in the 1790's only
add more material showing the range of disagreement among the
Founders.
One individual who specifically mentioned the problem of defining
a republic was John Adams. In one letter he wrote Mercy Warren about
his objections to her history of the American Revolution, he said:
"The first appearance of a national stipulation in favor of
Republican government was in the Constitution of the United
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States, in which a Republican constitution was guaranteed to
the several States.
It may perhaps be a sufficient
recommendation of this article to say that it was introduced
by Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina; and he ought to
have the glory of it. But I confess I never understood of, and I
believe no other man ever did, or ever will."1
One problem with the word "republic," as Adams pointed out, is it
has been given so many definitions throughout history. Adams stated a
republic is a government of "more than one," but goes on to argue this is
almost no definition at all. "A Republican government is a government of
more than one. The word Republic has been used, it is true, by learned
men, to signify every actual and every possible government among men that of Constantinople as well as that of Geneva."2
For Adams, the distinction then is between republics which are free
and those which are not free.
"The most accurate distinction, then, has been between free
republics and republics which are not free. It is not even said
in our Constitution that the people shall be guaranteed a free
and republican government. The word is so loose and
indefinite that successive predominant factions will put
glosses and constructions on it as different as light and
darkness; and if ever there should be a civil war, which
Heaven forbid, the conquering General in all his triumph may
establish a military despotism, and yet call it a constitutional
republic, as Napoleon has already set him the example. The
only effect of it that I could ever see is to deceive the people;
and this practice my heart abhors, my head disapproves,
and my tongue and my pen have ever avoided. I am no
Pharisee, Jesuit, or Machiavellian."3
Adams, John and Mercy Warren, Correspondence Between John Adams and Mercy
Warren (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 352-353.
2 Ibid, 353.
3 Ibid, 353.
1
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Adams points out just how "loose and indefinite" the word republic
is, how many different types of government have been identified as
republics, and the danger that follows from relying on such an ill-defined
word to describe and understand just what form of government the
United States exists under. It is that difficulty in defining the word republic I
want to further explore through my comparison of Hamilton and Madison.
Now, Hamilton and Madison did not see their disagreements as a
matter of conflicting definitions of "republic," or indeed any other word.
They simply wanted different things for the United States. The reason I
argue for taking the approach I advocate in comparing their conflicting
visions is that by focusing on a word central to both (after all, both
considered themselves republicans), one gains a theme around which to
organize such a comparison. This means it can also be used for other
Founders, and later individuals as well.
Examination of the ideas of the Founders is important because of
the influence they had on later generations down to today. All sorts of
individuals, from all sorts of ideological perspectives, call upon the
Founders in support of their policy goals. However, the Founders were not
the coherent group, with coherent sets of ideas and political principles,
that many would like them to be. So it is rather to their differences and to
their conflicts that we must look to fully understand their influence. In so
doing we can not only more completely understand them, but ourselves
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as well.
Not surprisingly, the literature on Hamilton and Madison is vast.
However, the literature that focuses on both of them at the same time is
much smaller. Even within the smaller corpus of work no one has yet done
the specific kind of work I propose. Nevertheless, a survey of work done
thus far that will assist in the project I propose is in order.
One simply cannot do any work during this era without consulting,
and distinguishing one's work from, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick's "The
Age of Federalism."

Elkins and McKitrick do compare Hamilton and

Madison, but with an eye towards explaining why they differed. For Elkins
and McKitrick, their differences all boil down to the different goals, and
different feelings toward, each man had vis a vis relations with Great
Britain.

In short, Hamilton's "Anglophilia" and Madison's "Anglophobia"

underlay their conflict. Elkins and McKitrick do identify the question I focus
on, that of defining of what a republic should be, once the Founders had
achieved the goal of ratifying the Constitution.
"But once the new government was in being, and its
legitimacy established, a new kind of ideological problem,
hitherto not of the first urgency, became insistent. The
Revolution had made the United States republican, and now
it had been determined that these states were no longer a
republican confederation, but a republican nation. But what
else?
Beyond the words of the Constitution and the
republican values represented by General Washington, what
was to be its character? At the beginning of 1790, the
answer still lay very much in the future. Now that it lies in the
past, we find it hard to imagine how heavily this question
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could have weighed upon the leaders of the time."4
For Elkins and McKItrick, the conflict began with Hamilton's policy
goals as Treasury Secretary. They begin, following Lance Banning's The
Jeffersonian Persuasion, by noting the similarities (which shocked and
horrified Madison), between Hamilton's proposals for funding the national
debt, creating a national bank, and providing governmental support for
manufacturing, and the "Court" policies of Sir Horace Walpole as Prime
Minister of Great Britain.
"As the Hamiltonian program revealed itself over the the next
two years - a sizable funded debt, a powerful national bank,
excises, national subsidized manufactures, and eventually
even a standing army - the Walpolean parallel at every point
was too obvious to miss. It was in resistance to this, and
everything it seemed to imply, that the ‘Jeffersonian
Persuasion’ was erected.”5
For most who have studied this era, the conflict between Hamilton
and Jefferson is the focus of their work. However, Elkins and McKitrick take
a similar approach to mine in emphasizing that one must first look at
Madison vs Hamilton to truly understand the conflicts of that era.
"The character and quality of national life in the 1790's are
thus not to be understood aside from the warfare of
Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans. Worth
noting, however, is that the groundwork for Jefferson's side
was laid not by Jefferson himself, but by his friend and fellow
Virginian, James Madison.
It is to James Madison's
estrangement from his friend, Alexander Hamilton, that one
must go as a first step in plumbing the political passions of the
Elkins, Stanley and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 78.
5 Ibid, 19.
4
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1790's."6
Again, as I mentioned above, this conflict between Hamilton and
Madison boils down to, for Elkins and McKitrick, their respective
“Anglophilia” and “Anglophobia.” They argue Madison’s point of view
resulted from, first, what they term the “Virginia principle.”

This is a

contrasting way of thinking to the way Elkins and McKitrick ascribe to most
of the members of the Constitutional convention. Elkins and McKitrick’s
second influence on Madison’s point of view is the aforementioned
“Anglophobia.”
“This was an anglophobia that could make ‘England’ a word
capable of tainting almost anything. Few other individuals
were more propelled by it in all they thought, said, and did
than Jefferson and Madison, and nothing was more of a
constant than this same anglophobia in the hostility to
Hamiltonian Federalism, which depended for its very life on a
prosperous commerce with England, or to give body to the
wild francophilia – or ‘Gallomania’ as the Federalists sullenly
called it – that persisted throughout the 1790s.”7
In contrast, Hamilton’s “Anglophilia” they attribute to his having
grown up in a commercial environment, unlike Madison’s more agrarian
background.

His plans, so clearly outlined in his work as Treasury

Secretary, displayed his affinity for a more commercial vision for the
republic.
“A clear by-product of all this, for Alexander Hamilton, was
the makings of a very special attitude toward England. An
anglophile position on virtually everything was a basic
6
7

Ibid, 77.
Ibid, 27.
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component in what Hamilton would come to stand for
ideologically, and it would be of extraordinary importance in
the political divisions of the future.”8
So, with Elkins and McKitrick, we see an argument for the eventual
conflict between erstwhile friends Hamilton and Madison attributed to
different preferences regarding the United States’ relationship with Great
Britain. They hint at deeper preferences, though, such as different views
on the economy, but do not pursue them.

It is to one such deeper

preference this work is dedicated.
Lance Banning, in his The Sacred Fire of Liberty, also examines the
conflict between Hamilton and Madison.

Starting with Hamilton’s

attempts to understand the developing conflict between himself and
Madison, Banning argues that their views had never been exactly the
same, as Hamilton seemed to think at first.
“But Hamilton and Madison, as I have shown, had never really
shared ‘the same point of departure’; and Madison’s
positions in the years through 1789 were not what many
modern analysts have taken them to be.
Hamilton
misunderstood his colleague, and sharing some of Hamilton’s
assumptions, later analysts have often shared in his
misjudgment.”9
In contrast to other scholars who see a shift in Madison’s beliefs from
the 1780s to the 1790s, Banning argues for conflicting underlying
preferences between Hamilton and Madison all along regarding the

Ibid, 128
Banning, Lance, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the
Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 296.
8
9
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desirable extent of national power.
“Madison, as has been shown, had never been a ‘nationalist’
in Hamilton’s conception of that term. Even as he led the
nation through the framing and ratifcation of the Constitution,
he had also shown a lively fear of distant, independent rulers,
a fear he had displayed repeatedly during the 1780s. . . . In
the 1780s as in the 1790s, Hamilton’s most cherished object
was to build a modern nation-state. Madison’s fundamental
purpose was to nurture and defend a revolutionary order of
society and politics, which he regarded as profoundly
inconsistent with the policies that many economic nationalists
intended to pursue.”10
So, we see with Banning an explanation of the conflict between
Hamilton and Madison as based on different preferences regarding the
balance of power between the states and the national government,
which he argues were there all along, even during the time they worked
so closely together to get the Constitution they later could not agree on
how to interpret and carry into effect.
James H. Read, in his Power versus Liberty, focuses on the question
of power, and similarly to Banning, attributes the conflict between
Hamilton and Madison to different preferences as to where power should
reside in the United States.
“What Madison argued against – and believed he saw in
Hamilton’s rule of constitutional construction – was the use of
implied powers in a way that allowed the indefinite expansion
of governmental power. There is a difference between
implied powers and complete powers, and Madison’s
argument against the Bank hinges on this difference. Neither
those who drafted the Constitution nor the people when they
ratified it had clear ideas of the extent of the power it
10

Ibid, 296-297.
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granted. But they understood very clearly that the document
was not designed to allow indefinite expansion of the powers
of the national government.”11
I think Read’s analysis is enlightening because it focuses specifically
on different underlying preferences between Hamilton and Madison
regarding how to deal with the question of power itself, and compares
the two directly on this question.
“The key to understanding Hamilton’s views on power and
liberty and why he aroused such extraordinary fears among
his contemporaries is the fact that Hamilton made a basic
distinction between the liberty of citizens and the power of
states, while most of his opponents did not. He believed it
was possible greatly to expand the power of the national
government with respect to the states without upsetting the
ordinary balance between the power of government and the
liberty of citizens. But in a sovereignty contest between
national government and states, no such balance was
possible.”12
Forrest McDonald, in his Novus Ordo Seclorum, focuses on differing
underlying definitions of what a republic should be like, so his work is in
part similar to this dissertation.
“For example, Hamilton, who had inherited almost nothing,
was wont to define a republic as any government in which no
one had a hereditary status; whereas his friend Madison, who
had inherited the status of freeman amidst slavery and whose
blacks had inherited their status as slaves, preferred a
definition that would avoid the sticky question of status and
merely considered as republican any system in which
governmental power derived from the consent of the

Read, James H., Power versus Liberty: Madison, Hamilton, Wilson, and Jefferson
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 12.
12 Ibid, 15.
11

10

‘public.’”13
Like other scholars, McDonald describes Hamilton as a thinker more
in the vein of a political economist, while Madison is more of a political
theorist for him. McDonald points to this as being one of the sources of
their disagreement, in that they came to the subject of interpreting the
Constitution from different mindsets.
“There is a mystery here: despite their close collaboration in
1787-1788 and the many conversations on public matters
they had engaged in during that period, Hamilton and
Madison apparently never discussed at any length their
thoughts on political economy. When, in the period 17891791, the differences between them became overwhelmingly
obvious, both men were genuinely surprised.”14
McDonald argues Hamilton believed his plans would increase the
quality of human life in the new republic. Note the positive role McDonald
identifies in Hamilton’s ideas regarding the role of the national
government. For Hamilton, but not Madison, it is to the actions of the
national government that one can look for potential improvements in life
for United States citizens.
“The greatest benefits of a government-stimulated and
government-channeled system of free private enterprise for
profit, as Hamilton visualized things, were spiritual, not
economic – the enlargement of the range of human freedom
and the diversification of the possibilities for human
endeavor.”15

McDonald, Forrest, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 5.
14 Ibid, 135-136.
15 Ibid, 141
13
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Madison, on the other hand, was never, in McDonald’s view, as
sanguine regarding the role of the national government as Hamilton. It is
true he did want to increase the power of the federal government, but
not as much as Hamilton. McDonald attributes this to Hamilton not having
as close emotional ties with his adopted home state of New York as
Madison did with Virginia.
“The Madison of the 1780s, however, is generally
regarded as having been as solidly entrenched in the
nationalist camp as Hamilton was. This view of Madison as
ardent nationalist must be tempered by at least two major
sets of qualifications. One was that throughout his career on
the national stage, at least until Jefferson became president,
Madison was always mindful of the interests of his state and
was rarely if ever willing to do anything in the national interest
which he believed to be inconsonant with the interests of
Virginia. That alone repeatedly set him apart from such
nationalists as Gouverneur Morris, Hamilton, and Washington.
The other qualification to Madison’s nationalism was
that it was a matter of vital concern with him that the
national government be appropriately balanced and
checked, lest it become an engine of tyranny.”16
I have saved for last the works most similar to my own.

The

aforementioned works did not concentrate solely on Hamilton and
Madison, but included their disagreement as part of each one’s overall
work.

Colleen A. Sheehan’s 2004 American Political Science Review

article, “Madison v. Hamilton:

The Battle Over Republicanism and the

Role of Public Opinion,” does directly compare Hamilton and Madison,
taking their conflicting ideas as the main point of her work. However, she
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Ibid, 204
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does not compare them on a variety of points, as I propose for this
dissertation. Rather, she focuses on their conflicting views of the role of
public opinion in determining public policy.
“By 1801, and probably earlier, Hamilton recognized that
Madison’s opposition to him and the Federalists was
propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over
the nature and role of public opinion in a republic. Tied to
Madison’s and Hamilton’s differing perspectives on public
opinion were conflicting interpretations of the Constitution
and divergent visions of America’s economic future. These
disagreements between the two leading Publii shattered their
Roman alliance of 1787-88.”17
Sheehan argues Madison was far more in favor of ongoing input
from citizens, not just political elites, in determining public policy. Also,
though, she argues he was in favor of limiting the interpretation of the
Constitution to how those who ratified it thought of it at the time of
ratification.
“In Madison’s mind, the principle of popular sovereignty
meant the recognition of the supremacy of the Constitution,
understood and administered in a manner consistent with the
sense of the people who ratified and adopted it. It also
meant the ongoing sovereignty of public opinion, which
requires the active participation of the citizenry in the affairs
of the political community.”18
Hamilton had, Sheehan argues, a very different understanding of
the role of public opinion.

Following on his well-known concerns

regarding democratic forms of government, Hamilton wanted as little

Colleen A. Sheehan, “Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle Over Republicanism and the
Role of Public Opinion,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 3 (2004): 405 – 406.
18 Ibid, 406.
17
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ongoing, direct, participation by citizens in government. Rather, Sheehan
states, Hamilton wanted citizens to participate through expressing, or
withholding, their “confidence” in their elected leaders.
“Hamilton feared that the Republican agenda embraced the
naive democratic optimism of his age, that in fact it had
close connections across the seas to the ‘vain reveries of a
false and new fangled philosophy’ of the French
Enlightenment. In contrast, he advocated a less active, more
submissive role for the citizenry and a more energetic and
independent status for the executive and his administration.
For him, public opinion was the reflection of the citizens
‘confidence’ in government.”19
Another article which compares Hamilton and Madison on a
specific issue is Michael Schwarz’s “The Great Divergence Reconsidered:
Hamilton, Madison, and U.S. – British Relations, 1783-89.”

As the title

indicates, Schwarz compares the two on how they differed in regards to
dealing with Great Britain during the era of the Articles of Confederation.
Schwarz references the controversy which of the two, Hamilton or
Madison, had supposedly “abandoned” the other. Various authors have
taken the side of one or the other, but Schwarz argues that Madison had
good reason to consider that it was Hamilton who had abandoned him.
“Because Madison and Hamilton led the movement for
constitutional reform, and because the sorry state of foreign
affairs provided substantial impetus for that movement, it
seems reasonable that we should reassess the Great
Divergence of the 1790s by examining Madison and
Hamilton’s approach to Anglo-American relations in the
1780s. On this issue, at least, important evidence suggests
that in specific yet fundamental ways it was Hamilton, not
19

Ibid, 406.
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Madison, who reversed course.”20
Even though Madison and Hamilton had worked together on The
Federalist, it was only a few years after the ratification of the Constitution
that their differences became all-too-evident. Schwarz characterizes their
differences over how to deal with Great Britain as tied to their conflicting
estimations on either the utility, or danger, of the United States continuing
to have Great Britain as its primary trade partner.
“By the time the Wars of the French Revolution broke out in
1792, Hamilton and Madison had developed irreconcilable
views of America’s proper relationship to Great Britain. As
Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton saw in Britain a model of
stability and an invaluable trading partner, whose commerce
would provide a major source of revenue to support his
ambitious fiscal plans. Madison, on the other hand, had
come to view Britain as an enemy to republican liberty and
an implacable foe to American independence, which he
feared was threatened by Britain’s virtual monopoly over
American trade.
They had, however, arrived at these
differing views from much the same starting point.
Throughout the 1780s, Hamilton and Madison shared similar
concerns and offered similar solutions to every important
problem in Anglo-American relations.”21
Schwarz’s claim that Hamilton wanted to continue relations with
Great Britain as part of his economic goals for the United States is
plausible, but he does not offer any direct statement from Hamilton
himself to support it. Likewise, his estimation of Madison’s motivation is also
plausible, but he does not offer any statement from Madison himself

Michael Schwarz, “The Great Divergence Reconsidered: Hamilton, Madison, and U.S.British Relations, 1783-89,” Journal of the Early Republic 27, no. 3 (2007): 409.
21 Ibid, 410-411.
20
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either. So, for me, Schwarz’s characterization is indicative of the kind of
claim that needs more evidence before we can be truly confident it is
correct.
As is clear from this review of other work done, the sort of direct,
issue-by-issue comparison of Hamilton and Madison has not been done,
with the exception of Sheehan’s and Schwarz’s articles I just discussed.
This dissertation will expand the comparison of Hamilton and Madison into
new areas that have not been as fully explored as they will be here. This is
my original

contribution

to

the

literature

on

Hamilton, Madison,

Constitutional interpretation, and the early history of the United States
republic.
In Chapter One, I will review the history of the idea of a republic,
beginning with Polybius and continuing up until the time of Hamilton and
Madison. My approach follows, for the most part, the presentation from
J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment. My approach differs slightly
from his, though, in that I will include some individual thinkers he does not.
In Chapter Two I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of
slavery. As I will show, Hamilton was a documented opponent of slavery
since service in the Army during the Revolution. He also was active in the
New York Manumission society to the end of his life. Madison, on the other
hand, while he disliked slavery, and even expressed a desire to have as
little to do with it as possible, did not take any overt action to oppose
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slavery throughout his life. Only late in life did he offer a rather tepid
support for the idea of resettling voluntarily freed slaves in Africa. Also,
Hamilton did not display any bias towards blacks, considering them to be
to be just as competent as whites. He did not express any reservations or
fears regarding freed slaves living alongside other Americans. Madison,
though, was convinced to the end of his life that blacks and whites could
not life together successfully.
In Chapter Three I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue
of how the United States should position itself between the two major
powers of the early period of American history, France and Great Britain. I
will show how, rather than having an “Anglophilia,” as Elkins and McKitrick
describe him, Hamilton had a staunch focus on the well-being of the
United States.

He was concerned about the influence of both major

powers, and the influence of Europe in general, rather than having a
preference for one over the other. Madison, though, was more attached
to republicanism, as he understood it, than to France.

He supported

connections with France as a way of counterbalancing the influence of
Great Britain, but once France had left its experiment in republicanism
behind for the rule of Napoleon, he treated France no differently than any
other foreign country.
In Chapter Four I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of
Constitutional interpretation. I will show how their differences of opinion
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existed even during the time they worked together on The Federalist, as
Hamilton and Madison’s opinions, which I will document, during that time
showed sharply different expectations. Neither departed from the other in
later years, because neither understood they had conflicting views all
along. That they did not realize this only shows that they simply did not
have an in-depth discussion of their expectations for the future of the
United States.
In Chapter Five I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of
religion. Madison, as is well known, was an ardent defender of individual
religious freedom throughout his adult life. He did not express any strong
religious beliefs of his own at any point in his life. His focus was not on
personal piety, but rather on freedom from religion. He even tried to have
the protections from official religion in the United States Constitution
extended to limit the state governments as well during the time Congress
was writing the Bill of Rights. Hamilton was similarly not given to religious
expressions during most of his life, but he did show some religious
reflections when young and still living in the Caribbean. However, as he
aged, especially after leaving public office, he showed greater and
greater interest in religion. He expressed his thoughts on Christianity in
writing more and more during the late 1790s and early 1800s. Finally, as he
lay dying, he wanted to receive Communion.
In Chapter Six I will compare Hamilton and Madison on the issue of
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federal government involvement in the economy. Both showed their later
preferences before the Constitution was ratified, so again, neither
genuinely departed from the other in later years. Hamilton showed his
strong preference for government regulation of various aspects of the
economy all along, and Madison, while favoring regulation in some ways,
was nowhere near as eager to involve the federal, rather than state,
government in economic matters.
My

conclusion

will

focus

on

the

overall

implications

for

republicanism of the differing points of view Hamilton and Madison had.
As I mentioned above, there is no one definitive definition of the word
“republic,” and so what it means for the United States to be a republic has
been a source of constant debate throughout its history. The differences
Hamilton and Madison had will help highlight that debate, as both were
pivotal figures in the early history of the United States, and their influence
has continued to this day.

19

Chapter One: Definitions of a Republic From Other Authors
Since this dissertation is an examination of the idea of a republic
according to the preferences of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison,
I will dedicate this chapter to a discussion of the background to the idea
of a republic throughout history. In so doing, my approach is heavily
influenced by J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, although I will
include some figures he does not in my presentation.

Regardless of

whether they are all strictly within the historical development of
republican thought as it is currently understood, I argue the individuals I
include are worth discussing because Hamilton and Madison did not
concern themselves with the intellectual categories that we later
academics

use.

Their

thought

on

what

constituted

“proper”

republicanism drew on a wider range of influences.
As Pocock argues, though, the primary source for what we now
identify as republican thought, with its emphasis on a mixed constitution, is
Polybius and his The Histories.
“The sixth book of Polybius’ Histories, though it did not
become available in a language other than Greek until the
second decade of the sixteenth century, exercised so great
an influence on Renaissance ideas about politics in time that
it may be considered here as indicative of that age’s
fundamental conceptual problems.”22

Pocock, J.G.A., The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 77.
22
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As is well known, Polybius borrowed the idea for a mixed
constitution from Aristotle, but further elaborated on and expanded
Aristotle’s ideas. The whole point of positing a mixture of different political
systems was stability, at least one which would conceivably last longer
than any of the stages through which Polybius argues societies moved as
a matter of regular history.
“In the natural, spontaneous course of events, the first system
to arise is monarchy, and this is followed by kingship, but it
takes the deliberate correction of the defects of monarchy
for it to develop into kingship. Kingship changes into its
congenital vice – that is, into tyranny – and then it is the turn
of aristocracy, after the dissolution of tyranny. Aristocracy
necessarily degenerates into oligarchy, and when the
general populace get impassioned enough to seek redress
for the crimes committed by their leaders, democracy is born.
And in due course of time, once democracy turns to violating
and breaking the law, mob-rule arises and completes the
series.”23
Polybius’ cure for this endless cycle is once again the mixture of all
three types of government at its best, kingship, aristocracy, and
democracy, specifically exemplified by the Roman republic. The three
components, or building blocks, as Polybius called them, were the consuls,
which provided the kingship element, the senate, which provided the
aristocratic element, and the people, which provided the democratic
element.
“To a considerable extent, then, each of the three
components of the Roman constitution can harm or help the
Polybius, The Histories, trans. by Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
373.
23
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other two. This enables the whole made up of all three parts
to respond appropriately to every situation that arises, and
that is what makes it the best conceivable system of
government.”24
I will follow an historical approach to discussing the other authors
who followed in Polybius’ footsteps, so the next individual I have included
is Cicero, the Roman senator. He also discussed the possible types of
government as including monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.
“When, therefore, the supreme power is in the hands of one
man, we call that man a king and that form of government a
monarchy. When it is in the hands of certain selected
persons, the state is said to be ruled by the will of an
aristocracy. And a state is democratic – for that is the term
used – when all authority is in the hands of the people
themselves. Any one of these three forms of government,
while not, of course, perfect nor in my judgment the best, is
nevertheless a possible form of government, if the bond holds
which originally united its members in the social order of the
commonwealth; and one may be better than another.”25
Cicero does not posit the same cycle of governments as Polybius,
merely listing the options he sees as possible. However, he does argue
there is in fact a kind of government which is superior to any of these
three, and here we see a continuation of Polybius’ mixed model.
“There is, accordingly, a fourth kind of commonwealth which,
in my opinion, should receive the highest approval, since it is
formed by the combination, in due measure, of the three
forms of state which I described as original.”26
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Machiavelli, in The Discourses, also presents Polybius’ cycle without
specifically referring to him by name.

Humans originally select the

strongest man among them to rule, and thus begins the cycle through
kingship, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, anarchy, and then
begin the cycle all over again. However, there is a kind of government
that is better than any of these by itself.
“I say, then, that all kinds of government are defective; those
three which we have qualified as good because they are too
short-lived, and the three bad ones because of their inherent
viciousness. Thus sagacious legislators, knowing the vices of
each of these systems of government by themselves, have
chosen one that should partake of all of them, judging that to
be the most stable and solid. In fact, when there is combined
under the same constitution a prince, a nobility, and the
power of the people, then these three powers will watch and
keep each other reciprocally in check.”27
Machiavelli argues the origin of this especially worthwhile form of
government comes from a gifted legislator, who sets up laws which
thereafter are complied with throughout subsequent generations.
Machiavelli,

one

such legislator

was

Lycurgus,

whose

model

For
of

government for Sparta lasted for centuries. Even though Rome did not
have any such individual legislator, though, it nevertheless developed the
type of government of which Machiavelli approves.
“But let us come to Rome. Although she had no legislator like
Lycurgus, who constituted her government, at her very origin,
in a manner to secure her liberty for a length of time, yet the
disunion which existed between the Senate and the people
Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince and the Discourses, trans. by Luigi Ricci, revised by
E.R.P. Vincent (New York: The Modern Library, 1950), 114-115.
27
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produced such extraordinary events, that chance did for her
what the laws had failed to do. Thus, if Rome did not attain
the first degree of happiness, she at least had the second.
Her first institutions were doubtless defective, but they were
not in conflict with the principles that might bring her to
perfection.”28
Returning to Pocock, he argues the “glue,” if you will, of this
preferred, mixed form of government, according to Machiavelli, is virtue.
Just having the structural elements of a monarchical element, an
aristocratical element, and a democratical element, are not enough.
What is needed in addition is, specifically, “civic” virtue, in order for such
republics to succeed.
“The republic or polity was in yet another sense a structure of
virtue: it was a structure in which every citizen’s ability to
place the common good before his own was the
precondition of every other’s, so that every man’s virtue
saved every other’s from that corruption part of whose timedimension was fortuna.
The republic was therefore a
structure whose organizing principle was something far more
complex and positive than custom.”29
Pocock ascribes the importation of Machiavellian republican
influence into England to the political conflict which led to that nation’s
Civil War. Instead of monarchical and feudal ideas, some allowance was
held to be needed for the other sources of political power, namely the
aristocracy and the people. Pocock identifies the crucial step as having
been taken by Charles 1’s advisors.
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“On 21 June 1642, with about two months to go before the
formal beginnings of civil war, two of Charles 1’s advisors –
Viscount Falkland and Sir John Colepeper – drafted, and
persuaded him to issue, a document in which the King, not
Parliament, took the step of declaring England a mixed
government rather than a condescending monarchy. His
Majesty’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses
of Parliament . . . is a crucial document in English political
thought, and among other things one of a series of keys
which opened the door to Machiavellian analysis.
In
essence, it asserts that the government of England is vested in
three estates, the King, the lords, and the commons, and that
the health and the very survival of the system depend upon
maintenance of the balance between them.”30
While he is not included among the authors Pocock discusses, I am
including Thomas Hobbes because of his undisputed place in the
development of English, and thus later American, political thought.
Hobbes also identifies three main types of government, monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy. However, for Hobbes, the most important
goal for any form of government, is not virtue as with Machiavelli, but
rather peace and security.
“The difference between these three kindes of Commonwealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the
difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the
Peace, and Security of the people; for which end they were
instituted.”31
For Hobbes, the kind of government whose end result is most clearly
the peace and security of the people, is in fact monarchy.

Hobbes

argues that the interest of the monarch is the same as that of the country
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as a whole, and thus monarchy is best suited to creating the hoped-for
outcomes of peace and security.
“From whence it follows, that where the publique and private
interest are most closely united, there is the publique most
advanced. Now, in Monarchy, the private interest is the
same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a
Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation
of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor
secure; whose subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or
too weak through want, or dissension, to maintain a war
against their enemies:
Whereas in a Democracy, or
Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to
the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as
doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action,
or a Civill warre.”32
It is with James Harrington, however, who Pocock does identify as
being clearly within the republican tradition, that we begin to receive
even more details regarding what a republic should be like, more than just
having a mixed government. For Harrington, land ownership, and also
possession of weapons, is vital.
“But the tillage, bringing up a good soldiery, bringeth up a
good commonwealth . . . for where the owner of the plough
comes to have the sword too, he will use it in defence of his
own, whence it hath happened that the people of Oceana,
in proportion to their property, have always been free, and
the genius of this nation hath ever had some resemblance
with that of ancient Italy, which was wholly addicted unto
commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the
greatest account of her rustic tribes and to call her consuls
from the plough.”33
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It is this ownership of land, though, which specifically provides for
Harrington the means of balancing power within a commonwealth.
Rather

than

relying

solely

on

civic

virtue,

having

a

successful

commonwealth means the otherwise weakest of the three, the people,
have sufficient land to counteract the power of the other two.
“And if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so
divided among them, that no one man, or number of men,
within the compass of the few or aristocracy, overbalance
them, the empire without the interposition of force is a
commonwealth.”34
Furthermore, Harrington defines “popular government” as the best,
because it best approximates what human beings can accomplish
through the use of their reason.
“Mankind then must either be less just than the creature, or
acknowledge also his common interest to be common right.
And if reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of
mankind be the right interest, then the reason of mankind
must be right reason. Now compute well, for if the interest of
popular government come the nearest unto the interest of
mankind, then the reason of popular government must come
the nearest unto right reason.”35
But what, exactly, kind of “popular government” did Harrington
intend in The Commonwealth of Oceana? Not only does his ideal form of
government rely on widespread land ownership, armed commoners, and
a mixed government, it also specifically includes voting rights. Missing are
references to a hereditary monarchy, or a hereditary aristocracy as well.
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“An equal commonwealth by that which hath been said is a
government established upon an equal agrarian, arising into
the superstructures or three orders, the senate debating and
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy
executing by an equal rotation through the suffrage of the
people given by the ballot.”36
John Locke is another author who, like Thomas Hobbes, is not
included among those considered by Pocock to be within the republican
tradition. Nevertheless, any discussion of background influences on early
Americans such as Hamilton and Madison would be incomplete without
noting his contributions.
To begin, Locke of course argues that organized societies come
into being through the consent of the people who constitute them, in
order to better protect their “liberty and property.” For Locke, there are
specific goals people have in mind when they make the choice to live
together rather than apart. Those goals limit the range of actions any
government the people choose to create can take on its own. Moreover,
the primary part of government for Locke is in fact the legislature which is
the first thing created.
“THE great end of mens entering into Society, being the
enjoyment of the Properties in Peace and Safety, and the
great instrument and means of that being the Laws
established in that Society; the first and fundamental positive
Law of all Common-wealths, is the establishing of the
Legislative Power; as the first and fundamental natural law.”37
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Not only is the form of government chosen by the people who
choose to create it limited in what it can do, the people who created it
can change the government itself if they so choose.
“. . . there remains still in the People a Supream Power to
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative
act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”38
Furthermore, the government itself can even be removed if that is
felt to be necessary.
“There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby
Governments are dissolved, and that is; when the Legislative,
or the Prince, either of them act contrary to their Trust.”39
Algernon Sidney, writing, like Locke, in response to Sir Robert Filmer’s
Patriarcha, makes arguments quite similar to Locke’s in regards to the
origins and limited powers of government. His arguments do include the
notion of “justice” in the forming of governments, though.
“The liberty of one is thwarted by that of another; and whilst
they are all equal, none will yield to any, otherwise than by a
general consent. This is the ground of all just governments; for
violence or fraud can create no right; and the same consent
gives the form to them all, how much soever they differ from
each other.”40
The purpose of creating government, according to Sidney, is justice,
and those who are given power under any form of government, are there
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to carry out justice. Justice is the good of the society, not of any one
individual or group within that society.
“‘Tis lawful therefore for any such bodies to set up one, or a
few men to govern them, or to retain the power in
themselves; and he or they who are set up, having no other
power but what is conferred upon them by that multitude,
whether great or small, are truly by them made what they
are; and by the law of their own creation, are to exercise
those powers according to the proportion, and to the ends
for which they were given.”41
Sidney does give pride of place to mixed government as being the
best of all possible choices.
“And if I should undertake to say, there never was a good
government in the world, that did not consist of the three
simple species of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, I
think I might make it good.”42
Like Locke, Sidney clearly states that governments can be changed
as desired.
“. . . whilst the foundation and principle of a government
remains good, the superstructures may be changed
according to occasions, without any prejudice to it.”43
Sidney’s main concern is with “corruption,” which, even if a
government is initially set up well, can cause its decline into despotism.
Corruption for Sidney is ultimately reliance on the monarch for one’s
income, since it is in absolute monarchies that corruption inevitably
occurs.
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“This being the state of the matter on both sides, we may
easily collect, that all governments are subject to corruption
and decay; but with this difference, that absolute monarchy
is by principle led unto, or rooted in it; whereas mixed or
popular governments are only in a possibility of falling into it:
As the first cannot subsist, unless the prevailing part of the
people be corrupted; the other must certainly perish, unless
they be preserved in a great measure free from vices: and I
doubt whether any better reason can be given, why there
have been and are more monarchies than popular
governments in the world, than that nations are more easily
drawn into corruption than defended from it; and I think that
monarchy can be said to be natural in no other sense, than
that our depraved nature is most inclined to that which is
worst.”44
This need for virtue in Sidney’s thought does reveal a conflict within
his argument.
governments

At one point he admits that aristocratically-rooted
are

less

subject

to

corruption

that

popular,

or

democratically-rooted governments.
“If it be said, that those governments in which the
democratical part governs most, do more frequently err in the
choice of men or of the means of preserving that purity of
manners which is required for the well-being of a people,
than those wherein aristocracy prevails; I confess it.”45
However, just sentences later, he extols the virtues of democracy as
the form of government most likely to be the best one possible.
“. . . and of all governments, democracy, in which every
man’s liberty is least restrained, because every man hath an
equal part, would certainly prove to be the most just, rational
and natural;”46
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Be that as it may, Sidney’s goal in Discourses Concerning
Government is to argue against absolute monarchies, because they are
the most unjust possible form of government.

Power comes from the

people, not from divine right. Power proceeds upwards from the people
to their magistrates, and does not descend from a divinely appointed
monarch.
“. . . I take liberty to say, that whereas there is no form
appointed by God or nature, those governments only can be
called just, which are established by the consent of nations.
These nations may at the first set up popular or mixed
governments, and without the guilt of sedition introduce them
afterwards, if that which was first established prove
unprofitable or hurtful to them; and those that have done so,
have enjoy’d more justice in times of peace, and managed
wars, when occasion requir’d, with more virtue and better
success, than any absolute monarchies have done.”47
Sidney was a martyr to other Whigs, especially the later “True Whig”
writers who were so influential with the leaders of the American
Revolution. His Discourses Concerning Government were the source of
ideas which revolutionary leaders across the colonies called upon to justify
their complaints regarding the actions of Parliament and King.

Some

passages of his need only be mentioned to show the influence of his
thought.
“But those who seek after truth, will easily find, that there can
be no such thing in the world as the rebellion of a nation
against its own magistrates, and that rebellion is not always
evil.”48
47
48
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This passage also needs no further comment in regards to not only
the ideas, but the actions taken, by leaders of the American Revolution.
“But tho every private man singly taken be subject to the
commands of the magistrate, the whole body of the people
is not so; for he is by and for the people, and the people is
neither by nor for him.
The obedience due to him from
private men is grounded upon, and measured by the general
law; and that law regarding the welfare of the people,
cannot set up the interest of one or a few men against the
puclick. The whole body therefore of a nation cannot be tied
to any other obedience than is consistent with the common
good, according to their own judgment: and having never
been subdued or brought to terms of peace with their
magistrates, they cannot be said to revolt or rebel against
them to whom they owe no more than seems good to
themselves, and who are nothing of or by themselves, more
than other men.”49
Montesquieu, as has been demonstrated by Donald Lutz50, was
cited a comparable number of times as John Locke during the 1760’s and
1770’s (15 vs. 18), and his influence on the separation of powers debate
clearly justifies his inclusion here.

Montesquieu identifies a somewhat

different set of possible governments than do the other authors I have thus
far discussed.
“There are three kinds of government:
REPUBLICAN,
MONARCHICAL, and DESPOTIC. To discover the nature of
each, the idea of them held by the least educated of men is
sufficient. I assume three definitions, or rather, three facts:
one, republican government is that in which the people as a
body, or only a part of the people, have sovereign power;
ibid, 519.
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monarchical government is that in which one alone governs,
but by fixed and established laws; whereas, in despotic
government, one alone, without law and without rule, draws
everything along by his will and his caprices.”51
Notice his inclusion of both democracy and aristocracy under the
label of republic, and his definition of a monarchy as one which abides by
laws, which is what distinguishes it from the rule of a despot.

Also,

Montesquieu distinguishes between the “nature” of a type of government
and its “principle.”
“There is this difference between the nature of the
government as its principle: its nature is that which makes it
what it is, and its principle, that which makes it act. The one is
its particular structure, and the other is the human passions
that set it in motion.”52
The particular principle that both democratic republics and
aristocratic republics need is “virtue,” although Montesquieu argues
aristocracies need it less than democracies.
“Just as there must be virtue in popular government, there
must also be virtue in the aristocratic one. It is true that it is
not as absolutely required.”53
Montesquieu goes into considerable detail to specify just what kind
of virtue he argues is necessary for a democratic republic to exist.
“One can define this virtue as love of the laws and the
homeland. This love, requiring a continuous preference of
the public interest over one’s own, produces all the individual
virtues; they are only that preference.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. by Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn
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This love is singularly connected with democracies. In
them alone, government is entrusted to each citizen. Now
government is like all things in the world; in order to preserve
it, one must love it.”54
Montesquieu also provides, and argues in favor of, a specific
definition of “liberty” as part of his presentation of what a government is
like when people have a country in which they can enjoy liberty. First of
all, liberty does “not” mean just doing whatever one chooses to do:
“It is true that in democracies the people seem to do
what they want, but political liberty in no way consists in
doing what one wants. In a state, that is, in a society where
there are laws, liberty can consist only having the power to
do what one should want to do and in no way being
constrained to do what one should not want to do.
One must put oneself in mind of what independence is
and what liberty is. Liberty is the right to do everything the
laws permit; and if one citizen could do what they forbid, he
would no longer have liberty because the others would
likewise have this same power.”55
Montesquieu does not automatically assign political liberty to
republics or democracies. In fact, he states that quite often republics and
democracies are less free than monarchies. This is due to his insistence
that the exercise of power by any one person or group be constrained, or
checked, by the power of other people or other groups.
“Democracy and aristocracy are not free states by
their nature. Political liberty is found only in moderate
governments. But it is not always in moderate states. It is
present only when power is not abused, but it has eternally
been observed that any man who has power is led to abuse
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it; he continues until he finds limits. Who would think it? Even
virtue has need of limits.
So that one cannot abuse power, power must check
power by the arrangement of things. A constitution can be
such that no one will be constrained to do the things the law
does not oblige him to do or be kept from doing the things
the law permits him to do.”56
Most countries, according to Montesquieu, did not have political
liberty as their purpose, not even the Italian republics of his day. The only
country he considered as having political liberty as its purpose was Great
Britain, because there political power was divided between different
branches of government. The influence of this distinction on the United
States Constitution and its division of power between executive, legislative
and judicial powers is of course well known.
“In each state there are three sorts of powers:
legislative power, executive power over the things depending
on the right of nations, and executive power over the things
depending on civil right. . . . Political liberty in a citizen is that
tranquility of spirit which comes from the opinion each one
has of his security, and in order for him to have this liberty the
government must be such that one citizen cannot fear
another citizen.
When legislative power is united with executive power
in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there
is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or
senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them
tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not
separate from legislative power and from executive power. . .
. All would be lost if the same man or the same body of
principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised
these three powers:
that of making the laws, that of
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executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or
the disputes of individuals.”57
David Hume, even though his role was more that of a foil than of a
source of inspiration because of his support for the monarchy and his
preference for tradition rather than innovation, nevertheless was a widely
read, and even cited, author during the early decades of the United
States, as again Donald Lutz has shown.58

Even though Hume was

hesitant to recommend any changes to political institutions, he
nevertheless did ponder the possibility of exploring the idea of an ideal
form of government against which current forms could be compared so
as to provide a kind of model for alterations.
“First, a legislature is essential, but not a unicameral legislature:
All free governments must consist of two councils, lesser and
greater; or, in other words, of a senate and people. The
people, as HARRINGTON observes, would want wisdom,
without the senate: The senate, without the people, would
want honesty.”59
Interestingly, Hume precedes later individuals such as Madison in
arguing that it is possible to extend a republic over a large country. In
fact, Hume argues that if done properly, a large republic would have
distinct advantages over a small one.
“We shall conclude this subject, with observing the falsehood
of the common opinion, that no large state, such as FRANCE
ibid, 156-157.
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or GREAT BRITAIN, could ever be modelled into a
commonwealth, but that such a form of government can
only take place in a city or small territory. The contrary seems
probable. Though it is more difficult to form a republican
government in an extensive country than in a city; there is
more facility, when once it is formed, of preserving it steady
and uniform, without tumult and faction.”60
In fact, Hume argues that such large countries are precisely the sort
in which one can, slowly and cautiously to be sure, approach more
refined and perhaps even ideal forms of government.
“In a large government, which is modelled with masterly skill,
there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy,
from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first
elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the
higher magistrates, who direct all the movements.”61
I conclude this discussion with an examination of John Trenchard
and Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters, which antedated the American
Revolution by only a few decades. That Cato’s Letters was widely read,
appreciated, and used by the leaders of the American Revolution is
already well known.

They also, like others before mentioned, locate

ultimate power in the people at large.
“The first Principles of Power are in the People; and all the
Projects of Men in Power ought to refer to the People, to aim
solely at their Good, and end in it: And whoever will pretend
to govern them without regarding them, will soon repent it.”62
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The only form of government that can be called good according to
Trenchard and Gordon is the one which aims at the common good,
rather than the good of one or of a few.
“Dominion that is not maintained by the Sword, must be
maintained by Consent; and in this latter Case, what Security
can any Man at the Head of Affairs expect, but from pursuing
the People’s Welfare, and seeking their good Will? The
Government of One for the Sake of One, is Tyranny; and so is
the Government of a Few for the Sake of Themselves: But the
Government executed for the Good of All, and with the
Consent of All, is Liberty; and the Word (Government) is
prophaned, and its Meaning abused, when it signifies any
Thing else.”63
The only form of government which does actively seek the good of
all is the government that dutifully represents all of the people. That form
of government is the mixed constitution, because it in turn represents the
people at large, the aristocracy, and the monarchy, all at the same time
rather than any one at a time.
“But, Thanks be to Heaven and our worthy Ancestors, our
Liberties are better secured. We have a Constitution, in which
the People have a large Share: They are one part of the
Legislature, and have the sole Power of giving Money; which
includes in it every thing that they can ask for the publick
Good; and the Representatives, being neither awed nor
bribed, will always act for the Country’s Interest; their own
being so interwoven with the People’s Happiness, that they
must stand and fall together.”64
Any form of good government must also be one in which the laws
are the ultimate power. Rule of law, rather than rule by any one person or
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group, is for Trenchard and Gordon an essential aspect of the good
government the people of Great Britain enjoy.
“Power is like Fire; it warms, scorches, or destroys, according
as it is watched, provoked, or increased. It is as dangerous as
useful. Its only Rule is the Good of the People; but because it
is apt to break its Bounds, in all good Governments nothing, or
as little as may be, ought to be left to Chance, or the Humors
of Men in Authority: All should proceed by fixed and stated
Rules; and upon any Emergency, new Rules should be made.
This is the Constitution, and this the Happiness of Englishmen,
as has been formerly shewn at large in these Letters.”65
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Chapter Two: Hamilton and Madison on Slavery
I will now compare Hamilton and Madison on a variety of issues,
beginning with slavery.

I have chosen this issue because slavery was

spoken of by both over several decades of their lives, and each took a
quite different approach in responding to the problem of slavery. Neither
Hamilton nor Madison was actually in favor of slavery, but as I will show,
Hamilton was far more active in opposing slavery, and even seeking its
discontinuation, while Madison was much more equivocal in his response.
Madison did not speak out publicly in favor of ending slavery until near
the end of his life, while Hamilton took a far more active, public role as
early as during the Revolutionary War.
From Hamilton we will see an effort during the Revolution, along
with his friend and fellow Army officer Henry Laurens, to actively recruit
slaves for the Army, and offer them their freedom in exchange for service.
He simply did not think that slaves were either better or worse than other
ordinary people. That he maintained this point of view throughout the
remainder of his life we will clearly see by his extremely active involvement
in the New York Manumission Society up until the time of his duel with
Aaron Burr.
Madison, on the other hand, even though as we will see, found the
idea of freeing slaves in exchange for military service a good idea, he
never adopted an active role in ridding the United States of slavery. Only
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late in life did he even half-heartedly “recommend” an effort to resettle
slaves who had been voluntarily freed back in Africa.

Indeed, he

remained convinced throughout his life that blacks and whites could not
peacefully and successfully coexist in the United States.
Lance Banning speculates that, even though Madison did not take
action to end slavery during most of his life, he was nevertheless guiltridden by its existence.

Furthermore, Banning argues Madison was

especially troubled by his own involvement in its continuation.
“Madison was fully conscious of the wickedness of slavery,
probably from the beginning of the war. Throughout his life and with increasing guilt - he thought of it as an abomination
absolutely incompatible with his ideals. Nevertheless, through
forty years of active public service, he refused to risk his
usefulness in other urgent causes by identifying with the more
outspoken, active critics of the institution; and he never freed
himself from daily, intimate involvement with the evil.
Attended by a body servant even when he traveled to the
North, he willed his chattels to his wife and hoped in his
retirement that a voluntary, gradual emancipation could be
speeded by permitting slavery's diffusion to the West.
Trapped by his belief that whites wouldn’t permit equality for
blacks and that the former slaves would be impoverished and
dangerous in a state of partial freedom, he could do no
more, in his old age, than to commit his waning energies and
great prestige to the leadership of the American Colonization
Society. Slavery clamped its fetters even on his mind.”66
In a similar manner, Ron Chernow speculates about the influence of
Hamilton’s childhood on his perception of slavery, arguing it was the
Banning, Lance, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the
Federal Republic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995, 83.
66
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memories of growing up in the midst of slavery in the Caribbean and
seeing its horrors first-hand that made him an opponent.
“The memories of his West Indian childhood left Hamilton with
a settled antipathy to slavery. During the war, Hamilton had
supported John Laurens' futile effort to emancipate southern
slaves who fought for independence. He had expressed an
unwavering belief in the genetic equality of blacks and
whites - unlike Jefferson, for instance, who regarded blacks as
innately inferior - that was enlightened for his day. And he
knew this from his personal boyhood experience.”67
The problem with both Banning’s and Chernow’s arguments is not
their lack of plausibility, but rather that neither actually provides
documentation

showing

where

Hamilton

or

Madison

specifically

expressed the sentiment Banning and Chernow attribute to them. Yes, as
I will include below, Madison did express a desire to have as little to do
with slavery himself, but nowhere did he express the guilt Banning
mentions. Likewise, Chernow does not point to a statement by Hamilton
himself identifying the origin of his opposition to slavery as coming from his
childhood.
Now, we do know Hamilton clearly opposed slavery from at least
the time of the Revolutionary War, because he stated such in his
correspondence. So, while the points Banning and Chernow raise might
be valid, I argue it is better to rely on what both Hamilton and Madison
actually wrote for their views on the subject of slavery.
67
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Clearly, Hamilton did not believe Africans were inferior to
Europeans. He unequivocally said so as part of the plan he and his friend,
Lt. Colonel Henry Laurens developed to organize battalions of slave
soldiers, who would as a result of their service gain their freedom.
“Colonel Laurens, who will have the honor of delivering
you this letter, is on his way to South Carolina, on a project,
which I think, in the present situation of affairs there, is a very
good one and deserves every kind of support and
encouragement. This is to raise two three or four batalions of
negroes; with the assistance of the government of that state,
by contributions from the owners in proportion to the number
they possess. . . .
It appears to me, that an expedient of this kind, in the
present state of Southern affairs, is the most rational, that can
be adopted, and promises very important advantages.
Indeed, I can hardly see how a sufficient force can be
collected in that quarter without it; and the enemy's
operations there are growing infinitely serious and formidable.
I have not the least doubt, that the negroes will make very
excellent soldiers, with proper management; and I will
venture to pronounce, that they cannot be put in better
hands than those of Mr. Laurens. He has all the zeal,
intelligence, enterprise, and every other qualification requisite
to succeed in such an undertaking. It is a maxim with some
great military judges, that with sensible officers soldiers can
hardly be too stupid; . . . I mention this, because I frequently
hear it objected to the scheme of embodying negroes that
they are too stupid to make soldiers. This is so far from
appearing to me a valid objection that I think their want of
cultivation (for their natural faculties are probably as good as
ours) joined to that habit of subordination which they acquire
from a life of servitude, will make them sooner become
soldiers than our White inhabitants. Let officers be men of
sense and sentiment, and the nearer the soldiers approach to
machines perhaps the better.
I foresee that this project will have to combat much
opposition from prejudice and self-interest. The contempt we
have been taught to entertain for the blacks, makes us fancy
many things that are founded neither in reason nor
experience; and an unwillingness to part with property of so
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valuable a kind will furnish a thousand arguments to show the
impracticability or pernicious tendency of a scheme which
requires such a sacrifice. But it should be considered, that if
we do not make use of them in this way, the enemy probably
will; and that the best way to counteract the temptations
they will hold out will be to offer them ourselves. An essential
part of the plan is to give them their freedom with their
muskets. This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage,
and I believe will have a good influence upon those who
remain, by opening a door to their emancipation. This
circumstance, I confess, has no small weight in inducing me
to wish the success of the project; for the dictates of humanity
and true policy equally interest me in favour of this
unfortunate class of men.”68
I realize this is a lengthy quote, but since I am basing my arguments
entirely on what both Hamilton and Madison actually wrote, in this
instance its length is necessary.

Here, we see clearly Hamilton’s

enthusiasm for a way of at least reducing the number of slaves in the
United States, in part to make use of their services instead of the British, his
clear opinion that Africans are not inferior to Europeans, and finally his
emotional preference for the removal of slavery.
Madison also thought it a good idea to offer freedom to slaves in
exchange for military service during the Revolution.
“I am glad to find the legislature persist in their resolution to
recruit their line of the army for the war, though without
deciding on the expediency of the mode under their
consideration, would it not be as well to liberate and make
soldiers at once of the blacks themselves as to make them
instruments for enlisting white Soldiers? It wd. certainly be
more consonant to the principles of liberty which ought never
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob Ed. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, volume II: 1779-1781. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 17-19.
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to be lost sight of in a contest for liberty, and with white
officers & a majority of white soldrs. no imaginable danger
could be feared from themselves, as there certainly could be
none from the effect of the example on those who should
remain in bondage:
experience having shown that a
freedman immediately loses all attachment & sympathy with
his former fellow slaves.”69
As I mentioned above, Madison did express a desire to distance
himself from slavery, at least in his personal life.
“My wish is if possible to provide a decent & independent
subsistence, without encountering the difficulties which I
foresee in that line. Another of my wishes is to depend as little
as possible on the labour of slaves.
The difficulty of
reconciling these views, has brought into my thoughts several
projects from which advantage seemed attainable.”70
Nevertheless, he continued to make use of slaves, even when away
from home, where he had numerous slaves working in various capacities
on his plantation. Concerning a slave that had run away, and a slave
currently in his service, he stated in a letter to his father:
“The enquiries which I have at different times made of Billey
concerning Anthony satisfy me that he either knows, or will tell
nothing of the matter. It does not appear to me probable
that all the circumstances mentioned by Anthony with regard
to his rambles can be true. Besides other objections which
occur, there seems to have been scarcely time for all the trips
which he pretends to have made. I have not communicated
to John the suspicions entertained of him. Whilst he remains
in my service it will be well for him to suppose that he has my
Hutchinson, William T., and William M.E. Rachal, eds., The Papers of James Madison,
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confidence, and that he has a character staked on his good
behaviour. He has been very attentive & faithful to me as
yet, particularly since I left VIrginia. His misbehaviour in
Fredericksbg. was followed by some serious reprehensions, &
threats from me, which have never lost their effect.”71
One of his reasons for not actively seeking the end of slavery was
the Union of all the states was more important than ending slavery. Since
some states were implacable on the subject of emancipation, he placed
the maintenance and continuation of the United States as a whole above
any effort at ending slavery.
“I should conceive this clause to be impolitic, if it were one of
those things which could be excluded without encountering
greater evils. The southern states would not have entered
into the union of America, without the temporary permission
of that trade. And if they were excluded from the union, the
consequences might be dreadful to them and to us.”72
Also:
“Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the union would be
worse. If those states should disunite from the other states, for
not indulging them in the temporary continuance of this
traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid from foreign
powers.”73
Madison was, however, never actively in favor of extending the
slave trade any longer than necessary.
Constitution,

specifically

prohibited

Article 1, Section 9 of the

Congress

from

outlawing

the
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importation of slaves until 1808, but it did allow Congress to impose a tax
on such importation in the meantime. In a speech on the floor of the
House of Representatives, he said:
“I conceive the constitution in this particular, was formed in
order that the government, whilst it was restrained from laying
a total prohibition, might be able to give some testimony of
the sense of America, with respect to the African trade. We
have liberty to impose a tax or duty upon the importation of
such persons as any of the states now existing shall think
proper to admit; and this liberty was granted, I presume, upon
two considerations - the first was, that until the time arrived
when they might abolish the importation of slaves, they might
have an opportunity of evidencing their sentiments, on the
policy and humanity of such a trade; the other was that they
might be taxed in due proportion with other articles imported;
for if the possessor will consider them as property, of course
they are of value, and ought to be paid for.”74
And:
“I do not wish to say anything harsh, to the hearing of
gentlemen who entertain different sentiments from me, or
different sentiments from those I represent; but if there is any
one point in which it is clearly the policy of this nation, so far
as we constitutionally can, to vary the practice obtaining
under some of the state governments it is this; therefore, upon
principle, we ought to discountenance it as far as is in our
power.”75
Further, Madison added one of his reasons for opposing the
continuance of the slave trade, that it would weaken the national security
of not just the slave states, but of the United States as a whole. Thus,
Hobson, Charles F., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 12: 2 March 1789
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rather than being a states’ rights issue regarding their internal police,
further importation of slaves was a threat to the entire United States, and
given the federal government’s requirement in the Constitution to protect
each and every state from invasion, this issue became one proper for the
federal government to take action on. It would have been interesting to
see the effect of this if he had been a more public advocate of the effect
of slavery on national security overriding states’ rights.
“If I was not afraid of being told that the representatives of
the several states, are the best able to judge of what is
proper and conducive to their particular prosperity, I should
venture to say that it is as much the interest of Georgia and
South Carolina, as of any in the union. Every addition they
receive to their number of slaves, tends to weaken them and
renders them less capable of self defence; in case of
hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of
inviting attack instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary
duty of the general government to protect every part of the
empire against danger, as well internal as external; every
thing therefore which tends to encrease this danger, though it
may be a local affair, yet if it involves national expence or
safety, becomes of concern to every part of the union, and is
a proper subject for the consideration of those charged with
the general administration of the government.”76
This is a point both Hamilton and Madison had made during the
Revolutionary War, and both remembered those lessons learned in their
later political careers. As students of the later American Civil War have
demonstrated, the large slave population was at first a drag on the
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Confederacy’s war efforts, because so many potential troops had to be
kept at home rather than on the front lines in order to keep slaves under
control, but later freed slaves provided essential services, both under arms
and in other ways, to the Union army. Clearly, this issue is one on which
both Hamilton and Madison were prescient, but not in the way either
expected.
Madison did entertain the idea of a more voluntary form of
emancipation through the settlement of freed slaves in Africa, primarily
because he did not think people of European descent would ever
genuinely accept those of African descent. He simply did not believe
they could co-exist, in stark contrast to Hamilton. The only option he ever
supported, at least in theory, was colonization.
“Without enquiring into the practicability or the most proper
means of establishing a Settlement of freed blacks on the
Coast of Africa, it may be remarked as one motive to the
benevolent experiment that if such an asylum was provided,
it might prove a great encouragement to manumission in the
Southern parts of the U.S. and even afford the best hope yet
presented of putting an end to the slavery in which not less
than 600,000 unhappy negroes are now involved.”77
And:
“In order to render this change eligible as well to the
Society as to the Slaves, it would be necessary that a
compleat incorporation of the latter into the former should
Hobson, Charles F., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 12: 2 March 1789
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result from the act of manumission. This is rendered impossible
by the prejudices of the Whites, prejudices which proceeding
principally from the difference of colour must be considered
as permanent and insuperable.
It only remains then that some proper external
receptacle be provided for the slaves who obtain their liberty.
The interior wilderness of America, and the Coast of Africa
seem to present the most obvious alternative. The former is
liable to great if not invincible objections. If the settlement
were attempted at a considerable distance from the White
frontier, it would be destroyed by the Savages who have a
peculiar antipathy to the blacks: If the attempt were made in
the neighbourhood of the White Settlements, peace would
not long be expected to remain between Societies,
distinguished by such characteristic marks, and retaining the
feelings inspired by their former relation of oppressors &
oppressed. The result then is that an experiment for providing
such an external establishment for the blacks as might induce
the humanity of Masters, and by degrees both the humanity
& policy of the Governments, to forward the abolition of
slavery in America, ought to be pursued on the Coast of
Africa or in some other foreign situation.”78
As I have mentioned above, Madison was equivocal on the issue of
slavery throughout his life. He clearly did not approve of slavery itself, but
was not convinced, as Hamilton was, that it was possible to both end
slavery and have former slaves live peacefully alongside former slave
owners and others of European descent.

In contrast to active slave

advocates, however, he emphatically did not believe slavery to be in any
way a good influence on society.
“The Petitions on the subject of Slavery have employed more
78
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than a week, and are still before the Committee of the whole.
The Gentlemen from S. Carolina & Georgia are intemperate
beyond all example and even all decorum. They are not
content with palliating slavery as a deep-rooted abuse, but
plead for the lawfulness of the African trade itself - nor with
protesting agst. the object of the Memorials, but lavish the
most virulent language on the authors of them. If this folly did
not reproach the public councils, it ought to excite no regret
in the patrons of Humanity & freedom. Nothing could hasten
more the progress of those reflections & sentiments which are
secretly undermining the institution which this mistaken zeal is
laboring to secure agst. the most distant approach of
danger.”79
However, Madison also did not think it proper, or possible, for him as
an elected official to speak out against the institution of slavery as such,
given the number of his constituents who, like he, owned slaves. In a letter
to Robert Pleasants during his time serving in Congress under the Articles
of Confederation, he stated:
“The petition relating to the Militia bill contains nothing that
makes it improper for me to present it. I shall therefore readily
comply with your desire on that subject. I am not satisfied
that I am equally at liberty with respect to the other petition.
Animadversions, such as it contains and which the authorized
object of the petitioners did not require on the slavery existing
in our country, are supposed by the holders of that species of
property, to lessen the value by weakening the tenure of it.
Those from whom I derive my public station are known by me
to be greatly interested in that species of property, and to
view the matter in that light. It would seem that I might be
chargeable at least with want of candour, if not of fidelity,
were I to make use of a situation in which their confidence
Hobson, Charles F., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 13: 20 January
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has placed me, to become a volunteer in giving a public
wound, as they would deem it, to an interest on which they
set so great a value.”80
So, what we see from this comparison of Hamilton and Madison on
the issue of slavery is agreement on the evil of slavery, but wide
divergence on just what to do about it, given their vastly different
expectations for whether or not those of European descent could ever
live peaceably with those of African descent. Hamilton was again far
more active in opposing slavery, had essentially an equal view of the
abilities of blacks versus whites, and continued his efforts from early until
the end of his life.
Madison, on the other hand, while personally deploring slavery,
never actually took action, either privately or publicly, to oppose the
institution itself. He remained a slave owner throughout his life, thought it
improper to even indirectly associate himself with anti-slavery efforts while
in political office, and only late in life made even the limited public
statements regarding slavery that he made. He just did not think whites
would ever accept blacks, especially former slaves.
This disagreement between Hamilton and Madison is of course
reflective of the much wider conflict over slavery in the United States,
which was not resolved until the Civil War ended, and the issue of race

Rutland, Robert A., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 14: 6 April 1791 16 March 1793. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, 91-92.
80

53

relations is one which the United States, like almost every other country, still
struggles with to this day.
As far as their conflicting visions of republicanism, these excerpts
from the writings of Hamilton and Madison show that, for Hamilton,
“liberty” meant liberty for everyone, including slaves.

The American

Revolution was an event Hamilton saw as demanding freedom for all
Americans, not just those considered “white.” Hamilton clearly did not
consider there to be any underlying racial differences of importance
between blacks and whites, which we saw in his opinion regarding the
suitability of freed slaves for military service. Neither better nor worse than
whites, freed slaves would have been an asset, not a threat to the
republic. If nothing else, Hamilton was prescient in arguing that if the
Americans did not make slaves the offer, the British would. For Hamilton,
republicanism did not carry with it any racial component.

Blacks and

whites were in his estimation equal, and could participate equally in the
American republic as he envisioned it.
Any participation by both free blacks and whites in the American
republic was, on the other hand, impossible for Madison.

He disliked

slavery, but made use of slaves throughout his life. He did not, in contrast
to some other Founders, ever free his slaves.

Finally, even his belated

effort of supporting resettling voluntarily freed slaves reflected only his
unwavering belief that blacks and whites simply could not successfully live
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together as equals. For Madison, the American republic did have a racial
component, whites only, as part of his vision for its success.
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Chapter Three: Hamilton and Madison on
France versus Great Britain
As I mentioned in discussing the research which has already been
done on Hamilton and Madison by Elkins and McKitrick in their The Age of
Federalism, they argue that the later political differences between
Hamilton and Madison can be explained largely by Hamilton’s Anglophilia
and Madison’s Anglophobia. I respectfully disagree, and will argue that
Hamilton and Madison’s differences in regards to overall foreign policy,
when each had the opportunity to weigh in on that issue, were not
attributable to a strong preference by either for the two great powers of
that time.
We will see Hamilton’s focus was on American independence from
both Great Britain and France, and not on maintaining ties with Great
Britain at any cost out of some “Anglophilia.” In each case, when the
potential of war loomed, first with Great Britain, later with France, he
counseled the exact same approach: Prepare for war at home, but first
try to negotiate a solution before resorting to a declaration of war.
Hamilton also at first supported the French Revolution, but had doubts all
along, which were for him confirmed by the Terror and other assorted
violence, and especially by the execution of Louis XVI. That did turn him
away from actively supporting France, but not towards greater support for
Great Britain in response.
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With Madison we will see him of two different minds regarding Great
Britain and France at various points. At first, after the Revolution, he did
clearly favor France, out of both a sense of gratitude for French
assistance, and also out of a strong antipathy towards Great Britain. Then,
when the French Revolution occurred, he did show a continued
preference for France out of a spirit of worldwide republican revolution. It
is only with Napoleon’s takeover that he abandoned France, not in
preference for Great Britain, but rather towards a much cooler attitude
towards both countries.
The point Elkins and McKitrick argue can be found, attributed in part
to figures such as Jefferson, in Marshall Smelser’s articles on “The Jacobin
Phrenzy,” in both its Anglophobic and Gallophobic manifestations during
the 1790’s.

Ultimately, both sides, including Hamilton and Madison on

each, were afraid of the influence over the United States of the two great
powers of the time, France and Great Britain. Each side suspected the
other of being too greatly influenced by either France or Great Britain, if
not in fact traitors plotting to bring the United States under the control of
their respective patrons.
The most influential event leading to this fear by both sides is widely
regarded to be the French Revolution, with its expansion of the change in
government to other countries in Europe.
common amongst Federalists, Smelser writes:

Regarding the attitude
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“During the first years of the American federal republic,
Europe was being overrun by French revolutionary forces and
ideas. Nation after nation had fallen to the revolutionaries –
first weakened by propaganda and subversive organizations,
then subdued by soldiery, finally converted into subordinate
allies. Watching these successes, some Americans feared
that the Atlantic was too narrow to keep revolutionary arms
and ideology away. Indeed, the ideology seemed already
to permeate the country.”81
Smelser argues this fear amongst Federalists had at least some
plausibility. After all, the French revolutionaries had clearly first subverted,
then taken over other countries. To those living at that time, this could
easily seem as a possible future for the United States as well.
“What they feared might happen here had happened in
Europe several times – that is, satellite republics (the Batavian,
Helvetian, and others) had been established in part by
betrayal to the French from within. John Quincy Adams and
others in the foreign service had seen it done and had
reported in detail to superiors, relatives, and friends.”82
Jeffersonian Republicans were not immune to this fear, either,
although their anxiety fixated not on France, especially once it had joined
the republican revolution movement, but rather Great Britain and the
specter of aristocracy, monarchy, or both.
“One group, forming around Jefferson, James Madison,
James Monroe, Albert Gallatin and like-minded men – now
called the Republicans – came to suspect that the executive
officers of government – of the group known as the
Federalists – were engaged in a vast plot to establish a pro-
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British, tyrannical plutocracy wearing the gaudy cloak of
monarchy.”83
Since President Washington himself was beyond direct criticism or
attack, Smelser states the Jeffersonians’ target was instead Alexander
Hamilton.
“By and large the Republicans tried to convince the people
that the archmiscreant of plutocratic monarchism was the
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. They could
not attack Washington. The President’s popular standing was
so high and his solid common sense so apparent that the
leadership of the party concentrated the fire on Hamilton.”84
Overall, though, the Jeffersonians’ fear, so similar to that of the
Federalists’, but different in its focus, was grounded on Washington
Administration policies they perceived as favoring Great Britain over
France, and thus putting the United States in danger of being, in effect, a
British satellite.
“As in the suspected plot to monarchize the country,
Alexander Hamilton was considered to be the archvillain of
Anglophilia. Jefferson had long been recording evidences of
Hamilton’s pro-British leanings:
opposition to trade
discriminations against Britain, improper communications with
the British Minister in Philadelphia, suggestion of a defensive
treaty of alliance with Britain in 1790, a pro-British position in
the cabinet discussions at the time of the Neutrality
Proclamation, a rumor that the British relied more on Hamilton
than on their resident Minister in the United States – even a
note of pure fantasy to the effect that asylum in Britain had
already been arranged for Hamilton in the event of an AngloAmerican war. Jefferson could not quite believe this last bit
of ‘derogatory information’ but the remainder of the ‘record’
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was sufficient to cause him to doubt Hamilton’s loyalty
thereafter.”85
As I mentioned above, though, I disagree with Elkins and McKitrick’s
argument, and will begin my argument with Hamilton’s views, since as
Smelser noted he was the centerpiece of the dispute over the feared
influences of either Great Britain or France, at least according to the
Jeffersonians.
I argue Hamilton had, rather than Anglophilia, a staunch
commitment to the United States. His commitment sometimes seems to
me to be such that only converts to a cause or religion manifest, but that
can be traced to his birth in the Caribbean rather than in any state. Thus,
in comparison with Madison, his credentials as an American were based
far more on his deeds, rather than simply being part of his identity. In a
letter to George Washington during 1783, he stated:
“We have I fear men <among> us and men in trust who have
a hankering afte<r> British connection. We have others
whose confidence in France savours of credulity.
The
intrigues of the former and the incautiousness of the latter
may be both, though in different degrees, injurious to the
American interests; and make it difficult for prudent men to
steer a proper course.”86
So, even before the later conflicts of the 1790’s, Hamilton was
himself concerned about the possible influence of Great Britain and
France. Here, he clearly states his goal is to “steer a proper course,” not
ibid, 255-256.
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as an adherent to either great power, but rather to find an American way
of proceeding.
Further, he was also concerned with European influence in general
over the United States, and of course wanted to avoid such an
occurrence.

In another letter to George Washington from 1783, he

remarked:
“Your Excellency will before this reaches you have received a
letter from the Marquis De la Fayette informing you that the
preliminaries of peace between all the belligerent powers
have been concluded. I congratulate your Excellency on this
happy conclusion of your labours. It now only remains to
make solid establishments within to perpetuate our union to
prevent our being a ball in the hands of European powers
bandied against each other at their pleasure - in fine to make
our independence truly a blessing. This it is to be lamented
will be an arduous work, for to borrow a figure from
mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger than the
centripetal force in these states - the seeds of disunion much
more numerous than those of union.”87
Regarding the French Revolution, Hamilton made it clear in a letter
to the Marquis de Lafayette during 1789 that he was, at first, quite happy
with that event, but that he did have fears all along about possible
outcomes of the Revolution. He hoped the French would not make too
many changes, given his assessment of what he considered the French
“character,” and also what he considered possible, due to his
understanding of human nature.

Notably, Hamilton also expressed

concern regarding the influence of French philosophers.
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“I have seen with a mixture of Pleasure and
apprehension the Progress of the events which have lately
taken Place in your Country. As a friend to mankind and to
liberty I rejoice in the efforts which you are making to establish
it while I fear much for the final success of the attempts, for
the fate of those I esteem who are engaged in it, and for the
danger in case of success of innovations greater than will
consist with the real felicity of your Nation. If your affairs still
go well, when this reaches you, you will ask why this
foreboding of ill, when all the appearances have been so
much in your favor. I will tell you; I dread disagreements
among those who are now united (which will be likely to be
improved by the adverse party) about the nature of your
constitution; I dread the vehement character of your people,
whom I fear you may find it more easy to bring on, than to
keep within Proper bounds, after you have put them in
motion; I dread the interested refractoriness of your nobles,
who cannot all be gratified and who may be unwilling to
submit to the requisite sacrifices. And I dread the reveries of
your Philosophic politicians who appear in the moment to
have great influence and who being mere speculatists may
aim at more refinement than suits either with human nature or
the composition of your Nation.
These my dear Marquis are my apprehensions. My
wishes for your personal success and that of the cause of
liberty are incessant. Be virtuous amidst the Seductions of
ambition, and you can hardly in any event be unhappy.”88
In fact, Hamilton sought parity in trade for the United States with
both Great Britain and France. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson during 1791,
he wrote:
“I had rather endeavour by a new Treaty of Commerce with
France to extend reciprocal advantages and fix them on a
permanent basis. This would not only be more solid but it
would perhaps be less likely than apparently gratuitous and
voluntary exemptions to beget discontents elsewhere;
especially (as ought to be the case) if each party should be
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at liberty for equivalent considerations to grant like privileges
to others. My commercial system turns very much on giving a
free course to Trade and cultivating good humour with all the
world. And I feel a particular reluctance to hazard any thing
in the present state of our affairs which may lead to
commercial warfare with any power; which as far as my
knowledge of examples extends is commonly productive of
mutual inconvenience and injury and of dispositions tending
to a worse kind of warfare. Exemptions & preferences which
are not the effect of Treaty are apt to be regarded by those
who do not partake in them as proofs of an unfriendly temper
towards them.”89
For Hamilton, the point, and value, of good relations with Great
Britain would be the bargaining strength it would give the United States
with the rest of Europe. In a letter to Benjamin Goodhue during 1791 he
mentioned:
“I would not warrant the issue; but if some liberal
arrangement with Great Britain should ensue, it will have a
prodigious effect upon the Conduct of some other parts of
Europe. Tis however most wise for us to depend as little as
possible upon European Caprice & to exert ourselves to the
utmost to unfold and improve every domestic resource.”90
In regards to establishing and maintaining a foreign policy based on
neutrality between warring European powers, Hamilton argued this
approach would be the best way to retire the Revolutionary War debt as
fast as possible. In a letter to George Washington from 1792 he wrote:
“The public Debt was produced by the late war. It is not the
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fault of the present government that it exists; unless it can be
proved, that public morality and policy do not require of a
Government an honest provision for its debts. Whether it is
greater than can be paid before new causes of adding to it
will occur is a problem incapable of being solved, but by
experience; and this would be the case if it were not one
fourth as much as it is. If the policy of the Country be
prudent, cautious and neutral towards foreign nations, there
is a rational probability, that war may be avoided long
enough to wipe off the debt. . . . But whether the public Debt
shall be extinguished or not within a moderate period
depends on the temper of the people. If they are rendered
dissatisfied by misrepresentations of the measures of the
government, the Government will be deprived of an efficient
command of the resources of the community towards
extinguishing the Debt. And thus, those who clamour are
likely to be the principal causes of protracting the existence
of the debt.”91
So, far from being based on a preference for relations with Great
Britain, Hamilton’s policies were aimed at greater strength and stability for
the United States, in part by paying off its indebtedness as soon as could
be by staying out of wars as long as possible.
Further evidence of Hamilton’s strictly American views can be seen
in an article he wrote for the Gazette of the United States in 1793.
“The late War with Great Britain produced three parties
in the UStates, an English party, a French Party, and an
American party, if the latter can with propriety be called a
party. These parties continue to the present moment. There
are persons among us, who appear to be more alive to the
interests of France, on the one hand, and to those of Great
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Britain, on the other, than to those of the UStates. Both these
dispositions are to be condemned, and will be rejected by
every true American.
A dispassionate and virtuous citizen of the UStates will
scorn to stand on any but purely American ground. It will be
his study to render his feeling and affections neutral and
impartial towards all foreign Nations. His prayer will be for
peace, and that his country may be as much as possible kept
out of the destructive vortex of foreign politics.”92
In his Defense of the President’s Neutrality Proclamation from May,
1793, Hamilton first stated what had caused his support for the French
Revolution to weaken and then disappear. Also, he indicated again for
the first time his concern that such “French” influence might even
negatively affect the United States as well.
“That zeal for the liberty of mankind, which produced so
universal a sympathy in the cause of France in the first stages
of its revolution, and which, it is supposed, has not yet yielded
to the just reprobation, which a sober temperate and
humane people, friends of religion, social order, and justice,
enemies to tumult and massacre, to the wanton and lawless
shedding of human blood cannot but bestow upon those
extravagancies excesses and outrages, which have sullied
and which endanger that cause - that laudable, it is not too
much to say that holy zeal is intended by every art of
misrepresentation and deception to be made the instrument
first of controuling finally of overturning the Government of
the Union.”93
When as a result of British attacks on American shipping after the
outbreak of war with revolutionary France, many called for the United
States to join the war on France’s side, Hamilton urged President
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Washington to negotiate first, but also to have the United States prepare
for war. Hamilton clearly shows a willingness to go to war if needed, but
not a desire to avoid war with Great Britain at all costs out of some
preference for that country.

In a letter to George Washington during

1794, he argued:
“A course of accurate observation has impressed on
my mind a full conviction, that there exist in our councils three
considerable parties - one decided for preserving peace by
every effort which shall any way consist with the ultimate
maintenance of the national honor and rights and disposed
to cultivate with all nations a friendly understanding - another
decided for war and resolved to bring it about by every
expedient which shall not too directly violate the public
opinion - a third not absolutely desirous of war but solicitious
at all events to excite and keep alive irritation and ill humour
between the UStates and Great Britain, not unwilling in the
pursuit of this object to expose the peace of the country to
imminent hazards.
The views of the first party in respect to the questions
between GBritain and us favour the following course of
conduct - To take effectual measures of military preparation,
creating in earnest force and revenue - to vest the President
with important powers respecting navigation and commerce
for ulterior contingencies - to endeavour by another effort of
negotiation confided to hands able to manage it and friendly
to the object, to obtain reparation for the wrongs we suffer
and a demarkation of a line of conduct to govern in future to avoid 'till the issue of that experiment all measures of a
nature to occasion a conflict between the motives which
might dispose the British Government to do us the justice to
which we are intitled and the sense of its own dignity - If that
experiment fails then and not till then to resort to reprisals and
war. . . . Prosperous as is truly the situation of this country,
great as would be the evils of War to it, it would hardly seem
to admit of a doubt, that no chance for preserving peace
ought to be lost or diminished, in compliance either with
resentment or the speculative ideas, which are the
arguments for a hostile course of conduct.
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At no moment were the indications of a plan on the
part of Great Britain to go to War with us sufficiently decisive
to preclude the hope of averting it by a negotiation
conducted with prudent energy and seconded by such
military preparations as should be demonstrative of a
Resolution eventually to vindicate our rights. . . . To you, Sir, it
is unnecessary to urge the extreme precariousness of the
events of War. The inference to be drawn is too manifest to
escape your penetration. This Country ought not to set itself
afloat upon an ocean so fluctuating so dangerous and so
uncertain but in a case of absolute necessity.”94
Note Hamilton’s main points: The United States should avoid war if
possible, but should be ready should there be no other option; Great
Britain has not itself declared war, and has not shown a clear intention of
doing so; and finally, war is an extremely uncertain state for any country
to be in, let alone a young country such as the United States.

His

concerns do not include maintaining peace with Great Britain at any
cost, but rather what he conceives the best options for the United States
to be.
He did make his disillusionment with France clear, though, in his work
The Cause of France, in which he compares the behavior of France’s new
rulers with that of religious fanatics.
“The world has been scourged with many fanatical
sects in religion - who inflamed by a sincere but mistaken zeal
have perpetuated under the idea of serving God the most
atrocious crimes. If we were to call the cause of such men
the cause of religion, would not every one agree, that it was
an abuse of terms?
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The best apology to be made for the terrible scenes (of which
every new arrival shocks us with the dreadful detail) is the
supposition, that the ruling party in France is actuated by a
zeal similar in its nature (though different in its object) to that
which influences religious fanatics. Can this political phrenzy
be dignified with the honorable appellation of the cause of
Liberty with any greater propriety than the other kind of
phrenzy would be denominated the cause of religion?
But even this comparison is too favourable to the ruling
party in France. Judging from their acts, we are authorised to
pronounce the cause in which they are engaged, not the
cause of Liberty, but the cause of Vice Atheism and
Anarchy.”95
Hamilton was clearly one of those who Smelser mentioned as being
afraid of French influence, and of the United States becoming one of its
satellites as had several countries in Europe. In a letter to William Bradford
in 1795, he complained: “When shall we cease to consider ourselves as a
colony to France?”96 He quite clearly did not have such concerns about
Great Britain, which may very well have contributed to his being
characterized by his opponents as being in favor of too much influence
for that country in contrast to France.
He was not, though, opposed to at least cordial relations with
France if possible. In response to a request from George Washington for
his thoughts on the recently negotiated Jay Treaty with Great Britain,
Hamilton argued:
“But will it give umbrage to France?
It cannot do it unless France is unreasonable.
ibid, 585-586.
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Because our engagements with her remain unimpaired &
because she will still be upon as good a footing as Great
Britain.
We are in a deplorable situation if we cannot secure
our peace and promote our own interests by means which
not only do not de<rogate> from our faith but which leave
the same advantages to France as to other powers with
whom we form Treaties. Equality is all that can be claimed
from us.”97
Hamilton is clearly not of the mindset of preferring Great Britain over
France, at least in commercial matters. If he had been, he would have
sought greater trade privileges for Great Britain than France, and there is
no record of his ever expressing such a desire or goal.
When later war with France appeared to be a possibility, Hamilton
once again advocated policies which mirrored his earlier preferences for
avoiding war with Great Britain: preparedness at home, but making every
possible effort to avoid war first. He even suggested that any group of
extraordinary envoys to France include James Madison, whom he had by
this point known for years to be a critic, in order to show no partiality
towards Great Britain. To William Loughton Smith he wrote in 1797:
“I am clearly of opinion for an extraordinary mission and
as clearly it should embrace Madison. I do not think we
ought to construe the declaration of the Directory against
receiving a Minister Plenipotentiary as extending to an
extraordinary mission pro hac vice. And if it does, it would be
no reason with me against it. I would accumulate the proofs
of French Violence & demonstrate to all our Citizens that
nothing possible has been omitted. That a certain party
Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, volume XVIII: January 1795 July 1795. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, 453-454.
97

69

desires it is with me a strong reason for it - since I would disarm
them of all plea that we have not made every possible effort
for peace. The idea is a plausible one that as we sent an
Envoy Extraordinary to Britain so ought we to send one to
France. And plausible ideas are always enough for the
multitude.
These and other reasons (and principally to avoid
Rupture with a political monster with seems destined soon to
have no Competitor but England) make me even anxious for
an extraordinary mission.”98
Again in 1797, Hamilton expressed a desire for, instead of
preference for either Great Britain or France, a genuinely American way
of understanding the United States’ standing as regards the various
European powers. To George Washington he wrote:
“We have nothing new here more than our papers contain;
but are anxiously looking forward to a further development of
the negotiations in Europe with an ardent desire for general
accomodation. It is at the same time agreeable to observe
that the public mind is adopting more and more sentiments
truly American and free from foreign tincture.”99
Hamilton, like Madison, corresponded with the Marquis de
Lafayette. It is noteworthy that the Marquis did try to counsel each side in
the American debate at that time to give each other the benefit of the
doubt, but neither was willing to listen, unfortunately.

In any case,

Hamilton did express his views to the Marquis regarding France, its
revolution, Great Britain, whether or not France was capable of being a
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republic like the United States, and the charges against him of
Anglophilia. In 1798 he wrote:
“Your letter implied, as I had before understood, that
though your engagements did not permit you to follow the
fortunes of the republic yet your attachments had never
been separated from them. In this, I frankly confess, I have
differed from you. The suspension of the King and the
massacre of September (of which events a temporary
intelligence was received in this Country) cured me of my
good will for the French Revolution.
I have never been able to believe that France can
make a republic and I have believed that the attempt while
it continues can only produce misfortunes.
Among the events of this revolution I regret extremely
the misunderstanding which has taken place between your
country and ours and which seems to threaten an open
rupture. It would be useless to discuss the causes of this state
of things. I shall only assure you that a disposition to form an
intimate connection with Great Britain, which is charged
upon us forms no part of the real Cause, though it has served
the purpose of a party to impose its belief of it on france. I
give you this assurance on the faith of our former friendship.
And the effect will prove to you that I am not wrong. The
basis of the policy of the party, of which I am, is to avoid
intimate and exclusive connection with any foreign
powers.”100
The case for Madison’s views is much simpler.

Not needing to

establish himself as a genuine American, having been born and raised in
Virginia to a prominent family, Madison did not need to make such
vehement statements of Americanism as did Hamilton. Nor, however, did
he display the Francophilia that many attribute to Thomas Jefferson. As I
will show below, his attachment to the French Revolution was the product
of a genuine belief in the overwhelmingly positive benefits to the human
100
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race of self-government along republican lines. When France gave up its
republican experiment in favor of Napoleon, however, he quickly lost his
admiration for that country.

Like Hamilton, Madison also reached a

breaking point regarding events in France.
Writing for the National Gazette in 1792, Madison made clear his
view that the establishment of government through reason, rather than
force, was the greatest accomplishment of the United States, and also of
France at that time.
“In Europe, charters of liberty have been granted by power.
America has set the example and France has followed it, of
charters of power granted by liberty. This revolution in the
practice of the world, may, with an honest praise, be
pronounced the most triumphant epoch of its history, and the
most consoling presage of its happiness. We look back,
already, with astonishment, at the daring outrages
committed by despotism, on the reason and the rights of
man; We look forward with joy, to the period, when it shall be
despoiled of all its usurpations, and bound for ever in the
chains, with which it had loaded its miserable victims.”101
As I mentioned above, though, once France gave up on
republicanism, Madison lost his admiration for France. It became simply
another foreign country which the United States needed to deal with as
best it could. To Thomas Jefferson he wrote in 1800:
“The spirit manifested in the Senate steadily, & in the other
House occasionally, however mischevious in its immediate
effects, cannot fail I think to aid the progress of reflection &
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change among the people. In this view our public malady
may work its own cure, and ultimately rescue the republican
principle from the imputation brought on it by the
degeneracy of the public Councils. Such a demonstration of
the rectitude & efficacy of popular sentiment, will be the
more precious, as the late defection of France has left
America the only Theatre on which true liberty can have a
fair trial.”102
Like Hamilton, when it came Madison’s turn to take part in Executive
branch matters, he also emphasized the desire for the United States to
involve itself as little as possible in the affairs of Europe.

To Robert

Livingston he wrote in 1801:
“Your observations on Neutral rights & the means of
promoting them are certainly very interesting, & will merit
consideration.
It is questionable however whether any
leading arrangements by the U. States during the war, even in
an eventual form adapted to a state of peace, would be
free from the danger of entangling us too much in the
present contests & vicisitudes of Europe; or at least of exciting
too much the apprehensions of this consequence, among
our own Citizens.”103
Further, his ideas regarding dealing with France and Great Britain
once he was Secretary of State are essentially the same as the advice
Hamilton provided then-President Washington. I will come back to this
later, but I have become convinced the differences between Hamilton
and Madison, while real, were not as dramatic as each believed. Both
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should have followed Lafayette’s advice and given each other the
benefit of the doubt. In 1802, Madison wrote to Rufus King:
“It is I am persuaded the sincere desire of the people of this
Country, and of every department of its Government, to
cultivate the most thorough good will, and the most friendly
commerce with G. Britain; but I do not believe that they will
purchase either by improper sacrifices. . . . I think with you
that in our respective stipulations with G.B. & France, it is
desirable to have them both so shaped as to avoid as much
as possible collisions between them, which might involve the
U.S. with one or other of those Nations.”104
In conclusion, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter, I disagree
with Elkins and McKitrick’s assessment of the disagreement between
Hamilton and Madison as stemming from Hamilton’s Anglophilia and
Madison’s Anglophobia. I can find no clear statement from either that
would support that argument. Rather, what I have found is instead a
desire by both to establish a clear identity for the nascent United States on
the world stage, mainly through staying out of the endless conflicts that
characterized European politics, especially at that time.
Hamilton’s view of American republicanism stressed independence
from all other countries. He wanted to be a part of creating a unique,
specifically American, way of acting in the international arena. For him, it
was more important for the United States to create an identity separate
from either of the “superpowers” of the time, Great Britain and France.
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Especially in his response to the threat he perceived of the United States
becoming a satellite republic of France, as had happened with the
Batavian and Helvetic Republics, among others, we see his fear for the
continued independence of the United States.
With Madison we see a much less amount of fear for the
independence of the United States from France, although he did
abandon overt support for France in comparison with Great Britain once
Napoleon took control. For Madison, there was much less of a pressing
need for the United States to go out of its way to craft a uniquely
American approach to dealing with any foreign country. I argue this is
due to his, unlike Hamilton, having been a lifelong Virginian and
American. He did not have to establish or prove himself worthy of the
United States.

Madison was much more committed to the idea of

republicanism as something that could be successfully established in other
countries than he was a supporter of France. He did display a strong
antipathy towards Great Britain, but that did not cause him to abandon
an idea similar to Hamilton’s, that of the United States involving itself as
little as possible in the affairs, and especially the wars, of Europe.
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Chapter Four: Hamilton and Madison on Constitutional Interpretation
At the center of Hamilton and Madison’s later conflicts, in spite of
their earlier collaboration in favor of the Constitution, is precisely their
varying interpretations of that document, and what powers each thought
it gave the federal government. Focus by others has been thus far on
those disagreements, such as over Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures,
and also whether or not Publius, in the Federalist, spoke with two different
voices. I myself am going to concentrate my efforts elsewhere, because I
am convinced that, for instance, the Federalist is in many ways not truly
indicative of either Hamilton or Madison’s essential points of view, being
written to convince potential convention delegates in New York and
Virginia to support ratification. Also, the disagreement which emerged
over the Report on Manufactures is exactly the sort of conflict I am trying
to explain the reasons for, so I will not include that here.
We will see in the excerpts that follow the very different view
Hamilton and Madison had all along regarding the issue of Constitutional
interpretation. Even before they worked together on The Federalist, they
had differences of opinion, and my take on why they never discussed this
or any of the other issues I point to is the extreme time constraints they
were under while working to write those newspapers articles in support of
ratifying the Constitution.
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With Hamilton we will see his preference for a loose construction,
because for him one simply cannot spell out all the details regarding
governmental power in any constitution. He regarded the issue of how to
distribute power between the federal and state governments as one of
“convenience,” rather than of exact definition. For Hamilton, one simply
had to set up the governments of the United States on a firm foundation,
and he thought all one would need thereafter for success would be for
elected officials to make “prudent” decisions as to how to administer the
nation as a whole.
Madison, however, was very concerned about corruption, about
the concentration of too much power in any one set of hands. For him,
the boundaries between the various branches of the federal government,
and especially between the federal government and the states, needed
to be precisely defined in order to prevent overreaching by power-hungry
individuals bent on tyranny. He did concede there were ambiguities in
the Constitution as written, but he thought those were inevitable, and
would be resolved once and for all before long by the accumulation of
precedents. That he reacted so strongly to the decisions made during the
Washington Administration in carrying out policies preferred by Hamilton
can be explained by his not wanting “those” precedents to be the way
Constitutional ambiguities were resolved.
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Hamilton clearly showed the point of view which Madison later
came to loathe during his efforts to secure ratification of the Constitution
by the state of New York’s convention.
“It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any
gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion,
speak of things as they are; and hold up opinions in the light
of which they ought to appear: and I maintain, that all that
has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and
of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle
or fact - That it is mere verbage, and idle declamation. The
true principle of government is this - Make the system
compleat in its structure; give a perfect proportion and
balance to its parts; and the powers you give it will never
affect your security. The question then, of the division of
powers between the general and state governments, is a
question of convenience: It becomes a prudential enquiry,
what powers are proper to be reversed to the latter; and this
immediately involves another enquiry into the proper objects
of the two governments. This is the criterion, by which we
shall determine the just distribution of powers.”105
Corruption was very much on the mind of Madison, whose response
to Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures included the argument that basing
actions taken by the federal government on the general welfare of the
nation would leave the federal government with no limits whatsoever on
its powers. But, as we see here, Hamilton was much less concerned with
corruption, and clearly felt much more comfortable with the power given
to the federal government. Especially, though, note his argument that the
division of powers between the states and the federal government is a
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“question of convenience.”

This shows the preference we will see in

further quotes I will include below that Hamilton had for the federal
government over the states.
We see this in Hamilton’s desire for more powerful law enforcement
in the hands of the federal government.

He bemoaned the federal

government having to rely on the states to enforce laws.

To George

Washington he wrote in 1791:
“It is to be lamented that our system is such as still to leave the
public peace of the Union at the mercy of each state
Government. This is not only the case as it regards direct
interferences, but as it regards the inability of the National
Government in many particulars to take those direct
measures for carrying into execution its views and
engagements which exigencies require.”106
Hamilton was genuinely surprised when Madison began to oppose
his policy proposals as Treasury Secretary. He had considered Madison to
have the same preference for federal power over state power, but as we
have seen this was not really the case. The Constitution was, by 11 out of
the 13 states, ratified by 1789. By 1792, Hamilton and Madison’s conflict
had become apparent to both. To Edward Carrington, Hamilton wrote in
1792:
“When I accepted the Office, I now hold, it was under
a full persuasion, that from similarity of thinking, conspiring
with personal goodwill, I should have the firm support of Mr.
Madison, in the general course of my administration. Aware
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of the intrinsic difficulties of the situation and of the powers of
Mr. Madison, I do not believe I should have accepted under
a different supposition.
I have mentioned the similarity of thinking between that
Gentleman and myself. This was relative not merely to the
general principles of National Policy and Government but to
the leading points which were likely to constitute questions in
the administration of the finances. I mean 1 the expediency
of funding the debt 2 the inexpediency of discrimination
between original and present holders 3 The expediency of
assuming the state Debts.”107
Not only was this a difference of opinion for either man:

each

considered the ideas the other had as not only mistaken, but dangerous,
even bordering on treasonous. I have mentioned this before, and will
explore this more fully later, but this is one of the most important aspects of
their disagreement.

Just like today, neither side in the first political

conflicts under the Constitution could consider the other side as
legitimate. For both, it was their way of understanding the Constitution,
and no other. Also to Edward Carrington from 1792:
“It was not 'till the last session that I became unequivocally
convinced of the following truth – ‘That Mr. Madison
cooperating with Mr. Jefferson is at the head of a faction
decidedly hostile to me and my administration, and actuated
by views in my judgment subversive of the principles of good
government and dangerous to the union, peace and
happiness of the Country.’”108
One example of Hamilton’s expansive vision for interpreting the
Constitution, and thus the powers of the federal government, is his plan to
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fund, and eventually pay off, the Revolutionary War debt. Hamilton is
sometimes portrayed as being in favor of a perpetual debt. That is simply
mistaken. His efforts were all focused on paying off that debt, as I have
already shown in regards to his support for American neutrality between
France and Great Britain. Yet more from his letter to Edward Carrington in
1792:
“Whatever the original merits of the funding system,
after having been so solemnly adopted, & after so great a
transfer of property under it, what would become of the
Government should it be reversed? What of the National
Reputation? Upon what system of morality can so atrocious a
doctrine be maintained?
In me, I confess it excites
indignation & horror!
What are we to think of those maxims of Government
by which the power of a Legislature is denied to bind the
Nation by a Contract in an affair of property for twenty four
years? For this is precisely the case of the debt. What are to
become of all the legal rights of property, of all charters to
corporations, nay, of all grants to a man his heirs & assigns for
ever, if this doctrine be true? What is the term for which a
government is in capacity to contract? Questions might be
multiplied without end to demonstrate the perniciousness &
absurdity of such a doctrine.
In almost all the questions great & small which have
arisen, since the first session of Congress, Mr. Jefferson & Mr.
Madison have been found among those who were disposed
to narrow the Federal authority. The question of a National
Bank is one example.”109
This quote shows another aspect of Hamilton’s concern with giving
the federal government more power.
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property rights, and was afraid of the tendency in the states towards
negating such rights through debt relief, paper money, etc.

Thus, he

argued in favor of the above mentioned power to contract for extensive
periods of time, which of course would bind subsequent administrations,
Congresses, and even later voters.
Hamilton’s underlying reason for interpreting the Constitution as he
did was his fear that the federal government would not prove strong
enough to control the states, which would, in his estimation, eventually
lead to a dissolution of the Union, and perhaps even civil war. Because of
his desire for a stronger federal government than, say, Madison wanted,
some accused him of secretly desiring a return to a monarchical form of
government. As Hamilton stated in that letter to Edward Carrington from
1792:
“A word on another point. I am told that serious
apprehensions are disseminated in your state as to the
existence of a Monarchical party meditating the destruction
of State & Republican Government. If it is possible that so
absurd an idea can gain ground it is necessary that it should
be combatted. I assure you on my private faith and honor as
a Man that there is not in my judgment a shadow of
foundation of it. A very small number of men indeed may
entertain theories less republican than Mr. Jefferson & Mr.
Madison; but I am persuaded there is not a Man among
them who would not regard as both criminal & visionary any
attempt to subvert the republican system of the Country.
Most of these men rather fear that it may not justify itself by its
fruits, than feel a predilection for a different form; and their
fears are not diminished by the factions & fanatical politics
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which they find prevailing among a certain set of Gentlemen
and threatening to disturb the tranquility and order of the
Government.
As to the destruction of State Governments, the great
and real anxiety is to be able to preserve the National from
the too potent and counteracting influence of those
Governments. As to my own political Creed, I give it to you
with the utmost sincerity. I am affectionately attached to the
Republican theory. I desire above all things to see the
equality of political rights exclusive of all hereditary distinction
firmly established by a practical demonstration of its being
consistent with the order and happiness of society.
As to State Governments, the prevailing byass of my
judgment is that if they can be circumscribed within bounds
consistent with the preservation of the National Government
they will prove useful and salutary. If the States were all the
size of Connecticut, Maryland or New Jersey, I should
decidedly regard the local Governments as both safe &
useful. As the thing is, however, I acknowledge the most
serious apprehensions that the Government of the U States
will not be able to maintain itself against their influence. I see
that influence already penetrating into the National Councils
& perverting their direction.
Hence a disposition on my part towards a liberal
construction of the powers of the National Government and
to erect every fence to guard it from depredations, which is,
in my opinion, consistent with constitutional propriety.”110
Hamilton and John Adams are often lumped in together as being
indicative of Federalist Party thought, but there are in fact many
differences between the two, which no doubt contributed to their conflict
and eventual break during Adams’ term as President. Note Hamilton’s
argument above in favor of republicanism without hereditary distinctions
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and in favor of equality of rights.

In contrast to how many have

interpreted Adams’ A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the
United States of America, Hamilton here clearly indicates he does not see
any need for different orders in society written into the Constitution or law.
This is yet another example of the fears both Hamilton and Madison had
regarding the other that obscured their similarities.
Another aspect of Hamilton’s view of the proper way to interpret
the Constitution was his argument that one could never spell out all the
details necessary for actually carrying governing into practice. This shows
why he favored use of notions such as the “general welfare” as warrant
for the policies he wanted to carry out. Madison considered this method
dangerous, though, arguing it would lead to no limits whatsoever on what
the federal government could do.

Regardless, as Hamilton wrote to

William Heth in 1791:
“My opinion is that there is and necessarily must be a
great number of undefined particulars incident to the general
duty of every officer, for the requiring of which no special
warrant is to be found in any law. . . . What law could ever
define the details of the duty of a Secretary of the Treasury?
It is evident these must be an endless variety of things
unexpressed which are incident to the nature of his station &
which he is bound in duty to perform at the call of the
President. . . . If it be said the law should then require this, I
answer that the detail would be endless. And surely it would
not answer to say in respect to any officer that he must do
whatever he is required to do. And if all that he is to do is to
be defined the Statutes of the United States must be more
voluminous than those of any Country in the world.
There is a large chapter of duties between Executive
Officers which grow out of the Nature of Executive power
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and which the natural relations of things can alone
determine.”111
Thus, neither the Constitution itself, nor even laws, can have all the
details spelled out in advance according to Hamilton. It is up to those
who administer both the laws and the Constitution to provide the vast
majority of the details. We have seen this Hamiltonian notion carried out
in great measure in recent decades by Congress’ delegation to the
bureaucracy the power to write the actual regulations which provide
much of the detail for administering laws.
Overall, Hamilton’s method of interpreting the Constitution, and thus
his understanding of the way government officials should act, can be
accurately characterized by a comment he made to Rufus King in 1798:
“You know also how widely different the business of
Government is from the speculation of it, and the energy of
the imagination, dealing in general propositions, from that of
execution in detail.”112
James Madison, on the other hand, had all along some important
differences from Hamilton in both his understanding of the importance of
the new Constitution, and how it should be put into practice. First of all,
he did not display Hamilton’s tendency towards a radical break with the
approach to governing under the Articles of Confederation, and he
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certainly did not entertain as much limitation on the powers of the states.
To Edmund Randolph, Madison wrote in 1787:
“I think with you that it will be well to retain as much as
possible of the old Confederation, tho' I doubt whether it may
not be best to work the valuable articles into the new System,
instead of engrafting the latter on the former. I am also
perfectly of your opinion that in framing a system, no material
sacrifices ought to be made to local or temporary prejudices.
. . . I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual
independence of the States, is utterly irreconcileable with the
idea of an aggregate sovereignty. I think at the same time
that a consolidation of the States into one simple republic is
not less unattainable than it would be inexpedient. Let it be
tried then whether any middle ground can be taken which
will at once support a due supremacy of the national
authority, and leave in force the local authorities so far as
they can be subordinately useful.”113
Even with Madison’s most famous attempt to give power to the
federal government over the states, that is, his desire for Congress to have
a veto on state legislation, he conceived of it not as a replacement of the
states by the federal government, but rather a way of providing stability
to both governments.
“Let the national Government be armed with a positive
& compleat authority in all cases where uniform measures are
necessary. As in trade &c. &c. Let it also retain the powers
which it now possesses.
Let it have a negative in all cases whatsoever on the
Legislative Acts of the States as the K. of G.B. heretofore had.
This I conceive to be essential and the least possible
abridgement of the State Sovereignties. Without such a
defensive power, every positive power that can be given on
paper will be unavailing. It will also give internal stability to
Hutchinson, William T., and William M.E. Rachal, eds., The Papers of James Madison,
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the States. There has been no moment since the peace at
which the federal assent wd have been given to paper
money &c. &c.”114
Notice Madison’s emphasis that the federal government should
have “compleat authority” only in cases where “uniform measures are
necessary.” This is a very different conception of the relationship between
the federal and state governments than Hamilton had. Instead of an
overwhelming fear of the states, Madison argued that only in certain
areas would they need to be restricted, and power instead given to the
federal government.
The problem of interpreting the Constitution, and thus how to put it
into effect, was on Madison’s mind from the very first.

He clearly

understood that it contained many ambiguities, but he thought those
would be removed over time as more and more precedents were
established. We can clearly see here the source of Madison’s concern
with Hamilton’s policy proposals, as if these became the precedents on
which later practice was to be based, then a way of understanding the
Constitution contrary to his own would become the norm. As he stated in
1790, ”Among other difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is
frequently a copious source, and must continue so until its meaning on all
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great points shall have been settled by precedents.”115
Much more so than Hamilton, Madison all along expressed
concerns about the federal government becoming too powerful.
However, his primary fear at the beginning of the new federal
government was with the power of Congress, no doubt in part because of
the criticisms he had had of the behavior of state legislatures under the
Articles of Confederation.
“In truth the Legislative power is of such a nature that it
scarcely can be restrained either by the Constitution or by
itself. And if the federal Government should lose its proper
equilibrium within itself, I am persuaded that the effect will
proceed from the Encroachments of the Legislative
department. If the possibility of encroachments on the part
of the Ex. or the Senate were to be compared, I should
pronounce the danger to lie rather in the latter than the
former.”116
Madison did express some concern over the power of the state
governments, but specifically in regards to civil rights. During the debates
in Congress over the then-proposed amendments to the Constitution
which became the Bill of Rights, Madison was in favor of extending some
of the protections therein to restrict the power of the states. Far before
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment by the
Supreme Court, Madison was in favor of limiting the states’ abilities to
violate certain rights.

When a fellow member of the House of
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Representatives moved to strike out "No state shall infringe the equal rights
of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press, nor of the right
of trial by jury in criminal cases,” Madison responded with this argument,
according to the record:
“Mr. Madison Conceived this to be the most valuable
amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to
restrain the government of the United States from infringing
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they
should be secured against the state governments; he thought
if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to
provide against the others, and was satisfied that it would be
equally grateful to the people.”117
Madison even, in part, agreed with Hamilton’s assessment that one
could never specify the powers of the federal government in advance
through the Constitution. He argued implied powers were inevitable. In
response to another House member’s proposal to add the word
“expressly” just before the word “delegated” in what has become known
as the 10th Amendment’s phrase where it says, "The powers not delegated
by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively," Madison’s response was:
“Mr. Madison Objected to this amendment, because it was
impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express
powers. There must necessarily be admitted powers by
implication, unless the constitution descended to recount
every minutiae. He remembered the word "expressly" had
been moved in the convention of Virginia, by the opponents
to the ratification, and after full and fair discussion was given
up by them, and the system allowed to retain its present
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form.”118
When Hamilton began to propose various measures for actually
putting the Constitution into practice, however, Madison realized just how
different his and his former collaborator’s ideas truly were. As I mentioned
above with Hamilton, Madison also considered ideas which differed from
his own as not only being simply mistaken, but as being subversive and
quite possibly even treasonous. It is surprising, as many have noted, just
how quickly individuals that knew each other, and had worked together
for years and even decades, could so abruptly alter their assessments of
each other to conclude that each was up to the worst possible things
they could imagine. To Henry Lee, Madison wrote in 1792:
“With respect to the general spirit of the administration you
already know how far my ideas square with yours. You know
also how extremely offensive some particular measures have
been; & I will frankly own, (though the remark is for yourself
alone at present) that if they should be followed by the
usurpation of power recommended in the report on
manufactures, I shall consider the fundamental &
characteristic principle of the Govt. as subverted. It will no
longer be a Govert. possessing special powers taken from the
General Mass, but one possessing the genl. mass with special
powers reserved out of it. And this change will take place in
defiance of the true & universal construction, & of the sense in
which the instrument is known to have been proposed,
advocated & ratified. Whether the people of this country will
submit to a constitution not established by themselves, but
imposed on them by their rulers, is a problem to be solved by
the event alone. It must unquestionably be the wish of all
118
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who are friendly to their rights, that their situation should be
understood by them, & that they should have as fair an
opportunity as possible of judging for themselves.”119
Here we see clearly Madison’s essential disagreement with
Hamilton.

For Madison, the federal government had only the specific

powers given to it by the Constitution, and not the extensive powers
proposed by Hamilton.

Now, this is clearly is contrast to his earlier

statement above that not all the powers of any government could be
completely specified in advance.

However, I argue Madison’s idea

regarding implied powers was that the actual powers mentioned in the
Constitution could not be completely specified in advance, and thus his
disagreement with Hamilton was that powers not specifically mentioned
there could not be claimed for the federal government. They needed to
be left to, if anywhere, the states. Note also his argument that there was a
clear understanding by those who proposed the Constitution regarding
what it meant. I will return to this point below.
Madison elaborated on this point in a letter to Edmund Pendleton,
also from 1792:
“If Congress can do whatever in their discretion can be done
by money, and will promote the general welfare, the
Government is no longer a limited one possessing
enumerated powers, but an indefinite one subject to
particular exceptions. It is to be remarked that the phrase out
of which this doctrine is elaborated, is copied from the old
Rutland, Robert A., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 14: 6 April 1791 16 March 1793. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983, 193-194.
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articles of Confederation, where it was always understood as
nothing more than a general caption to the specified
powers, and it is a fact that it was preferred in the new
instrument for that very reason as less liable than any other to
misconstruction.”120
Madison claimed many times that Hamilton’s proposals were in
violation of the understanding those who proposed the Constitution had
in mind when they created the document, and also that those who
accepted the Constitution had in mind as well. This is the main point on
which I criticize Madison, as I claim this is a classic example of “begging
the question,” the well-known logical fallacy. If, as is clear, Hamilton had
a rather different understanding of that document, and the powers it
gave the new government, how could Madison claim to speak
authoritatively for ALL those who had proposed it?
For instance, we know, from his own notes taken at the
Constitutional Convention, that the Constitution was itself the result of
extensive debate and disagreement. Many, if not most, proposals that
were accepted were agreed to only on close votes. It is clear that even
the individuals who themselves took part in writing the Constitution had
different opinions, and this point is further supported by the sides those
who had attended the Constitutional Convention took during the
debates of the 1790’s.

One need look no further for examples than

Hamilton and Madison themselves, although they are far from the only
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ones.
Further, to state that he knew without a doubt how those who had
accepted the Constitution had conceived of it is even more subject to
criticism.

Madison himself knew what every member of every state

convention that accepted the Constitution had in mind when voting in
favor of it? This is stretching credulity way beyond what can reasonably
be expected, as Madison could not have been sure even of the other
members of Virginia’s ratifying convention, let alone people in other states
he never even met.
This weakness in Madison’s arguments can be most clearly seen in
his Virginia Resolution, where he went so far as to claim the final say in
interpreting the Constitution for the individual states. Where once he had
wanted: “To give the new system its proper energy it will be desirable to
have it ratified by the authority of the people, and not merely by that of
the Legislatures,”121 he altered his argument to claim that the states, and
not the people, were the partners in the social contract that had created
the Constitution.
“That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare,
that it views the powers of the federal government, as
resulting from the compact to which the states are parties; as
limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument
constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are
authorised by the grants enumerated in that compact, and
Hutchinson, William T., and William M.E. Rachal, eds., The Papers of James Madison,
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that in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous
exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact,
the states who are parties thereto have the right, and are in
duty bound, to interpose for arresting the pro<gress> of the
evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the
authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.”122
In conclusion, I have argued in this chapter that the disagreements
which characterized Hamilton and Madison’s later careers, after once
closely collaborating on the Federalist, occurred because each had, all
along, distinctly different ideas as to how much power it would be
necessary to give to the federal government created by the Constitution
they both worked so hard to create and achieve. That they were both
surprised by the disagreements they had once they had secured the
Constitution shows that there never really has been a single way of
understanding the role of the Constitution and the federal government in
the United States, nor has there been a single way of “defining the
republic.”
As regards the issue of republicanism, we once again see just how
widely different preferences on what a republican government should be
like can be held by individuals living at the same time and in the same
country. For Hamilton, the difficulty in creating the kind of republic that
could survive was what he saw as the centrifugal influence of the states.
The states had too much power in his estimation, and people were far
Mattern, David B., et.al, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Volume 17: 31 March
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more loyal to them than to the United States as a whole. In order for that
to succeed, the power of the federal government needed to be
increased, very specifically taking power, and citizen loyalty, away from
the states. States “could” play a useful role in his vision of the United
States, but their influence needed to be as limited as possible.

One

specific issue he especially feared state influence on was property rights.
The states, with their tendencies toward debt relief, paper money, etc.,
would undermine the kind of order he saw as necessary for any human
society to continue to exist.

Thus, the Constitution needed to be

interpreted in such ways as to allow the federal government to do the
many things he saw as necessary for creating a lasting, successful,
powerful, and especially “great” country.
Madison was much less fearful of state power. Yes, he did see a
need to give the federal government more power, but he did not see any
need for a radical break from the principles of the Articles of
Confederation. Greater state power and state sovereignty were realities
he had lived with for far longer than Hamilton, so they posed less of a
problem in his mind. All the federal government needed were a few, welldefined group of powers, in order to assure the success of the federal
government, and the United States as a whole. For Madison, the goal
was the “least possible abridgement of state sovereignties.” As far as the
need to resolve Constitutional ambiguities through accumulation of
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precedent, he preferred a United States where such ambiguities led not
to greater power for the federal government, but greater assignment of
certain powers and duties to the state governments. For Madison, the
United States was far more a collection of individual states, and an entire
nation only secondarily. He saw no reason why such a situation could not
succeed.
opinion.

Hamilton, on the other hand, was of the exact opposite
In order to succeed, the United States needed to stress its

common identity, and not its continued existence as a collection of
states, where the individual citizen’s primary identification was with their
state.
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Chapter Five: Hamilton and Madison on Religion
Hamilton and Madison did not differ greatly in their opinions on
religion, at least as regards the official role of government. Madison, as is
well known, opposed much more openly and consistently, any attempt to
create or support an official religion for the United States as a whole. He
even, as I will show below, wanted to extend the protection of freedom of
conscience to apply to the states as well, which would have conflicted
with some state laws at the time.
As I have mentioned before, though, my goal in writing this
dissertation is to show the underlying differences between Hamilton and
Madison, rather than concentrating specifically the views of either. That
sort of work has been done extensively already, and does not need to be
repeated here. It is the underlying differences which I argue they had all
along that led to their eventual political rivalry, and one of the topics on
which they differed was religion, albeit not as sharply as in other areas.
Hamilton did display an underlying religious bent all of his life, far less
so at the beginning, but nevertheless growing in intensity as he aged.
There are few references to religion in Hamilton’s early years, but that
number increased dramatically towards the end of his life. For Hamilton,
the importance of religion stemmed from his conviction that it provided a
sense of order and continuity in life that could be found nowhere else.
Thus we will see his quite visceral horrified reaction to the atheism of the

97

French Revolution. That, and the violence I mentioned above in Chapter
Three, is what turned him away from supporting the French Revolution.
Madison did not display any overt religiosity in any of his writings
throughout his life. He did, however, show a consistent, and strong, belief,
in the necessity for religious freedom from any official religion, either in
Virginia or the United States as a whole. His was an ongoing suspicion of
religion, and indeed a great fear of any kind of official religion. Unlike
Hamilton, Madison showed no disapproval of the atheism of the French
Revolution. It just did not seem to bother him at all. Religion was just not
necessary for order in society in his view.
One piece of research on Hamilton I do agree shows us an
important aspect of his thought is Clement Fatovic’s “Reason and
Experience in Alexander Hamilton’s Science of Politics.

Fatovic argues

Hamilton followed David Hume in emphasizing the limitations of human
reason.
“I argue that even Hamilton’s most far-reaching reforms were
grounded in a Humean understanding of the limits of human
rationality in explaining and controlling the world with the kind
of certainty and mastery sought by many other
Enlightenment-era thinkers.
The Humean foundations of
Hamilton’s ‘science of politics’ suggest that an epistemology
grounded in concrete experience is not necessarily
committed to the status quo. In fact, because this science of
politics is not wedded to any fixed ideas about what works
best in politics, it can actually be open to significant
innovation and experimentation.”123
Clement Fatovic, “Reason and Experience in Alexander Hamilton’s Science of
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Fatovic includes as part of this argument an early work from
Hamilton, which I will also discuss below, regarding a hurricane which
struck the island he was living on. For Fatovic, this work is indicative of
Hamilton’s conviction from very early on in his life of the limitations humans
live with.
“In one of his earliest writings, an uncharacteristically
overwrought first-hand account of a deadly hurricane that
ripped through his native St. Croix, Hamilton exhibited that
characteristic sensitivity to the contingency of human life that
would pervade his more mature reflections on politics. After
describing the devastation inflicted by the storm in vivid terms
sure to arouse the imagination, the young West Indian
reflected on his own smallness and diffidence when
confronted with so much ‘ruin and confusion on every side.’ .
. . In calling upon the aid and mercy of God, the frightened
youth was not simply making a flamboyant display of his
piety. He was also expressing a developing awareness of the
limits of human understanding.”124
While as I said above, I agree with Fatovic’s view of Hamilton as
regards the limitations of human reason, the reason I will include the same
early work of Hamilton’s he discusses is that for me, it will begin the
presentation of the underlying greater amount of preference for
Christianity and its importance for supplying meaning and purpose to life I
am convinced Hamilton had all along. Madison was not hostile to religion
as such, but rather he was much less given over to religious sentiments
than Hamilton, and was far more concerned, due to the established
church in his home of Virginia, with religious freedom.
124
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Michael J. Rosano focuses more on Hamilton’s overall view of
human nature, and the effect it had on his political thought.
“This analysis, by contrast, seeks to understand Hamilton on his
own terms by interpreting and synthesizing his basic
observations about human nature so as to define his
conception of human nature and its vital relation to his
political thought. His conception is predominately and even
radically liberal, but it also reflects key features of Christian
and classical republican thought. The relation between those
conflicting aspects, in effect, defines his thought, reveals its
assumptions, and poses urgent philosophical, moral, and
political problems.”125
Rosano argues Hamilton’s views are the result of a complex mix of
influences, ultimately fashioned into a unique whole in pursuit of his own
goals for the United States.
“The Constitution is a republican solution to complex moral
and political problems rooted in human nature and displayed
throughout the history of government.
Hamilton rejects
classical republican and Christian principles in favor of
Machiavelli's effectual truth, Hobbes's concept of power,
Lockean liberty, and his own science of politics. Hamilton's
liberal conception of human nature as passionately selfinterested grounds his political science. But Hamilton's
synthesis of alternatives in modern political thought displays its
limits by depending on nobility and philanthropy. Classical
and Christian virtues thus infuse his conception of human
nature and bolster the Republic. Whether the spirits of liberty,
nobility, philanthropy, and power can continue to harmonize
as a chorus of the better angels of our nature is an open
question. Americans have the right to alter their government
according to the principles that seem likely to secure their
happiness. But safeguarding the rights of individuals marching
to the beat of their own drum requires more than vigilance.
Civic deliberation about the best principles for today in the
Michael J. Rosano, “Liberty, Nobility, Philanthropy, and Power in Alexander Hamilton’s
Conception of Human Nature,” American Journal of Political Science 47, No. 1 (2003):
61.
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light of the principles that made government by the
deliberation and choice of the people possible remains a
condition of liberty.”126
As I mentioned above, Madison was not as concerned with religion
himself throughout his life. I have read the collected writings of both and
there just is not the same underlying religiosity with Madison as there is with
Hamilton.

As we will see, Madison was not horrified by the atheism

espoused as part of the French Revolution as Hamilton was.

He was,

however, consistently throughout his life an opponent of official state
religion, for reasons I will show below.
Thomas Lindsay argues, in regards to Madison’s “Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,” that it reflects not only
Madison’s concern for religious freedom, but also that it shows his hostility
to religion itself.
“I argue that the Memorial’s explicit religious appeals are
better understood as rhetoric than as expressions of
Madison’s conviction that politics is ‘subordinate’ to God’s
‘commands.’ Moreover, I find Madison’s thought hostile not
only to religious establishments (as is well known) but also –
contrary to the language of the Memorial and to its
consensus interpretation – hostile, in important aspects, to
revealed religion itself.”127
I myself do not find the same hostility to religion itself as Lindsay, but
the point is Madison just did not express the same kind of faith in
Christianity that Hamilton had.
Ibid, 72-73.
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Vincent Munoz argues a slightly different point regarding Madison
on religion than I do.

For him, Madison’s thought on the relationship

between government and religion is one in which the government is
supposed to not take any notice of religion or religious belief when
interacting with citizens.
“I argue that Madison champions a ‘religion-blind’
constitution, a constitution that prohibits the state from taking
cognizance of religion. The state, in Madison’s view, may not
classify citizens on the basis of religious beliefs or religious
affiliation, which means that the state may neither privilege
nor penalize religious institutions, religious citizens, or religiously
motivated conduct as such.”128
While I do not disagree with Munoz, the point I will make below in
regards to Madison is in connection with his overall expectation for the
United States as a whole, not just as to how government treats religion in a
legal sense.
I now turn to the writings of Hamilton and Madison themselves. As I
mentioned above, as I have read the writings of both I have found a far
greater expressed religiosity, albeit in different forms, throughout the
writings of Hamilton than Madison. Like so many people, Hamilton did not
overtly express his religious preferences throughout most of his life. Rather,
they were part of his underlying understanding of what existence is like,
and provided him with a sense of meaning and purpose for life itself. This
greater religiosity can clearly be seen in the first excerpts from Hamilton’s
Vincent Phillip Munoz, “James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty,” The American
Political Science Review 97, No. 1 (2003), 17.
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works, a reflection following a hurricane which struck St. Croix, published in
The Royal Danish American Gazette on September 6, 1772.
“Let the Earth rend. Let the planets forsake their course.
Let the Sun be extinguished and the Heavens burst asunder.
Yet what have I to dread? My staff can never be broken—in
Omnip[o]tence I trusted.
He who gave the winds to blow, and the lightnings to
rage—even him have I always loved and served. His precepts
have I observed. His commandments have I obeyed—and his
perfections have I adored. He will snatch me from ruin. He will
exalt me to the fellowship of Angels and Seraphs, and to the
fullness of never ending joys.” 129
And:
“Our distressed, helpless condition taught us humility
and contempt of ourselves. The horrors of the night, the
prospect of an immediate, cruel death—or, as one may say,
of being crushed by the Almighty in his anger—filled us with
terror. And every thing that had tended to weaken our
interest with him, upbraided us in the strongest colours, with
our baseness and folly. That which, in a calm unruffled
temper, we call a natural cause, seemed then like the
correction of the Deity. Our imagination represented him as
an incensed master, executing vengeance on the crimes of
his servants. The father and benefactor were forgot, and in
that view, a consciousness of our guilt filled us with despair.
But see, the Lord relents. He hears our prayer. The
Lightning ceases. The winds are appeased. The warring
elements are reconciled and all things promise peace. The
darkness is dispell’d and drooping nature revives at the
approaching dawn. Look back Oh! my soul, look back and
tremble. Rejoice at thy deliverance, and humble thyself in the
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, volume I: 1768-1778. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 34-39.
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presence of thy deliverer. “130
As I mentioned above, Hamilton was not an overtly religious person
throughout most of his life, but one can see again and again the sort of
religious references with him that one simply does not find with Madison.
The event which does seem to have aroused his greatest amount of
reflection on the importance of religion was the French Revolution.
Hamilton was horrified by not only the violence and bloodshed which took
place, but also by the proclamations of atheism that were prominent
amongst those who led the Revolution.

In a letter to an unknown

correspondent from 1793, Hamilton expressed this negative, indeed
visceral, reaction regarding this French undermining of the importance of
religion.
“The cause of France is compared with that of America
during its late revolution. Would to Heaven that the
comparison were just. Would to heaven that we could
discern in the Mirror of French affairs, the same humanity, the
same decorum, the same gravity, the same order, the same
dignity, the same solemnity, which distinguished the course of
the American Revolution. Clouds & Darkness would not then
rest upon the issue as they now do.”131
And:
“When

I

find

the

doctrines

of

Atheism

openly
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advanced in the Convention and heared with loud
applauses—When I see the sword of fanaticism extended to
force a political creed upon citizens who were invited to
submit to the arms of France as the harbingers of Liberty—
When I behold the hand of Rapacity outstretched to
prostrate and ravish the monuments of religious worship
erected by those citizens and their ancestors. When I
perceive passion tumult and violence usurping those seats,
where reason and cool deliberation ought to preside—
I acknowlege, that I am glad to believe, there is no real
resemblance between what was the cause of America &
what is the cause of France—that the difference is no less
great than that between Liberty & Licentiousness. I regret
whatever has a tendency to confound them, and I feel
anxious, as an American, that the ebullitions of inconsiderate
men among us may not tend to involve our Reputation in the
issue.”132
One sees here Hamilton’s connection of religion with social order
and reason. Now, as I will argue below, Hamilton did not argue for any
sort of official religion on the part of the United States, but rather for an
ongoing understanding of, and reference to, religion as part of even
official government activity. He was not exclusionary in terms of which
specific religion, or at least we have no evidence of that, but rather he
equated atheism, that is, a lack of religion, especially Christianity, as part
of public life, with chaos and barbarism.
Further evidence of his rejection of the French Revolution comes
from an essay he wrote regarding “The War in Europe” in 1796.

For

Hamilton, Christianity had reduced the level of violence and destruction
132
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practiced in early wars, such as those fought by the Roman Empire. For
him, French rejection of Christianity was tantamount to a return to Roman
barbarism and destruction.
“Every step of the progress of the present war in Europe
has been marked with horrors. If the perpetration of them was
confined to those who are the acknowleged instruments of
despotic Power, it would excite less surprize—but when they
are acted by those who profess themselves to be the
Champions of the rights of man, they naturally occasion both
wonder and regret. Passing by the extreme severities which
the French have exercised in Italy, what shall we think of the
following declaration of Jourdan to the inhabitants of
Germany
Good God! is it then a crime for men to defend their
own Government and Country? Is it a punishable offence in
the Germans that they will not accept from the French what
they offer as liberty, at the point of the bayonet? This is to
confound all ideas of morality and humanity; it is to trample
upon all the rights of man and nations. It is to restore the ages
of Barbarism. According to the laws and practice of modern
war, the peasantry of a Country, if they remain peaceably at
home, are protected from other harm than a contribution to
the necessities of the invading army. Those who join the
armies of their Country and fight with them are considered
and treated as other soldiers. But the present French Doctrine
is, that they are to be treated as Rebels and Criminals.
German patriotism is a heinous offence in the eyes of French
Patriots. How are we to solve this otherwise than by observing
that the French are influenced by the same spirit of
Domination which governed the antient Romans! These
considered themselves as having a right to be the Masters of
the World and to treat the rest of mankind as their vassals.
How clearly is it proved <by> all <–> that the praise of a
<–> world is justly due to Christianity. War, by the influence of
the humane principles of that Religion, had been stripped of
half its terrors. The French renounce christianity & they relapse
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into Barbarism. War resumes the same hideous and savage
form, which it wore in the ages of Roman and Gothic
Violence.”133
Hamilton was far more comfortable with official public events
involving religion than Madison. He even went so far to advocate, on
more than one occasion, public proclamations and displays by
government officials as a means of expressing, or at least trying to
influence, the overall sense of the public will. When the French Directory
refused to receive Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in 1797, Hamilton wrote to
Timothy Pickering what he thought the United States should do.
“It is now ascertained that Mr Pinckney has been
refused and with circumstances of indignity. What is to be
done? The share I have had in the public administration
added to my interest as a Citizen make me extremely anxious
that at this delicate Crisis a course of conduct exactly proper
may be adopted. I offer to your consideration without
ceremony what appears to me such a course.
First. I would appoint a day of humiliation and prayer. In
such a crisis this appears to me proper in itself and it will be
politically useful to impress our nation that there is a serious
state of things—to strengthen religious ideas in a contest
which in its progress may require that our people may
consider themselves as the defenders of their Country against
Atheism conquest & anarchy. It is far from evident to me that
the progress of the war may not call on us to defend our fire
sides & our altars. And any plan which does not look forward
to this as possible will in my opinion be a superficial one.”134
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In his speech writing duties for President Washington, Hamilton also
displayed

his

comfort

with

a

public

role

for

the

President

in

acknowledging and even promoting religiosity among American citizens.
Below is a draft he wrote for President Washington in 1795. Note how
Hamilton argues the United States should specifically be grateful to God
for its favorable situation. For Hamilton, it is God’s good will towards the
United States that is responsible for the nation’s well-being, and thus the
nation as a whole should publicly give thanks. However, note the lack
reference to any one kind of religion. It is simply that religious groups are
“recommended,” not commanded, to take part on a specific day.
“Amidst the calamities which afflict so many other nations
[and trouble the sources of individual quiet security and
happiness,] the present condition of the UStates affords much
matter of consolation and satisfaction. Our exemption hitherto
from the evils of foreign war, an increasing prospect of the
continuance of that precious exemption—the great degree of
internal tranquillity we have enjoyed, the recent confirmation
of that tranquillity by the suppression of an insurrection which
so wantonly threatened it—the happy course of our public
affairs in general—the unexampled prosperity of all classes of
our citizens—are circumstances which peculiarly mark our
situation with [peculiar] indications of the Divine beneficence
towards us. In such a state of things it becomes us in an
especial manner as a People, with devout reverence and
affectionate gratitude to bow down before the Majesty of the
Almighty to acknowlege our numerous obligations to him & to
implore under a deep sense of his past goodness a
continuance and confirmation of the blessings we experience.
Deeply penetrated with this sentiment I George Washington
President of the Ustates do recommend to all religious
societies and denominations and to all persons whomsoever
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within the U States to set apart and observe Thursday the 19th
day of Feby next as a day of public thanksgiving and prayer
and on that day to meet together & render their sincere and
hearty thanks to the Great Ruler of Nations, for the manifold
and signal mercies which distinguish our lot as a Nation;
particularly for the possession of Constitutions of Government
which unite & by their union establish Liberty with Order for the
preservation of our peace foreign and domestic, for the
seasonable check which has been given to a spirit of disorder
in the suppression of the late Insurrection, and generally for the
prosperous course of our affairs public and private; and at the
same time humbly and fervently to beseech the kind Author of
these blessings graciously to prolong them to us—to imprint on
our hearts a deep and solemn sense of our obligations to him
for them—to teach us rightly to estimate their immense
value—to preserve us from the wantonness of prosperity, from
jeopardizing the advantages we enjoy by culpable or delusive
projects—to dispose us to merit the continuance of his favours,
by not abusing them, by our gratitude for them, and by a
correspondent conduct as citizens and as men to render this
country more & more a secure & propitious asylum for the
unfortunate of other countries—to diffuse among us true &
useful knowlege to diffuse and establish habits of sobriety,
order, morality and Piety and finally to impart all the blessings
we possess or ask for ourselves to the whole family of Mankind,
that so Men may be happy & God glorified throughout the
Earth.”135
Even Hamilton’s sense of public duty, and I argue even the quest for
fame that Douglass Adair and Martin Harvey noted,136 was in part
motivated by his conviction of the absolute importance of religion for
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
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organized civil society.

Without it, society would fall apart, in his

estimation. This is why, to the end of his life, he refrained from intentionally
engaging in public behavior which might disqualify him for public service.
I say “intentionally” because I am convinced his public letter attacking
President John Adams was a blunder he did not fully appreciate the
effect of until after he had issued it. Prior to that, though, including during
the Quasi-War era, his thoughts explicitly included the need to keep
himself available for public service, in part to defend religion. In 1795, he
wrote to Robert Troup:
“Because there must be some public fools who
sacrifice private to public interest at the certainty of
ingratitude and obloquy—because my vanity whispers I
ought to be one of those fools and ought to keep myself in a
situation the best calculated to render service—because I
dont want to be rich and if I cannot live in splendor in Town,
with a moderate fortune moderately acquired, I can at least
live in comfort in the country and I am content to do so.b . . .
The game to be played may be a most important one.
It may be for nothing less than true liberty, property, order,
religion and of course heads. I will try Troupe if possible to
guard yours & mine. . . .
You are good enough to offer to stand between me
and ostensibility. I thank you with all my soul. You cannot
doubt that I should have implicit confidence in you but it has
been the rule of my life to do nothing for my own emolument
under<cover—what> I would not promulge I would avoid. This
may be too great refinement. I know it is pride. But this pride
makes it part of my plan to appear truly what I am. . . .
God bless you. Always Affectionately Yrs.137”
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
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Note how Hamilton equates “true liberty” with not only “property,”
but also “order, religion,” and even “heads.” For Hamilton, his lifelong
religiosity manifested itself in a conviction that disavowal of religion and
religiosity by any nation was a recipe for disaster. Note also his use of
“God bless you,” something one simply does not find anywhere near as
often with Madison.
Even more clear evidence of Hamilton’s connection of the French
Revolution with chaos because of the violence and rejection of
Christianity came during the Quasi-War, and Hamilton’s published series of
articles entitled, “The Stand.” In number 3, written in 1798, he says:
“In reviewing the disgusting spectacle of the French
revolution, it is difficult to avert the eye entirely from those
features of it which betray a plan to disorganize the human
mind itself, as well as to undermine the venerable pillars that
support the edifice of civilized society. The attempt by the
rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to
pervert a whole people to Atheism, is a phenomenon of
profligacy reserved to consummate the infamy of the
unprincipled reformers of France. The proofs of this terrible
design are numerous and convincing.
The animosity to the Christian system is demonstrated
by the single fact of the ridiculous and impolitic establishment
of the decades, with the evident object of supplanting the
Christian Sabbath. The inscription by public authority on the
tombs of the deceased, affirming death to be an eternal
sleep, witness the desire to discredit the belief of the
immortality of the soul. The open profession of Atheism in the
1973, 328-329.
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Convention, received with acclamations; the honorable
mention on its journals of a book professing to prove the
nothingness of all religion;† the institution of a festival to offer
public worship to a courtezan decorated with the pompous
[title] of “Goddess of Reason;” the congratulatory reception
of impious children appearing in the hall of the Convention to
lisp blasphemy against the King of Kings; are among the
dreadful proofs of a conspiracy to establish Atheism on the
ruins of Christianity—to deprive mankind of its best
consolations and most animating hopes—and to make a
gloomy desert of the universe.”138
As I mentioned above, though, even while stressing the importance
of religion for civilized society, Hamilton did not show any strong
preference for one form of religion over another, at least as far as public
policy was concerned.

His statements show a marked preference for

religiosity among the citizenry, but not any kind of bigotry within the forms
of organized religion. While not his own words, a letter written in 1794 from
his sister-in-law Angelica shows a type of open-mindedness towards an
otherwise quite unpopular, in England, variant of Christianity, Unitarianism.
This, by the way, is a point of agreement between Hamilton and Madison,
as we will see below.
“You will have the pleasure to receive this letter by Dr.
Priestly, a man dear to virtue and to science. Without the
advantage and satisfaction of his acquaintance, I revere him
for his works, and take a particular interest that he should be
well received in America. That happy country which seems
reserved by Providence as an Assylum from the crimes and
persecutions which make Europe the pity and disgrace of the
Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, volume XXI: April 1797 - July
1798. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 402.
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age.
You my dear Brother will receive with distinguished
kindness this worthy stranger, (if he whose breast teems with
the love of mankind may anywhere be called a stranger)
and make our country so dear to him as to cause him to
forget that which he leaves at an advanced period of Life
and which he has most ably served.”139
Hamilton further emphasized the importance of religion during his
service as Inspector General for the Army.

At first, he did not think

Congress had authorized chaplains, and so wrote the Secretary of War to
recommend Congress add them.
“There is no provision in the law for Chaplains. I am
nevertheless deeply impressed with the importance of divine
service among the troops, and have written on the subject to
the S of War.”140
However, later, he did discover that Congress had authorized
chaplains, and expressed the importance of filling these positions, not
merely because he was simply carrying out the will of Congress, but also
because he himself considered provision for religion as important even in
the military.
“Application has been made to me on the Subject of
Chaplains. I find by recurrence to the laws that four of these
characters are provided for. This will furnish one to each
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
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brigade. I doubt not you will feel with me strong motives
which recommend the speedily going into these
appointments. The Revd. Mr. Hill has been proposed by Col.
Parker and I now offer him to you as a Candidate. It appears
from the letter of Col. Parker that this Gentleman has been
officiating in the character of Chaplain for some time.”141
Hamilton did consider there to be some limits on what kind of
religion would be appropriate. In a letter to William S. Smith in 1800, he
objected to a potential chaplain candidate due to that individual’s
“enthusiasm.” This is quite similar to his objection to the French Revolution
as having gone out of control due to excessive human emotion.
“I can not say any thing relative to the claim of Captain
White, having never been able to obtain from the S of War a
definitive rule on the subject. I have just renewed my
application relative to the point. The result as soon as known
shall be communicated to you. Enthusiasm is certainly a very
good thing, but religious enthusiasm is at least a dangerous
instrument. From this, and some other circumstances which
have come to my knowledge, I must decline authorizing you
to employ the person you mention.”142
But when George Washington died, in addition to the military
honors one would expect an Inspector General would arrange for a
former President and Commanding General, Hamilton specifically wanted
to include the services of a minister. To William North he wrote:
“I enclose to you some regulations relative to the
funeral honors to be paid to our departed chief. They will
govern generally in the celebration, altho’ I have not
141
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definitively adopted them.
The ceremonies will be performed in this city on
Thursday next, and I should wish them to be performed in
New York at the same time. If this is practicable you will
immediately make the necessary arrangements for the
purpose. You will draw the companies from the island, leaving
only a sufficient number of men to manage the guard and
concert measures with General Clarkson for bringing forward
the uniform corps of volunteers and militia to take part in the
scene. It will be proper likewise that the city should form part
of the procession, and you will do what shall appear to you
proper in reference to that idea. The half hour guns will be
fired on the island, and the minute guns from the battery. The
time is not sufficient for preparing a regular oration, but I
should be happy if you could prevail on Doctor Moore or
some other Clergyman to deliver a discourse suited to the
occasion.”143
It is in his private life, though, that one can most clearly see his
religious sentiments expressed, and just how important they were for his
life, even if he did not express them publicly.

His letters to his wife,

Elizabeth, are especially full of the religious expressions which simply do
not occur in similar letters by Madison. In 1797, his father-in-law, Philip
Schuyler, had a bout of ill health, and so Hamilton wrote to her:
“I pray you, don’t alarm yourself for you know how dangerous
it will be in your situation and how much it is a duty should his
case ever take a worse turn than we now apprehend to arm
ourselves with Christian fortitude and resignation.”144
Also in 1797, when his eldest son Philip also was in bad health, he

Ibid, 114-115.
Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, volume XXI: April 1797 - July
1798. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, 51.
143
144

115

wrote:
“I am arrived here My Dear Eliza in good health but very
anxious about my Dear Philip. I pray heaven to restore him
and in every event to support you. . . . God bless my beloved
and all My Dear Children.”145
One essential aspect of Hamilton’s religious beliefs, already
mentioned in regards to the negative influence he believed the French
Revolution’s emphasis on atheism would have on civilization, is the belief
in an afterlife, which he clearly considered provided not only meaning
and purpose, but also comfort and consolation, to human life. After one
of his wife’s sisters died in 1801, he wrote to Elizabeth:
“On Saturday, My Dear Eliza, your sister took leave of
her sufferings and friends, I trust, to find repose and happiness
in a better country.
Viewing all that she had endured for so long a time, I
could not but feel a relief in the termination of the scene. She
was sensible to the last and resigned to the important
change.
Your father and mother are now calm. All is as well as it
can be; except the dreadful ceremonies which custom
seems to have imposed as indispensable in this pla<ce>, and
which at every instant open anew the closing wounds of
bleeding hearts. Tomorrow the funeral takes place. The day
after I hope to set sail for N York.
I long to come to console and comfort you my darling
Betsey. Adieu my sweet angel. Remember the duty of
Christian Resignation.
Ever Yrs.”146
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This idea of “Christian resignation” was one he used again and
again in his correspondence with Elizabeth Hamilton. It is an aspect of his
religiosity that appeared well before his son Philip was killed in a duel in
1801, but was clearly evident in his letters to people from whom he had
received condolences after Philip’s death. To John Dickinson he wrote:
“I was not, My Dear Sir, insensible to the kind attention
shewn me by your letter of the 30th. of November last. But till
very lately the subject has been so extremely painful to me,
that I have been under a necessity of flying from it as much
as possible. Time and effort and occupation have at length
restored the tranquillity of my mind, sufficiently to permit me
to acknowlege the kindness of those friends who were good
enough to manifest their sympathy in my misfortune.
Be assured, Sir, that consolation from you on such an
occasion was particularly welcome to me, and that I shall
always remember it with a grateful sense. The friendship of
the wise and good rises in value, in proportion as we learn to
form a just estimate of human character and opinion.
That estimate too has a tendency to reconcile us to the
departure of those, who are dear to us, from a world, which
holds out to virtue many snares, few very few supports or
recompences. I do assure you, Sir, that as soon as the calm of
Reason returned, this consideration had no small influence in
disposing me to resign, with diminished regret, the eldest and
brightest hope of my family. Happy those who deduce from it
motives to seek in earnest a higher, and far more substantial,
bliss, than can ever be found in this chequered, this ever
varying scene!”147
To Benjamin Rush he wrote, also on March 29, 1802:
“I felt all the weight of the obligation which I owed to
you and to your amiable family, for the tender concern they
147
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manifested in an event, beyond comparison, the most
afflicting of my life. But I was obliged to wait for a moment of
greater calm, to express my sense of the kindness.
My loss is indeed great. The highest as well as the eldest
hope of my family has been taken from me. You estimated
him rightly—He was truly a fine youth. But why should I repine?
It was the will of heaven; and he is now out of the reach of
the seductions and calamities of a world, full of folly, full of
vice, full of danger—of least value in proportion as it is best
known. I firmly trust also that he has safely reached the haven
of eternal repose and felicity.
You will easily imagine that every memorial of the
goodness of his heart must be precious to me. You allude to
one recorded in a letter to your son. If no special reasons
forbid it, I should be very glad to have a copy of that
letter.”148
Among those few expressions of his religious beliefs that we have in
his papers to anyone other than immediate family, is his letter to Martha
Washington after George Washington’s death.
“I did not thing it proper, Madam, to intrude amidst the
first effusions of your grief. But I can no longer restrain my
sensibility from conveying to you an imperfect expression of
my affectionate sympathy in the sorrows you experience. No
one, better than myself, knows the greatness of your loss, or
how much your excellent heart is formed to feel it in all its
extent. Satisfied that you cannot receive consolation, I will
attempt to offer none. Resignation to the will of Heaven,
which the practice of your life ensures, can alone alleviate
the sufferings of so heart-rending an affliction.
There can be few, who equally with me participate in
the loss you deplore. In expressing this sentiment, I may
without impropriety allude to the numerous and distinguished
marks of confidence and friendship, of which you have
148
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yourself been a Witness; but I cannot say in how many ways
the continuance of that confidence and friendship was
necessary to me in future relations.
Vain, however, are regrets. From a calamity, which is
common to a mourning nation, who can expect to be
exempt? Perhaps it is even a privilege to have a claim to a
larger portion of it than others.”149
Even when faced with possible death, Hamilton expressed how he
intended to behave based on his Christian beliefs. Now, the expressions
he made did show a difference in the preparations he made and the
sentiments he recorded between his upcoming duel with Aaron Burr and
the earlier preparations he had made for other possible duels. One of
Hamilton’s flaws, perhaps his greatest, was his extraordinary concern for
his personal honor. It is only a guess to say they were based on his family
background (parents of uncertain marriage status), and lack of
established family connections, but nevertheless the concern was there.
We have several incidents recorded amongst his own papers where he
felt the possibility of fighting a duel was his only choice. However, it is only
with the last, his duel with Burr, that we have any strong religious
sentiments tied directly to the upcoming event.
In a statement regarding the upcoming “interview,” Hamilton wrote
he was not eager to participate, due to the possibility of harming another
human being, which he deplored due to his Christian beliefs.
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“My religious and moral principles are strongly opposed to the
practice of Duelling, and it would even give me pain to be
obliged to shed the blood of a fellow creature in a private
combat forbidden by the laws.”150
To Elizabeth Hamilton he wrote:
“This letter, my very dear Eliza, will not be delivered to
you, unless I shall first have terminated my earthly career; to
begin, as I humbly hope from redeeming grace and divine
mercy, a happy immortality.
If it had been possible for me to have avoided the
interview, my love for you and my precious children would
have been alone a decisive motive. But it was not possible,
without sacrifices which would have rendered me unworthy
of your esteem. I need not tell you of the pangs I feel, from
the idea of quitting you and exposing you to the anguish
which I know you would feel. Nor could I dwell on the topic
lest it should unman me.
The consolations of Religion, my beloved, can alone
support you; and these you have a right to enjoy. Fly to the
bosom of your God and be comforted. With my last idea; I
shall cherish the sweet hope of meeting you in a better
world.”151
When, after the duel, Hamilton realized he was a dying man, his
thoughts were of making a final expression of his religious beliefs. As is well
known, he requested two different clergymen to give him communion as
a final statement regarding his beliefs. I am including Benjamin Moore’s
statement to William Coleman so as to provide documentation of
Hamilton’s deep-seated beliefs. Much as the statement of a dying person
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is taken quite seriously in the law, Hamilton’s intention at this point of his life
shows the intensity of his beliefs.
“Mr. Coleman,
The public mind being extremely agitated by the melancholy
fate of that great man, Alexander Hamilton, I have thought it
would be grateful to my fellow-citizens, would provide against
misrepresentation, and, perhaps, be conducive to the
advancement of the cause of religion, were I to give a
narrative of some facts which have fallen under my own
observation, during the time which elapsed between the
fatal duel and his departure out of this world.
Yesterday morning, immediately after he was brought
from Hoboken to the house of Mr. Bayard, at Greenwich, a
message was sent informing me of the sad event,
accompanied by a request from General Hamilton, that I
would come to him for the purpose of administering the holy
communion. I went; but being desirous to afford time for
serious reflection, and conceiving that under existing
circumstances, it would be right and proper to avoid every
appearance of precipitancy in performing one of the most
solemn offices of our religion, I did not then comply with his
desire. At one o’clock I was again called on to visit him. Upon
my entering the room and approaching his bed, with the
utmost calmness and composure he said, ‘My dear Sir, you
perceive my unfortunate situation, and no doubt have been
made acquainted with the circumstances which led to it. It is
my desire to receive the communion at your hands. I hope
you will not conceive there is any impropriety in my request.’
He added, ‘It has for some time past been the wish of my
heart, and it was my intention to take an early opportunity of
uniting myself to the church, by the reception of that holy
ordinance.’ I observed to him, that he must be very sensible
of the delicate and trying situation in which I was then
placed; that however desirous I might be to afford
consolation to a fellow mortal in distress; still, it was my duty as
a minister of the gospel, to hold up the law of God as
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paramount to all other law; and that, therefore, under the
influence of such sentiments, I must unequivocally condemn
the practice which had brought him to his present unhappy
condition. He acknowledged the propriety of these
sentiments, and declared that he viewed the late transaction
with sorrow and contrition. I then asked him, ‘Should it please
God, to restore you to health, Sir, will you never be again
engaged in a similar transaction? and will you employ all your
influence in society to discountenance this barbarous
custom?’ His answer was, ‘That, Sir, is my deliberate intention.’
I proceeded to converse with him on the subject of his
receiving the Communion; and told him that with respect to
the qualifications of those who wished to become partakers
of that holy ordinance, my inquiries could not be made in
language more expressive than that which was used by our
Church. ‘Do you sincerely repent of your sins past? Have you
a lively faith in God’s mercy through Christ, with a thankful
remembrance of the death of Christ? And are you disposed
to live in love and charity with all men?’ He lifted up his hands
and said, ‘With the utmost sincerity of heart I can answer
those questions in the affirmative—I have no ill will against
Col. Burr. I met him with a fixed resolution to do him no harm. I
forgive all that happened.’ I then observed to him, that the
terrors of the divine law were to be announced to the
obdurate and impenitent: but that the consolations of the
Gospel were to be offered to the humble and contrite heart:
that I had no reason to doubt his sincerity, and would
proceed immediately to gratify his wishes. The Communion
was then administered, which he received with great
devotion, and his heart afterwards appeared to be perfectly
at rest. I saw him again this morning, when with his last
faltering words, he expressed a strong confidence in the
mercy of God through the intercession of the Redeemer. I
remained with him until 2 o’clock this afternoon, when death
closed the awful scene—he expired without a struggle, and
almost without a groan.
By reflecting on this melancoly event, let the humble
believer be encouraged ever to hold fast that precious faith
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which is the only source of true consolation in the last
extremity of nature. Let the Infidel be persuaded to abandon
his opposition to that gospel which the strong, inquisitive, and
comprehensive mind of a Hamilton embraced, in his last
moments, as the truth from heaven. Let those who are
disposed to justify the practice of duelling, be induced, by this
simple narrative, to view with abhorrence that custom which
has occasioned in irreparable loss to a worthy and most
afflicted family: which has deprived his friends of a beloved
companion, his profession of one of its brightest ornaments,
and his country of a great statesman and a real patriot. With
great respect,
I remain
your friend and ser’t,
Benjamin Moore.”152
So, all well and good. Hamilton had an underlying sense of religion
that we can document from his earliest to his last days.

He was

convinced not only of the importance of religion in his own life, but also
for the good of civilization as a whole. How did this affect his views of
what the United States should be and become? This we can clearly see
in his plan, expressed to James Bayard in 1802, for a “Christian
Constitutional Society,” in response to the threat he perceived of an
American version of French Jacobinism and atheism.
“Neither are you to infer that any revolutionary result is
contemplated. In my opinion the present Constitution is the
standard to which we are to cling. Under its banners, bona
fide must we combat our political foes—rejecting all changes
but through the channel itself provides for amendments. By
these general views of the subject have my reflections been
guided. I now offer you the outline of the plan which they
have suggested. Let an Association be formed to be
denominated, “The Christian Constitutional Society.” It’s
objects to be
152
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1st The support of the Christian Religion.
2nd The support of the Constitution of the United States.
...
Its Means.
1st The diffusion of information. For this purpose not only the
Newspapers but pamphlets must be la[r]gely employed & to
do this a fund must be created. 5 dollars annually for 8 years,
to be contributed by each member who can really afford it,
(taking care not to burden the less able brethren) may afford
a competent fund for a competent time. It is essential to be
able to disseminate gratis useful publications. Whenever it
can be done, & there is a press, clubs should be formed to
meet once a week, read the newspapers & prepare essays
paragraphs &ct.
2nd The use of all lawful means in concert to promote the
election of fit men. A lively correspondence must be kept up
between the different Societies.
3rd The promoting of institutions of a charitable & useful
nature in the management of Fœderalists. The populous cities
ought particularly to be attended to. Perhaps it will be well to
institute in such places 1st Societies for the relief of
Emigrants—2nd. Academies each with one professor for
instructing the different Classes of Mechanics in the principles
of Mechanics
especially confidential & Elements of Chemistry. The cities
have been employed by the Jacobins to give an impulse to
the country. And it is believed to be an alarming fact, that
while the question of Presidential Election was pending in the
House of Rs. parties were organized in several of the Cities, in
the event of there being no election, to cut off the leading
Fœderalists & sieze the Government.”153
Notice the means mentioned by Hamilton. This is not an attempt to
impose a nation-wide, official church or religion on all citizens. Nor is it an
attempt to make laws for the mind, something we will see Madison was
concerned with below.

Rather, it is an attempt to influence the
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population at large from a Christian-based point of view. Not only does it
include dissemination of ideas Hamilton would have found acceptable,
but it also includes charitable efforts to help the less fortunate. The goal
here is to inculcate in the minds of the population an association between
the Christian religion and not only good order, but also good acts.
What Madison would have thought of all this we do not know. As I
have mentioned before, and will document below, his concerns were
with preventing the imposition of any one form of religion, Christian or
otherwise, on those who did not accept or want it. This is understandable
due to his growing up in Virginia, with its established, tax-supported,
church. I am saying nothing that has not already been well-documented
before when I note that Madison loathed having an established church.
It was a threat not only to freedom of thought, but political freedom as
well. To William Bradford he wrote in 1774:
“If the Church of England had been the established and
general Religion in all the Northern Colonies as it has been
among us here and uninterrupted tranquility had prevailed
throughout the Continent, It is clear to me that slavery and
Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated
among us. Union of Religious Sentiments begets a surprizing
confidence and Ecclesiastical Establishments tend to great
ignorance and Corruption all of which facilitate the Execution
of mischevious Projects.”154
Not only did an established church prevent freedom of though and
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political freedom, it also had a negative effect on the people themselves,
in Madison’s estimation.

The lethargy it created in personal matters

manifested itself in ethical and moral decline, not the positive effects
those, such as Patrick Henry, argued having an established church would
create.
“Poverty and Luxury prevail among all sorts: Pride ignorance
and Knavery among the Priesthood and Vice and
Wickedness among the Laity. This is bad enough But It is not
the worst I have to tell you. That diabolical Hell conceived
principle of persecution rages among some and to their
eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for
such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever.
There are at this [time?] in the adjacent County not less than
5 or 6 well meaning men in close Gaol for publishing their
religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox. I
have neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing
relative to this matter, for I have squabbled and scolded
abused and ridiculed so long about it, [to so lit]tle purpose
that I am without common patience. So I l[leave you] to pity
me and pray for Liberty of Conscience [to revive among
us.]”155
In fact, Madison argued not imposing any one type of religion on
the population through an established church would create the positive
effects proponents of an established church wanted.

Also to William

Bradford, who was from Pennsylvania, a state with no one established
religion, he wrote in 1774:
“You are happy in dwelling in a Land where those inestimable
privileges are fully enjoyed and public has long felt the good
155
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effects of their religious as well as Civil Liberty. Foreigners
have been encouraged to settle amg. you. Industry and
Virtue have been promoted by mutual emulation and mutual
Inspection, Commerce and the Arts have flourished and I can
not help attributing those continual exertions of Gen[i]us
which appear among you to the inspiration of Liberty and
that love of Fame and Knowledge which always accompany
it. Religious bondage shackles and debilitates the mind and
unfits it for every noble enterprize every expanded
prospect.”156
Madison’s “A Memorial and Remonstrance” contains his main
thoughts and points regarding how he envisioned the United States should
be regarding religion.

His thought, as I have mentioned, centered on

religious freedom, but there are multiple points he raises in that document
that deserve especial attention and comment.
“Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth,
‘that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence.’ The Religion then
of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as
these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right.”157
The American Revolution was fought, in part, to defend the
“unalienable rights” of the colonists. Madison here adds to Jefferson’s
“Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” freedom of religion.

This

Lockean estimation of religion as among the rights which are unalienable
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because doing so would negate the very reason for the existence of
government, is in this instance Madison’s addition to Locke’s “Life, Liberty
and Property” formulation for the basis of organized society.
“It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending
only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds
cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is unalienable also,
because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards
the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the
Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of
time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of
Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society,
who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do
it with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority; much
more must every man who becomes a member of any
particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to
the Universal Sovereign.”158
The right to freely choose what religion to follow and support is a
duty which exists even before any government has been created, one
which every human owes to the Creator.

Madison here argues that

governments that try to establish any one religion, and enforce
recognition of it by the citizenry, are in fact trespassing on something
owed to God, and not to any human government.
“We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no
mans right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and
that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is,
that no other rule exists, by which any question which may
divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of
the majority; but it is also true that the majority may trespass
on the rights of the minority.
158
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Because if Religion be exempt from the authority of the
Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the
Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and
vicegerents of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative
and limited: it is limited with regard to the co-ordinate
departments, more necessarily is it limited with regard to the
constituents.”159
By definition, then, religion is beyond the ability of government to
legislate.

Government cannot legislate in matters concerning God or

religion, because those are superior to government.
“The preservation of a free Government requires not merely,
that the metes and bounds which separate each
department of power be invariably maintained; but more
especially that neither of them be suffered to overleap the
great Barrier which defends the rights of the people. The
Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, exceed the
commission from which they derive their authority, and are
Tyrants. The People who submit to it are governed by laws
made neither by themselves nor by an authority derived from
them, and are slaves.”160
Just as preservation of freedom and rights necessitates the division
of power between the branches of government, so they depend on a
division of power between the government and the rights of the people.
Further, any attempt by government to legislate on religion turns the
individuals responsible into dictators.
“Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on
our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty
of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of the late
Revolution. The free men of America did not wait till usurped
power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled
the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in
159
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the principle, and they avoided the consequences by
denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to
forget it. Who does not see that the same authority which
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions,
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? that the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence
only of his property for the support of any one establishment,
may force him to conform to any other establishment in all
cases whatsoever?”161
Hearkening back to the Revolution again, and the reasons why
Americans chose to fight, Madison compares this Remonstrance with the
efforts to respond to what the colonists considered British threats to their
rights. Just as the colonists had objected to British efforts, so those who
object to this attempt to establish a church are following the same path.
“Because the Bill violates that equality which ought to be the
basis of every law, and which is more indispensible, in
proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more
liable to be impeached. If ‘all men are by nature equally free
and independent,’ all men are to be considered as entering
into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more,
and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their
natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as
retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion
according to the dictates of Conscience.’ Whilst we assert for
ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe
the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we
cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have
not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If
this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not
against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an
account of it be rendered.”162
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The only one who need be concerned with enforcing “correct”
religious belief is God, not any government or government official, and in
fact is an example of government intruding on matters only God can
adequately judge.
“Because the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a
competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he may employ
Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in
all ages, and throughout the world: the second an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”163
Further, Christianity specifically has always considered itself as “not
of this world,” and separate from secular authorities.

So, having an

established, government-approved and supported, church contradicts
the faith of those who do profess it, and creates the impression amongst
those who do not that Christianity would not survive without official
sanction.
“Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not
requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it
is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every
page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this
world: it is a contradiction to fact; for it is known that this
Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the
support of human laws, but in spite of every opposition from
them, and not only during the period of miraculous aid, but
long after it had been left to its own evidence and the
ordinary care of Providence. Nay, it is a contradiction in
terms; for a Religion not invented by human policy, must have
pre-existed and been supported, before it was established by
human policy. It is moreover to weaken in those who profess
this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence and
the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still
163
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reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its
fallacies to trust it to its own merits.”164
Madison also calls attention to the history of official churches. They
do not have a good track record as regards individual rights. In fact, they
have often been the sources of oppression. Not only that, once again
Madison argues they have a negative effect on individual ethics and
morality, not the positive effects argued for by supporters of official
religions.
“Because
experience
witnesseth
that
ecclesiastical
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy
of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost
fifteen centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity
been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all
places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and
servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the
ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every
sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil
policy. Propose a restoration of this primitive State in which its
Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of their flocks,
many of them predict its downfall. On which Side ought their
testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when against
their interest?”165
One of the enticements to emigrate to Virginia has been,
Madison argues, the freedom to worship as one chose. If that is
taken away, Virginia will lose that attractiveness to potential
immigrants, and will also tend to drive away people who currently
do live in Virginia, thus weakening the state in each way.
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“Because the proposed establishment is a departure
from that generous policy, which, offering an Asylum to the
persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion,
promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the
number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of
sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an Asylum to
the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. It degrades
from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.
Distant as it may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it
differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other
the last in the career of intolerance. The magnanimous
sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view
the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some
other haven, where liberty and philanthrophy in their due
extent, may offer a more certain repose from his Troubles.
Because it will have a like tendency to banish our
Citizens. The allurements presented by other situations are
every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive
to emigration by revoking the liberty which they now enjoy,
would be the same species of folly which has dishonoured
and depopulated flourishing kingdoms.”166
Madison argues religious conflicts all-too-easily become violent, and
so every effort needs to be made to avoid them, especially by not
establishing one religion as official, because that would by definition put
all the others in a subservient situation.
“Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which
the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has
produced among its several sects. Torrents of blood have
been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular
arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all
difference in Religious opinion. Time has at length revealed
the true remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and rigorous
policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assuage
the disease. The American Theatre has exhibited proofs that
equal and compleat liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it,
sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and
166
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prosperity of the State. If with the salutary effects of this
system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the bounds
of Religious freedom, we know no name that will too severely
reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at the first
fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance of
the Bill has transformed ‘that Christian forbearance, love and
charity,’ which of late mutually prevailed, into animosities and
jealousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs
may not be dreaded, should this enemy to the public quiet
be armed with the force of a law?”167
He also argues laws which are unpopular and unacceptable to
large groups of citizens, even if they do not constitute a majority of the
population, weaken overall respect for laws in general. Such a law would
be resented by many, who would then learn to treat other laws with
contempt as well. This would lead to contempt for government itself, and
create far more difficulty than it is worth.
“Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts
obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to
enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of
Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not
generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the
case, where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? And what
may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in
the Government, on its general authority?”168
Finally, a violation of the right of freedom of religion is a violation of
all other rights, at least in essence. If the right to a free choice regarding
religion can be violated, what cannot? All rights must be protected, lest
any of them be transgressed.
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freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and other liberties, so it is
necessary to protect freedom of religion.
“Because finally, “the equal right of every citizen to the free
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of
conscience” is held by the same tenure with all our other
rights. If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if
we weigh its importance, it cannot be less dear to us; if we
consult the ‘Declaration of those rights which pertain to the
good people of Virginia, as the basis and foundation of
Government,’ it is enumerated with equal solemnity, or rather
studied emphasis. Either then, we must say, that the Will of the
Legislature is the only measure of their authority; and that in
the plenitude of this authority, they may sweep away all our
fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this
particular right untouched and sacred: Either we must say,
that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish
the Trial by Jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary
Powers of the State; nay that they may despoil us of our very
right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent
and hereditary Assembly or, we must say, that they have no
authority to enact into law the Bill under consideration.”169
Madison noted in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, in which he enclosed
the Remonstrance, that clergy opposition to the proposed establishment
had already occurred among those whose religion was not made official.
Madison approved of this, not because of the envy and fear it showed
between the sects, but rather because it was a convenient, and effective
means of preventing passage of the bill.
“The opposition to the general assessment gains ground. At
the instance of some of its adversaries I drew up the
remonstrance herewith inclosed. It has been sent thro' the
medium of confidential persons in a number of the upper
county[s] and I am told will be pretty extensively signed. The
169
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presbyterian clergy have at length espoused the side of the
opposition, being moved either by a fear of their laity or a
jealousy of the episcopalians. The mutual hatred of these
sects has been much inflamed by the late act incorporating
the latter. I am far from being sorry for it as a coalition
between them could alone endanger our religious rights and
a tendency to such an event had been suspected.”170
During the debate over ratifying the Constitution in Virginia’s
ratifying convention, Madison argued that the lack of a bill of rights
specifically enumerating the freedom of religion was not necessary,
ironically in response to criticism regarding such a lack from Patrick Henry,
who had been a supporter of the establishment bill Madison had
opposed. What good would a bill of rights do against a majority, Madison
argued. What was needed was what the United States already had, a
multiplicity of different religions and sects, each of whom could be
counted upon to oppose any efforts to establish one or another of them
as official.
“The honorable member has introduced the subject of
religion. Religion is not guarded - there is no bill of rights
declaring that religion should be secure. Is a bill of rights a
security for religion? would the bill of rights in this state
exempt the people from paying for the support of one
particular sect, if such sect were exclusively established by
law? If there were a majority of one sect, a bill of rights would
be a poor protection for liberty. Happily for the states, they
enjoy the utmost freedom of religion. This freedom arises from
that multiplicity of sects, which pervades America, and which
is the best and only security for religious liberty in any society.
170
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For where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a
majority of any one sect to oppress and persecute the rest.
Fortunately for this commonwealth, a majority of the people
are decidely against any exclusive establishment - I believe it
to be so in the other states. There is not a shadow of right in
the general government to intermeddle with religion. Its least
interference with it would be a most flagrant usurpation. I
can appeal to my uniform conduct on this subject, that I
have warmly supported religious freedom. It is better that this
security should be depended upon from the general
legislature, than from one particular state. A particular state
might concur in one religious project. But the United States
abound in such a variety of sects, that it is a strong security
against religious persecution, and is sufficient to authorise a
conclusion, that no one sect will ever be able to out-number
or depress the rest.”171
Now of course Madison did eventually see the need to add a Bill of
Rights to the Constitution, and was instrumental in their writing and
passage.

Further, we have several of his comments in the House of

Representatives by which to gauge his understanding of, most importantly
on the subject of religion, the 1st Amendment.
“Mr. Madison said he apprehended the meaning of the
words to be, that congress should not establish a religion, and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to
worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience;”172
In addition to protection from the federal government for religious
freedom, Madison wanted state governments to be similarly prohibited.
171Rutland,
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As the minutes of the House of Representatives from August 17, 1789 note:
“Tucker moved to strike out, ‘No state shall infringe the
equal rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of
the press, nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases.’
MR. MADISON Conceived this to be the most valuable
amendment on the whole list; if there was any reason to
restrain the government of the United States from infringing
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they
should be secured against the state governments; he thought
that if they provided against the one, it was as necessary to
provide against the other, and was satisfied that it would be
equally grateful to the people.”173
Madison was, like Hamilton, accepting of other religions besides
Protestant Christianity, and not hostile to them.

Just as Hamilton

welcomed Unitarians, so did Madison. As he wrote to George Nicholas in
1793:
“Mr. Toulmin will either hand you this, or see you in
consequence of it. He is lately from England, and very
warmly recommended to me by Mr. Maury our Consul at
Liverpool as meriting particular attention. His primary object
in visiting Kentucky is to procure a knowledge of the Country
for the information of his friends in England who have an eye
to America as a more eligible portion of the Earth than their
native spot is at present. His next object is of a more personal
nature. His partiality to our Country makes him anxious to
settle in it: and as he is not likely to find a Religious Society
with which he could connect himself as a Minister professing
the Unitarian System taught by Priestly & others, he wishes to
see if there be any prospect of his establishing himself an an
instructor of youth in classical knowledge and other branches
of liberal education; for which he is probably well qualified.
Any friendly offices you may find it convenient to render him
will be of much service to him in his plans, and will moreover
173
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be acknowledged by Dear Sir Your mo: Obedt. hble servt.”174
Further, he was also accepting of Roman Catholics, and saw them
as no threat to republican government.

In a speech in the House of

Representatives on January 1, 1795, he is noted as saying:
“He did not approve the ridicule attempted to be thrown out
on the Roman Catholics. In their religion, there was nothing
inconsistent with the purest republicanism. In Switzerland,
about one half of the Cantons were of the Roman Catholic
persuasion. Some of the most democratical Cantons were
so; Cantons, where every man gave his vote for a
Representative. Americans had no right to ridicule Catholics.
They had, many of them, proved good citizens, during the
revolution.”175
So, as regards religion, how do Hamilton and Madison compare? I
do not see any overt conflict in the writings we have, although it does
appear possible that Hamilton’s “Christian Constitutional Society” idea
might have, had he lived longer, and had such idea even taken off, been
the source of potential conflict. Hamilton did not specifically call for any
official recognition of Christianity, though, but rather simply for the
dissemination of ideas which would no doubt have supported a religious,
rather than an atheistic, approach to public life.
Both were, as I have noted, accepting of religious groups outside of
the majority Protestant sects.

What differentiates the two is the much
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greater religious sense that Hamilton had throughout his life, and his much
greater negative response to the French Revolution because of its
disavowal of religion.

Madison did not turn against France until after

Napoleon had taken power, and thus turned France away from the
republican experiment.
Hamilton, while not showing any preference for an official church of
any kind, nevertheless believed strongly, at least towards the end of his
life, that religion was an absolute necessity for the success of the
American republic.

He saw no trouble at all having religion in

government, such as military chaplains, and official calls for days of
religious expression by even the President himself.

Too much religious

“enthusiasm” was a bad thing, though, and he did not show any support
for non-standard, or extreme, varieties of religion.

Religion was an

essential support of order, continuity, meaning and purpose for all
humans, and even a republic such as the United States needed to have
religion as part of its public life, although an official church was never
mentioned as essential by him.
Madison was convinced religion was best left up to the individual
sects, both in terms of the success of the United States as a whole, and
also as a means of keeping religion from having too much influence in
public life. He had, after all, grown up in a colony, later state, which had
had an official religion, and so was far more concerned with the negative
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effects he saw official religions as having. For Madison, the danger was
not in a lack of religion in public life, as with Hamilton, but rather one of
official religions as a barrier to political freedom, and thus the success of a
republic built on freedom. Madison wanted religion left up to the reason
and conscience of each individual, and saw no reason to have it
included in official public life. It could only be a danger to the success of
the American republic, and not an asset, again in stark contrast to
Hamilton.
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Chapter Six: Hamilton and Madison on
Federal Government Involvement in the Economy
Of all the areas on which Hamilton and Madison came into conflict
beginning in the 1790’s, the issue of whether, and how much, the federal
government should involve itself in the economy is one of the more clear
examples of how, as I argue, they had underlying differences of opinion
all along. Both Hamilton and Madison displayed their later preferences
regarding economic involvement well before the Constitution was in
place, as I will document below. I am convinced the differences we will
see regarding the economy were issues they simply did not discuss before
their eventual break.
For Hamilton, we will see it is not only appropriate, but indeed
essential, that specifically the federal government take an active role in
the economy.

There is for him a danger in not having the federal

government involve itself in the economy, as only the federal government
can take the actions he sees as necessary for the survival and success of
the United States. A strictly free market is neither desirable nor possible for
Hamilton, as individual initiative will just not lead to the successful
economy that can provide the people of the United States with the
wealth that will convince them to continue support the American
republican experiment.
Madison also valued a role for the federal government in the
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economy, but not in the same ways, and not to the same degree, as
Hamilton. One area in which he saw a drastically different role for the
federal government in the economy was to use economic relations with
other countries as a weapon, especially through the use of embargoes
against countries he felt the United States had legitimate grievances with.
The role Madison saw as a valuable addition to the eventual success of
the United States was, as I will show below, was in encouraging
agriculture, not manufacturing, as Hamilton wanted.
I mentioned in Chapter Four that I would not discuss Hamilton’s
Report

on

Manufactures

as

part

of

the

issue

of

Constitutional

interpretation, but such a discussion is of course essential when dealing
with the question of the economy. So, I will include that below, but the
differences of opinion between Hamilton and Madison are evident before
that document came to light. Well before the Constitution was written,
Hamilton

argued

for

the

appropriateness,

indeed

necessity,

government involvement in the economy through regulation.

of

In The

Continentalist No. V, from 1782, he wrote:
“The vesting Congress with the power of regulating
trade ought to have been a principal object of the
confederation for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for
the purposes of commerce as of revenue. There are some,
who maintain, that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be
benefitted by the encouragements, or restraints of
government. Such persons will imagine, that there is no need
of a common directing power. This is one of those wild
speculative paradoxes, which have grown into credit among
us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most
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enlightened nations. Contradicted by the numerous
institutions and laws, that exist every where for the benefit of
trade, by the pains taken to cultivate particular branches and
to discourage others, by the known advantages derived from
those measures, and by the palpable evils that would attend
their discontinuance—it must be rejected by every man
acquainted with commercial history. Commerce, like other
things, has its fixed principles, according to which it must be
regulated; if these are understood and observed, it will be
promoted by the attention of government, if unknown, or
violated, it will be injured—but it is the same with every other
part of administration.
To preserve the ballance of trade in favour of a nation
ought to be a leading aim of its policy.” 176
Clearly this is not an argument in favor of laissez faire, nor even of
the much more free market options preferred by Adam Smith. Just as with
government, Hamilton argues there are laws which govern the economy.
Also, Hamilton did not want to leave the issue of regulation to the state
governments, as that was precisely one of the main problems he saw with
the Articles of Confederation. The United States needs specific federal
government involvement in the economy in order to achieve the best
results. The states are only parts of a whole.
“Perhaps it may be thought, that the power of
regulation will be left placed in the governments of the
several states, and that a general superintendence is
unnecessary. If the states had distinct interests, were
unconnected with each other, their own governments would
then be the proper and could be the only depositaries of
such a power; but as they are parts of a whole with a
common interest in trade, as in other things, there ought to
be a common direction in that as in all other matters. It is easy
to conceive, that many cases may occur, in which it would
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, volume III: 1782-1786. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, 75-76.
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be beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress a
particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to
either to attempt it without the concurrence of the rest, and
where the experiment would probably be left untried for fear
of a want of that concurrence.
No mode can be so convenient as a source of revenue
to the United States. It is agreed that imposts on trade, when
not immoderate, or improperly laid, is one of the most eligible
species of taxation. They fall in a great measure upon articles
not of absolute necessity, and being partly transferred to the
price of the commodity, are so far imperceptibly paid by the
consumer. It is therefore that mode which may be exercised
by the fœderal government with least exception or disgust.
Congress can easily possess all the information necessary to
impose the duties with judgment, and the collection can
without difficulty be made by their own officers.
They can have no temptation to abuse this power,
because the motive of revenue will check its own
extremes.”177
Hamilton does agree with Madison that the most convenient form
of taxation is tariffs. However, he shows he was consistent throughout his
political life in the United States in having an overriding preference for the
United States’ well-being as a whole, rather than that of any one state.
For him, the states are rather like jealous siblings, afraid someone will get
more than they.

Hamilton’s goals for the United States did include

“greatness,” one of his departures from classical republican thought, and
a “great” people thinks beyond the narrow self-interest of any one sector
to reach for more than mere survival or mediocrity. I am convinced this
was the result of his not growing up in one state or another, but rather the
Caribbean.
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“It is too much characteristic of our national temper to be
ingenious in finding out and magnifying the minutest
disadvantages, and to reject measures of evident utility even
of necessity to avoid trivial and sometimes imaginary evils. We
seem not to reflect, that in human society, there is scarcely
any plan, however salutary to the whole and to every part,
by the share, each has in the common prosperity, but in one
way, or another, and under particular circumstances, will
operate more to the benefit of some parts, than of others.
Unless we can overcome this narrow disposition and learn to
estimate measures, by their general tendency, we shall never
be a great or a happy people, if we remain a people at
all.”178
Hamilton argued there were dangers inherent in a lack of federal
government oversight of the economy. There would be a lack of money
that might otherwise be available. The government itself would not have
the power and revenue necessary for any government to exist, and this
would be an ongoing threat to the continuation of the Union between the
states. Overall, he argued that government oversight of the economy
would lead to increased prosperity for all Americans.
“Let us see what will be the consequences of not
authorising the Fœderal Government to regulate the trade of
these states.
Besides the want of revenue and of power, besides the
immediate risk to our independence, the danger of all the
future evils of a precarious union, besides the deficiency of a
wholesome concert and provident superintendence to
advance the general prosperity of trade, the direct
consequence will be, that the landed interest and the
labouring poor will in the first place fall a sacrifice to the
trading interest, and the whole eventually to a bad system of
policy, made necessary by the want of such regulating
power.”179
178
179
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Further, the people of the United States need protection which only
the federal government can provide, specifically the poor and those
whose primary wealth consists in land. They need protection, Hamilton
argued, precisely from “the trading interest.” As we will see below, this is
quite similar to a point Madison raised as well. Hamilton saw a need for
regulation to protect workers and farmers. Overall, a lack of regulation
would, in Hamilton’s estimation, have negative effects for the United
States as a whole. The states are not even mentioned as possible sources
of this protection. Only the federal government can do this, across the
entirety of the United States.
“The influence of these evils will be, to render landed property
fluctuating and less valuable, to oppress the poor by raising
the prices of necessaries, to injure commerce by
encouraging the consumption of foreign luxuries, by
encreasing the value of labor, by lessening the quantity of
home productions, enhancing their prices at foreign markets,
of course, obstructing their sale and enabling other nations to
supplant us.”180
However, government oversight of the economy, especially
through taxation, requires keeping in mind the good of the entirety of
society, and not privileging any one or more sector to the detriment of the
rest.

Taxation needs to be apportioned well, in order to create good

order. Also, anyone who thinks taxation can be avoided simply does not,
according to Hamilton, have a good understanding of the realities of
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human life. Human life requires government, government requires wellcompensated people to administer it, and administration requires
revenue, which can only be obtained through taxation.

Taxation will

bring benefits, though, such as increased safety from attack, both at
home from other countries, and also increased safety abroad for the
United States’ trade with foreign lands. Both are absolutely necessary in
Hamilton’s estimation, and the need for both will never cease.
“The great art is to distribute the public burthens well
and not suffer them, either first, or last, to fall too heavily upon
parts of the community; else distress and disorder must ensue.
A shock given to any part of the political machine vibrates
through the whole.”
...
“But perhaps the class is more numerous than those,
who not unwilling to bear their share of public burthens, are
yet averse to the idea of perpetuity, as if there ever would
arrive a period, when the state would cease to want
revenues and taxes become unnecessary. It is of importance
to unmask this delusion and open the eyes of the people to
the truth. It is paying too great a tribute to the idol of
popularity to flatter so injurious and so visionary an
expectation. The error is too gross to be tolerated any where,
but in the cottage of the peasant; should we meet with it in
the senate house, we must lament the ignorance or despise
the hypocrisy, on which it is ingrafted. Expence is in the
present state of things entailed upon all governments. Though
if we continue united, we shall be hereafter less exposed to
wars by land, than most other countries; yet while we have
powerful neighbours on either extremity, and our frontier is
embraced by savages, whose alliance they may without
difficulty command, we cannot, in prudence, dispense with
the usual precautions for our interior security. As a
commercial people, maritime power must be a primary
object of our attention, and a navy cannot be created or
maintained without ample revenues. The nature of our
popular constitutions requires a numerous magistracy, for
whom competent provision must be made; or we may be
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certain our affairs will always be committed to improper
hands; and experience will teach us, that no government
costs so much as a bad one.
We may preach till we are tired of the theme, the
necessity of disinterestedness in republics, without making a
single proselyte. The virtuous declaimer will neither persuade
himself nor any other person to be content with a double
mess of porridge, instead of a reasonable stipend for his
services. We might as soon reconcile ourselves to the Spartan
community of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long
beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissimulation in the
circumstances, as well as the manners, of society among us;
and it is as ridiculous to seek for models in the simple ages of
Greece and Rome, as it would be to go in quest of them
among the Hottentots and Laplanders.
The public, for the different purposes, that have been
mentioned, must always have large demands upon its
constituents, and the only question is whether these shall be
satisfied by annual grants perpetually renewed—by a
perpetual grant once for all or by a compound of permanent
and occasional supplies. The last is the wisest course. The
Fœderal Government should neither be independent nor too
much dependent. It should neither be raised above
responsibility or controul, nor should it want the means of
maintaining its own weight, authority, dignity and credit. To
this end permanent funds are indispensable, but they ought
to be of such a nature and so moderate in their amount, as
never to be inconvenient. Extraordinary supplies can be the
objects of extraordinary grants; and in this salutary medium
will consist our true wisdom.”181
Hamilton even argued that there should be differences in taxation
according to overall wealth, something which is still contentious even
today. Nevertheless, the idea does appear in his sentiments regarding
“the rich” again and again throughout his life.
“The rich must be made to pay for their luxuries; which is the
only proper way of taxing their superior wealth.”182
181
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As always with Hamilton, he expressed his concern for strengthening
and preserving the Union. He argued again and again for the need to
support and emphasize the importance of the federal government. For
Hamilton, the danger was NOT an overly-powerful federal government,
but rather the centrifugal effects of, in his estimation, overly-powerful
states. The United States needs to create a sense of national loyalty, NOT
state-centered loyalties.

Greatness, including safety and prosperity, is

possible for Hamilton ONLY in the Union, and not in smaller republics, such
as individual states, or the smaller confederations others had called for the
United States to split into in the years prior to ratification of the
Constitution.

Only a federal government with sufficient power can

achieve these worthwhile ends, which Hamilton argues will benefit
everyone across the United States.
“The reason of allowing Congress to appoint its own
officers of the customs, collectors of taxes, and military
officers of every rank, is to create in the interior of each state
a mass of influence in favour of the Fœderal Government.
The great danger has been shown to be, that it will not have
power enough to defend itself and preserve the union, not
that it will ever become formidable to the general liberty. A
mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be
a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and
intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect it: A
contest of arms will seldom be between the common
sovereign and a single refractory member; but between
distinct combinations of the several parts against each other.
A sympathy of situations will be apt to produce associates to
the disobedient. The application of force is always
disagreeable, the issue uncertain. It will be wise to obviate
the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of individuals
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in each state in support of the Fœderal Government, as will
be counterpoised to the ambition of others; and will make it
difficult for them to unite the people in opposition to the just
and necessary measures of the union.
There is something noble and magnificent in the
perspective of a great Fœderal Republic, closely linked in the
pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at
home, respectable abroad; but there is something
proportionably diminutive and contemptible in the prospect
of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of
union, jarring, jealous and perverse, without any determined
direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and
insignificant by their dissentions, in the eyes of other nations.
Happy America! if those, to whom thou hast intrusted the
guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy
future repose; but miserable and undone, if their negligence
or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banners
on the ruins of thy tranquility!183
While not an official part of his visions for the federal government
itself, Hamilton did help propose a “manufacturing society.”

For him,

increasing manufacturing in the United States was central to his goals of
American independence and greatness.

Improving the diversity of

occupations and kinds of business would also help pay off the Public
Debt, which all-too-often he has been erroneously accused of wanting to
make permanent. For Madison, however, manufacturing was an evil he
expected to eventually make its way to the United States, but he feared
and dreaded it as a threat to republican simplicity and virtue. Hamilton
displayed no such apprehensions, though. To William Duer he wrote in
1791:
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“I send you herewith a plan for a manufacturing
Society in conformity to the Ideas we have several times
conversed about.
...
The more I have considered the thing, the more I feel
persuaded that it will equally promote the Interest of the
adventurers & of the public and will have an excellent effect
on the Debt.”184
In the Prospectus of the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures,
Hamilton stressed the need for the United States to focus on prosperity.
While not necessarily opposed to virtue, prosperity was for Hamilton vital
for the continued existence of the United States. For political perfection to
be attained in the United States, Hamilton argued wealth was necessary,
and the United States needed manufacturing in order to acquire wealth.
He did mention the usefulness, at the time, of the public debt as a
resource, a source of capital, to help in expanding and diversifying the
economy through encouraging manufacturing.
“The establishment of Manufactures in the United States
when maturely considered will be fo<und> to be of the
highest importance to their prosperity. It <is> an almost self
evident proposition that that com<muni>ty which can most
completely supply its own w<ants> is in a state of the highest
political perfection. <And> both theory and experience
conspire to prove that a nation (unless from a very
peculiar coincidence of circumstances) cannot possess
much active wealth but as the result of extensive
manufactures.
...
The last objection disappears in the eye of those who
are aware how much may be done by a proper application
Harold C. Syrett, ed., and Jacob E. Cooke, assoc. ed., The Papers of Alexander
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of the public Debt. Here is the resource which has been
hitherto wanted. And while a direction of it to this object may
be made a mean of public prosperity and an instrument of
profit to adventurers in the enterprise, it, at the same time,
affords a prospect of an enhancement of the value of the
debt; by giving it a new and additional employment and
utility.”185
Of all of Hamilton’s thoughts and works on economic matters, his
massive Report on the Subject of Manufactures is the most important, not
only because of the breadth of subjects he covers, but also because it is
his single most comprehensive statement regarding what he thought was
right for the United States.

That it provoked yet another conflict with

Madison shows us yet again the differences in expectations between
these two vital Founders to understand.
From the beginning of the Report, he stresses several points he
considers to be reasons why the United States needs to add
manufacturing to what was then an overwhelmingly agricultural
economy. Again, the goal behind his policy proposals is the continued
independence of the United States through increasing its overall power by
adding manufacturing to its economy.

Having an economy based

primarily on agricultural exports to other countries is a weakness, and the
United States should increase its domestic market in order to improve its
economy.
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“The Secretary of the Treasury in obedience to the
order of ye House of Representatives, of the 15th day of
January 1790, has applied his attention, at as early a period
as his other duties would permit, to the subject of
Manufactures; and particularly to the means of promoting
such as will tend to render the United States, independent on
foreign nations, for military and other essential supplies. And
he there [upon] respectfully submits the following Report.
The expediency of encouraging manufactures in the
United States, which was not long since deemed very
questionable, appears at this time to be pretty generally
admitted. The embarrassments, which have obstructed the
progress of our external trade, have led to serious reflections
on the necessity of enlarging the sphere of our domestic
commerce: the restrictive regulations, which in foreign
markets abrige the vent of the increasing surplus of our
Agricultural produce, serve to beget an earnest desire, that a
more extensive demand for that surplus may be created at
home: And the complete success, which has rewarded
manufacturing enterprise, in some valuable branches,
conspiring with the promising symptoms, which attend some
less mature essays, in others, justify a hope, that the obstacles
to the growth of this species of industry are less formidable
than they were apprehended to be; and that it is not difficult
to find, in its further extension; a full indemnification for any
external disadvantages, which are or may be experienced,
as well as an accession of resources, favourable to national
independence and safety.”186
Manufacturing is a source of outlets for agricultural products, so the
two are not incompatible. Agriculture is pre-eminent, of course, but there
is no reason not to add manufacturing. Hamilton’s statements regarding
agriculture do show the same republican virtue emphasis that Madison
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stressed in his arguments, but for Hamilton, manufacturing is not the threat
Madison feared.
“It ought readily to be conceded, that the cultivation
of the earth—as the primary and most certain source of
national supply—as the immediate and chief source of
subsistence to man—as the principal source of those
materials which constitute the nutriment of other kinds of
labor—as including a state most favourable to the freedom
and independence of the human mind—one, perhaps, most
conducive to the multiplication of the human species—
has intrinsically a strong claim to pre-eminence over every
other kind of industry.
But, that it has a title to any thing like an exclusive
predilection, in any country, ought to be admitted with great
caution. That it is even more productive than every other
branch of Industry requires more evidence, than has yet been
given in support of the position. That its real interests, precious
and important as without the help of exaggeration, they truly
are, will be advanced, rather than injured by the due
encouragement of manufactures, may, it is believed, be
satisfactorily demonstrated. And it is also believed that the
expediency of such encouragement in a general view may
be shewn to be recommended by the most cogent and
persuasive motives of national policy.
It has been maintained, that Agriculture is, not only, the
most productive, but the only productive species of industry.
The reality of this suggestion in either aspect, has, however,
not been verified by any accurate detail of facts and
calculations; and the general arguments, which are
adduced to prove it, are rather subtil and paradoxical, than
solid or convincing.”187
Manufacturing is, for Hamilton, just as productive as agriculture,
which differentiated Hamilton from many other thinkers of his time.
“The foregoing suggestions are not designed to
inculcate an opinion that manufacturing industry is more
productive than that of Agriculture. They are intended rather
to shew that the reverse of this proposition is not ascertained;
187
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that the general arguments which are brought to establish it
are not satisfactory; and consequently that a supposition of
the superior productiveness of Tillage ought to be no obstacle
to listening to any substantial inducements to the
encouragement of manufactures, which may be otherwise
perceived to exist, through an apprehension, that they may
have a tendency to divert labour from a more to a less
profitable employment.
It is extremely probable, that on a full and accurate
devellopment of the matter, on the ground of fact and
calculation, it would be discovered that there is no material
difference between the aggregate productiveness of the
one, and of the other kind of industry; and that the propriety
of the encouragements, which may in any case be proposed
to be given to either ought to be determined upon
considerations irrelative to any comparison of that nature.”188
There is a need for society to have, as Hamilton argues, a proper
division of labor in order to have the best possible economy.
“It has justly been observed, that there is scarcely any thing of
greater moment in the œconomy of a nation, than the
proper division of labour. The seperation of occupations
causes each to be carried to a much greater perfection,
than it could possible acquire, if they were blended.”189
Having manufacturing will help the United States in another way,
through attracting immigrants.
“If it be true then, that it is the interest of the United States to
open every possible [avenue to] emigration from abroad, it
affords a weighty argument for the encouragement of
manufactures; which for the reasons just assigned, will have
the strongest tendency to multiply the inducements to it.” 190
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Increasing the number of occupations is beneficial, because it
leads to greater innovation throughout society.
“The spirit of enterprise, useful and prolific as it is, must
necessarily be contracted or expanded in proportion to the
simplicity or variety of the occupations and productions,
which are to be found in a Society. It must be less in a nation
of mere cultivators, than in a nation of cultivators and
merchants; less in a nation of cultivators and merchants, than
in a nation of cultivators, artificers and merchants.”191
The United States does need to take care to be self-sufficient as
regards its food supply, and also its raw materials used in the
manufacturing sector Hamilton wants.
“It is a primary object of the policy of nations, to be able to
supply themselves with subsistence from their own soils; and
manufacturing nations, as far as circumstances permit,
endeavor to procure, from the same source, the raw
materials necessary for their own fabrics. This disposition,
urged by the spirit of monopoly, is sometimes even carried to
an injudicious extreme. It seems not always to be recollected,
that nations, who have neither mines nor manufactures, can
only obtain the manufactured articles, of which they stand in
need, by an exchange of the products of their soils; and that,
if those who can best furnish them with such articles are
unwilling to give a due course to this exchange, they must of
necessity make every possible effort to manufacture for
themselves, the effect of which is that the manufacturing
nations abrige the natural advantages of their situation,
through an unwillingness to permit the Agricultural countries
to enjoy the advantages of theirs, and sacrifice the interests
of a mutually beneficial intercourse to the vain project
of selling every thing and buying nothing.”192
Reliance solely on agriculture, though, has been a disadvantage for
the United States thus far, and will only continue to be so if manufacturing
191
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is not added. Demand for agricultural products overseas is not reliable
and is thus not a good source of money which can be relied upon at all
times.
“But it is also a consequence of the policy, which has
been noted, that the foreign demand for the products of
Agricultural Countries, is, in a great degree, rather casual and
occasional, than certain or constant. To what extent injurious
interruptions of the demand for some of the staple
commodities of the United States, may have been
experienced, from that cause, must be referred to the
judgment of those who are engaged in carrying on the
commerce of the country; but it may be safely assumed, that
such interruptions are at times very inconveniently felt, and
that cases not unfrequently occur, in which markets are so
confined and restricted, as to render the demand very
unequal to the supply.
Independently likewise of the artificial impediments,
which are created by the policy in question, there are natural
causes tending to render the external demand for the surplus
of Agricultural nations a precarious reliance. The differences
of seasons, in the countries, which are the consumers make
immense differences in the produce of their own soils, in
different years; and consequently in the degrees of their
necessity for foreign supply. Plentiful harvests with them,
especially if similar ones occur at the same time in the
countries, which are the furnishers, occasion of course a glut
in the markets of the latter.”193
Especially given how fast the United States population is growing, if
it continues to rely solely on agriculture, that vast increase of people, all
working in farming, will only lead to an ever greater supply, which will
eventually lead to an over-abundance.

Manufacturing will help ease

that by providing an outlet other than exports for American farm
products.
193
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“Considering how fast and how much the progress of
new settlements in the United States must increase the surplus
produce of the soil, and weighing seriously the tendency of
the system, which prevails among most of the commercial
nations of Europe; whatever dependence may be placed on
the force of natural circumstances to counteract the effects
of an artificial policy; there appear strong reasons to regard
the foreign demand for that surplus as too uncertain a
reliance, and to desire a substitute for it, in an extensive
domestic market.
To secure such a market, there is no other expedient,
than
to
promote
manufacturing
establishments.
Manufacturers who constitute the most numerous class, after
the Cultivators of land, are for that reason the principal
consumers of the surplus of their labour.”194
Hamilton further argues manufacturing will actually help give
farmers an incentive to improve their lands, since they will have to find
ways to deal with the movement of workers from farming to industry.
“This idea of an extensive domestic market for the surplus
produce of the soil is of the first consequence. It is of all things,
that which most effectually conduces to a flourishing state of
Agriculture. If the effect of manufactories should be to
detatch a portion of the hands, which would otherwise be
engaged in Tillage, it might possibly cause a smaller quantity
of lands to be under cultivation but by their tendency to
procure a more certain demand for the surplus produce of
the soil, they would, at the same time, cause the lands which
were in cultivation to be better improved and more
productive. And while, by their influence, the condition of
each individual farmer would be meliorated, the total mass of
Agricultural production would probably be increased. For this
must evidently depend as much, if not more, upon the
degree of improvement; than upon the number of acres
under culture.”195
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Manufacturing also leads to different, new, industries, such as
mining, thus providing even more diversification and strength to the
economy overall.
“It merits particular observation, that the multiplication
of manufactories not only furnishes a Market for those articles,
which have been accustomed to be produced in
abundance, in a country; but it likewise creates a demand
for such as were either unknown or produced in
inconsiderable quantities. The bowels as well as the surface of
the earth are ransacked for articles which were before
neglected. Animals, Plants and Minerals acquire an utility and
value, which were before unexplored.
The foregoing considerations seem sufficient to
establish, as general propositions, That it is the interest of
nations to diversify the industrious pursuits of the individuals,
who compose them—That the establishment of manufactures
is calculated not only to increase the general stock of useful
and productive labour; but even to improve the state of
Agriculture in particular; certainly to advance the interests of
those who are engaged in it. There are other views, that will
be hereafter taken of the subject, which, it is conceived, will
serve to confirm these inferences.”196
Hamilton and Madison did both, at various points in their careers,
mention a preference for free trade among all nations. However, both
also noted that other countries, such as Great Britain, did not follow that
practice, so both argued that the United States could not rely on free
trade at that time.

The United States was simply not on equal terms with

any country in Europe at that point.
“If the system of perfect liberty to industry and
commerce were the prevailing system of nations—the
arguments which dissuade a country in the predicament of
the United States, from the zealous pursuits of manufactures
196
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would doubtless have great force. It will not be affirmed, that
they might not be permitted, with few exceptions, to serve as
a rule of national conduct. In such a state of things, each
country would have the full benefit of its peculiar advantages
to compensate for its deficiencies or disadvantages. If one
nation were in condition to supply manufactured articles on
better terms than another, that other might find an abundant
indemnification in a superior capacity to furnish the produce
of the soil. And a free exchange, mutually beneficial, of the
commodities which each was able to supply, on the best
terms, might be carried on between them, supporting in full
vigour the industry of each. And though the circumstances
which have been mentioned and others, which will be
unfolded hereafter render it probable, that nations merely
Agricultural would not enjoy the same degree of opulence, in
proportion to their numbers, as those which united
manufactures with agriculture; yet the progressive
improvement of the lands of the former might, in the end,
atone for an inferior degree of opulence in the mean time:
and in a case in which opposite considerations are pretty
equally balanced, the option ought perhaps always to be, in
favour of leaving Industry to its own direction.
But the system which has been mentioned, is far from
characterising the general policy of Nations. [The prevalent
one has been regulated by an opposite spirit.]
The consequence of it is, that the United States are to a
certain extent in the situation of a country precluded from
foreign Commerce. They can indeed, without difficulty obtain
from abroad the manufactured supplies, of which they are in
want; but they experience numerous and very injurious
impediments to the emission and vent of their own
commodities. Nor is this the case in reference to a single
foreign nation only. The regulations of several countries, with
which we have the most extensive intercourse, throw serious
obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the United
States.
In such a position of things, the United States cannot
exchange with Europe on equal terms; and the want of
reciprocity would render them the victim of a system, which
should induce them to confine their views to Agriculture and
refrain from Manufactures. A constant and encreasing
necessity, on their part, for the commodities of Europe, and
only a partial and occasional demand for their own, in return,
could not but expose them to a state of impoverishment,
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compared with the opulence to which their political and
natural advantages authorise them to aspire.”197
Hamilton further mentions an issue which would continue to be
controversial throughout most of the history of the United States, that of
“internal improvements,” but in a way which shows he completely
approved of them. Internal improvements, like manufacturing, would in
his estimation, only make things better for Americans. He also argued the
sooner the United States was independent of Europe economically, the
better.
“Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of
complaint. ’Tis for the nations, whose regulations are alluded
to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much
they do not lose more than they gain. ’Tis for the United States
to consider by what means they can render themselves least
dependent, on the combinations, right or wrong of foreign
policy.
It is no small consolation, that already the measures
which have embarrassed our Trade, have accelerated
internal improvements, which upon the whole have bettered
our affairs. To diversify and extend these improvements is the
surest and safest method of indemnifying ourselves for any
inconveniences, which those or similar measures have a
tendency to beget. If Europe will not take from us
the products of our soil, upon terms consistent with our
interest, the natural remedy is to contract as fast as possible
our wants of her.”198
Hamilton did show an influence from classical republican thought in
his estimation that even if manufacturing is encouraged by government,
most people will nevertheless still desire to be farmers, due to the
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independence of that occupation which was taken for granted at that
time.
“But it does, by no means, follow, that the progress of new
settlements would be retarded by the extension of
Manufactures. The desire of being an independent proprietor
of land is founded on such strong principles in the human
breast, that where the opportunity of becoming so is as great
as it is in the United States, the proportion will be small of
those, whose situations would otherwise lead to it, who would
be diverted from it towards Manufactures. And it is highly
probable, as already intimated, that the accessions of
foreigners, who originally drawn over by manufacturing views
would afterwards abandon them for Agricultural, would be
more than equivalent for those of our own Citizens, who
might happen to be detached from them.”199
Overall, for Hamilton there is an ongoing need for government
involvement in the economy. Laissez faire is simply not possible in his view
of human nature.

Government involvement is necessary for the

improvement of society, as, for instance, habit and imitation all-too-often
lead to a fear of innovation. People will often simply not risk their own
resources in order to make improvements, and so government needs to
step in and provide the source of innovation. This is for Hamilton a neverending positive role for government, as a means of improving the
economy over time. Government involvement leads to risk-taking that
would not otherwise occur.
Plus, the United States had an especially strong need for
government at its beginning, because it needed to overcome already
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established industries in other countries. Nascent industries in the United
States simply could not effectively compete with much more established
manufacturers elsewhere, if for no other reason than the support those
industries already received from their own governments. Thus, the United
States needed to do the same. Government support of manufacturing in
other countries was, in Hamilton’s estimation, the single greatest barrier to
growth of industry in the United States.
“The
remaining
objections
to
a
particular
encouragement of manufactures in the United States now
require to be examined.
One of these turns on the proposition, that Industry, if
left to itself, will naturally find its way to the most useful and
profitable employment: whence it is inferred, that
manufactures without the aid of government will grow up as
soon and as fast, as the natural state of things and the
interest of the community may require.
Against the solidity of this hypothesis, in the full latitude
of the terms, very cogent reasons may be offered. These
have relation to—the strong influence of habit and the spirit
of imitation—the fear of want of success in untried
enterprises—the intrinsic difficulties incident to first essays
towards a competition with those who have previously
attained to perfection in the business to be attempted—the
bounties premiums and other artificial encouragements, with
which foreign nations second the exertions of their own
Citizens in the branches, in which they are to be rivalled.
Experience teaches, that men are often so much
governed by what they are accustomed to see and
practice, that the simplest and most obvious improvements,
in the [most] ordinary occupations, are adopted with
hesitation, reluctance and by slow gradations. The
spontaneous transition to new pursuits, in a community long
habituated to different ones, may be expected to be
attended with proportionably greater difficulty. When former
occupations ceased to yield a profit adequate to the
subsistence of their followers, or when there was an absolute
deficiency of employment in them, owing to the
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superabundance of hands, changes would ensue; but these
changes would be likely to be more tardy than might consist
with the interest either of individuals or of the Society. In many
cases they would not happen, while a bare support could be
ensured by an adherence to ancient courses; though a resort
to a more profitable employment might be practicable. To
produce the desireable changes, as early as may be
expedient, may therefore require the incitement and
patronage of government.
The apprehension of failing in new attempts is perhaps
a more serious impediment. There are dispositions apt to be
attracted by the mere novelty of an undertaking—but these
are not always those best calculated to give it success. To
this, it is of importance that the confidence of cautious
sagacious capitalists both citizens and foreigners, should be
excited. And to inspire this description of persons with
confidence, it is essential, that they should be made to see in
any project, which is new, and for that reason alone, if, for no
other, precarious, the prospect of such a degree of
countenance and support from government, as may be
capable of overcoming the obstacles, inseperable from first
experiments.
The superiority antecedently enjoyed by nations, who
have preoccupied and perfected a branch of industry,
constitutes a more formidable obstacle, than either of those,
which have been mentioned, to the introduction of the same
branch into a country, in which it did not before exist. To
maintain between the recent establishments of one country
and the long matured establishments of another country, a
competition upon equal terms, both as to quality and price, is
in most cases impracticable. The disparity in the one, or in the
other, or in both, must necessarily be so considerable as to
forbid a successful rivalship, without the extraordinary aid and
protection of government.
But the greatest obstacle of all to the successful
prosecution of a new branch of industry in a country, in which
it was before unknown, consists, as far as the instances apply,
in the bounties premiums and other aids which are granted,
in a variety of cases, by the nations, in which the
establishments to be imitated are previously introduced. It is
well known (and particular examples in the course of this
report will be cited) that certain nations grant bounties on the
exportation of particular commodities, to enable their own
workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors, in the
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countries to which those commodities are sent. Hence the
undertakers of a new manufacture have to contend not only
with the natural disadvantages of a new undertaking, but
with the gratuities and remunerations which other
governments bestow. To be enabled to contend with
success, it is evident, that the interference and aid of their
own government are indispensible.”200
Individual initiative, while lauded by Hamilton, was for the reasons
he mentioned above, just not enough, given the particular circumstances
the United States found itself in at the time he submitted his report to
Congress. The only resource available was for the United States to mimic
the business-encouraging behavior of Europeans.
“Whatever room there may be for an expectation that the
industry of a people, under the direction of private interest,
will upon equal terms find out the most beneficial
employment for itself, there is none for a reliance, that it will
struggle against the force of unequal terms, or will of itself
surmount all the adventitious barriers to a successful
competition, which may have been erected either by the
advantages naturally acquired from practice and previous
possession of the ground, or by those which may have sprung
from positive regulations and an artificial policy. This general
reflection might alone suffice as an answer to the objection
under examination; exclusively of the weighty considerations
which have been particularly urged.”201
In a time of primary reliance on specie for use as money, and given
its general scarcity in the United States, what options were available to
provide the capital essential for the creation and maintenance of a
manufacturing economy? The public debt, specifically the securities of
the United States, can be used as money, due to the reliable value
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Hamilton argued such securities would have in the minds of those
exchanging them.
“Public Funds answer the purpose of Capital, from the
estimation in which they are usually held by Monied men;
and consequently from the Ease and dispatch with which
they can be turned into money. This capacity of prompt
convertibility into money causes a transfer of stock to be in a
great number of Cases equivalent to a payment in coin. And
where it does not happen to suit the party who is to receive,
to accept a transfer of Stock, the party who is to pay, is never
at a loss to find elsewhere a purchaser of his Stock, who will
furnish him in lieu of it, with the Coin of which he stands in
need. Hence in a sound and settled state of the public funds,
a man possessed of a sum in them can embrace any scheme
of business, which offers, with as much confidence as if he
were possessed of an equal sum in Coin.”202
Hamilton emphasized the “utility” of making such use of the debt.
However, again in contrast to a common misunderstanding of Hamilton,
he did not argue that the more debt, existing in perpetuity, the better.
This was for him only a temporary measure, to provide a means by which
greater economic exchange across the United States could be
encouraged in the short-term.

He very clearly argues not only for an

eventual reduction in the debt, but also for its eventual retirement. His
arguments echo classical republican virtue in decrying the accumulation
of too much debt over time.
“There are respectable individuals, who from a just
aversion to an accumulation of Public debt, are unwilling to
concede to it any kind of utility, who can discern no good to
alleviate the ill with which they suppose it pregnant; who
cannot be persuaded that it ought in any sense to be viewed
202
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as an increase of capital lest it should be inferred, that the
more debt the more capital, the greater the burthens the
greater the blessings of the community.
But it interests the public Councils to estimate every
object as it truly is; to appreciate how far the good in any
measure is compensated by the ill; or the ill by the good,
Either of them is seldom unmixed.
Neither will it follow, that an accumulation of debt is
desireable, because a certain degree of it operates as
capital. There may be a plethora in the political, as in the
Natural body; There may be a state of things in which any
such artificial capital is unnecessary. The debt too may be
swelled to such a size, as that the greatest part of it may
cease to be useful as a Capital, serving only to pamper the
dissipation of idle and dissolute individuals: as that the sums
required to pay the Interest upon it may become oppressive,
and beyond the means, which a government can employ,
consistently with its tranquility, to raise them; as that the
resources of taxation, to face the debt, may have been
strained too far to admit of extensions adequate to
exigencies, which regard the public safety.
Where this critical point is, cannot be pronounced, but
it is impossible to believe, that there is not such a point.
And as the vicissitudes of Nations beget a perpetual
tendency to the accumulation of debt, there ought to be in
every government a perpetual, anxious and unceasing effort
to reduce that, which at any time exists, as fast as shall be
practicable consistently with integrity and good faith.
Reasonings on a subject comprehending ideas so
abstract and complex, so little reducible to precise
calculation as those which enter into the question just
discussed, are always attended with a danger of runing into
fallacies. Due allowance ought therefore to be made for this
possibility. But as far as the Nature of the subject admits of it,
there appears to be satisfactory ground for a belief, that the
public funds operate as a resource of capital to the Citizens
of the United States, and, if they are a resource at all, it is an
extensive one.”203
Hamilton was not an advocate for government control of the
economy, though. That much is clear from his statements. For him, the
203
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free competition between businesses would have many desirable
outcomes, such as the elimination of monopolies, and the reduction in
price of commodities to the lowest point possible. So, Hamilton argued
government encouragement, but not control, of manufacturing would in
the long run benefit the people at large. Even agriculture, often seen as
antagonistic to manufacturing, would benefit, as lower prices for
manufactured goods would result in increased personal wealth even for
farmers. This is a consistent theme with Hamilton, that government exists
for the benefit of the people.
“The internal competition, which takes place, soon
does away every thing like Monopoly, and by degrees
reduces the price of the Article to the minimum of a
reasonable profit on the Capital employed. This accords with
the reason of the thing and with experience.
Whence it follows, that it is the interest of a community
with a view to eventual and permanent oeconomy, to
encourage the growth of manufactures. In a national view, a
temporary enhancement of price must always be well
compensated by a permanent reduction of it.
It is a reflection, which may with propriety be indulged
here, that this eventual diminution of the prices of
manufactured Articles; which is the result of internal
manufacturing establishments, has a direct and very
important tendency to benefit agriculture. It enables the
farmer, to procure with a smaller quantity of his labour, the
manufactured produce of which he stan<ds> in need, and
consequently increases the value of his income and
property.”204
Hamilton

also

echoed

the

sentiments

of

many

of

his

contemporaries, as well as people today, in expressing concern for the
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United States’ balance of trade with other countries. Showing a more
mercantilist aspect to his thought, he emphasized that manufacturing
would lead to a richer nation overall, and a better (i.e., positive) balance
of trade with other countries. Agriculture alone cannot supply this benefit
to the United States, though.
“From these circumstances collectively, two important
inferences are to be drawn, one, that there is always a higher
probability of a favorable balance of Trade, in regard to
countries in which manufactures founded on the basis of a
thriving Agriculture flourish, than in regard to those, which are
confined wholly or almost wholly to Agriculture; the other
(which is also a consequence of the first) that countries of the
former description are likely to possess more pecuniary
wealth, or money, than those of the latter.”205
In stark contrast to an emphasis on a lack of wealth being
necessary for republican virtue, as found in other writers, Hamilton stressed
the need for wealth in order to achieve the best possible sort of political
arrangements. In order for the supply of specie in the United States to
increase, there would need to exist a more well-rounded economy than
what was current. Manufacturing would lead to wealth, and wealth to
strengthened independence and security from other nations.
He pointed to the United States’ inability to supply itself during the
Revolutionary War as illustrative of the problems the country would
continue to face if it did not develop manufacturing as soon as possible.
For Hamilton, the United States had been altogether too reliant on
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supplies and other forms of assistance from France in gaining its
independence from Great Britain. Specifically, the United States needed
a Navy, which unfortunately, following classical republican doctrine, had
been completely disbanded after the end of the Revolution. In any case,
it is historically the case that French victories at sea enabled joint
French/American victories on land such as Yorktown.
“But the uniform appearance of an abundance of
specie, as the concomitant of a flourishing state of
manufacture<s> and of the reverse, where they do not
prevail, afford a strong presumption of their favourable
operation upon the wealth of a Country.
Not only the wealth; but the independence and
security of a Country, appear to be materially connected
with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view
to those great objects, ought to endeavour to possess within
itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise the
means of Subsistence habitation clothing and defence.
The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of
the body politic, to the safety as well as to the welfare of the
society; the want of either, is the want of an important organ
of political life and Motion; and in the various crises which
await a state, it must severely feel the effects of any such
deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the United States
during the late War, from an incapacity of supplying
themselves, are still matter of keen recollection: A future war
might be expected again to exemplify the mischiefs and
dangers of a situation, to which that incapacity is still in too
great a degree applicable, unless changed by timely and
vigorous exertion. To effect this change as fast as shall be
prudent, merits all the attention and all the Zeal of our Public
Councils; ’tis the next great work to be accomplished.
The want of a Navy to protect our external commerce,
as long as it shall Continue, must render it a peculiarly
precarious reliance, for the supply of essential articles, and
must serve to strengthen prodigiously the arguments in favour
of manufactures.”206
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Why is this important for the United States?
manufacturing?

Why encourage

Because doing so will help “establish substantial and

permanent order.” Again and again with Hamilton we see an overriding
emphasis on, and concern with, the tenuous nature of the continued
existence of the United States.

This recommendation regarding

manufacturing is only one means by which Hamilton is convinced the
United States will succeed in the long run.
“It is a truth as important as it is agreeable, and one to which
it is not easy to imagine exceptions, that every thing tending
to establish substantial and permanent order, in the affairs of
a Country, to increase the total mass of industry and
opulence, is ultimately beneficial to every part of it. On the
Credit of this great truth, an acquiescence may safely be
accorded, from every quarter, to all institutions &
arrangements, which promise a confirmation of public order,
and an augmentation of National Resource.”207
Now is a critical moment for Hamilton. The United States needs to
act immediately if it is to survive. Doing so will also lead to an increase in
foreign investment in the United States, which will lead to an increased
supply of specie, and improvement in the wealth of all Americans.
“If then, it satisfactorily appears, that it is the Interest of the
United states, generally, to encourage manufactures, it merits
particular attention, that there are circumstances, which
Render the present a critical moment for entering with Zeal
upon the important business. The effort cannot fail to be
materially seconded by a considerable and encreasing influx
of money, in consequence of foreign speculations in the
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funds—and by the disorders, which exist in different parts of
Europe.”208
In an argument once again quite similar to one of Madison’s, as we
will see below, the government of the United States must act to create a
domestic market, because other nations’ governments already do this.
The goal of this policy is again the well-being of the American people.
“Considering a monopoly of the domestic market to its own
manufacturers as the reigning policy of manufacturing
Nations, a similar policy on the part of the United states in
every proper instance, is dictated, it might almost be said, by
the principles of distributive justice; certainly by the duty of
endeavouring to secure to their own Citizens a reciprocity of
advantages.”209
One way to achieve these goals is to impose tariffs on foreign
goods, which need to be higher in the case of goods from some foreign
competitor to domestic manufacturers.
“The true way to conciliate these two interests, is to lay a duty
on foreign manufactures of the material, the growth of which
is desired to be encouraged, and to apply the produce of
that duty by way of bounty, either upon the production of the
material itself or upon its manufacture at home or upon both.
In this disposition of the thing, the Manufacturer commences
his enterprise under every advantage, which is attainable, as
to quantity or price, of the raw material: And the Farmer if the
bounty be immediately to him, is enabled by it to enter into a
successful competition with the foreign material; if the bounty
be to the manufacturer on so much of the domestic material
as he consumes, the operation is nearly the same; he has a
motive of interest to prefer the domestic Commodity, if of
equal quality, even at a higher price than the foreign, so long
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as the difference of price is any thing short of the bounty
which is allowed upon the article.”210
Another option is to pay bounties for certain goods, although this
option is much more problematic for Hamilton than tariffs.

They are

beneficial only when an industry is very young, and are frequently a
source of jealousy. Still, there are benefits to the country as a whole from
bounties, in his estimation. I myself am of the opinion that Hamilton shows
here in his opinions on bounties that he himself was far more high-minded,
and personally focused on the common good rather than his own selfinterest, than other people were then, or now. He just never shows the
malevolent calculation so many have characterized him as having. That
bounties could be a source of corruption seems not to have even
occurred to him.
“The continuance of bounties on manufactures long
established must almost always be of questionable policy:
Because a presumption would arise in every such Case, that
there were natural and inherent impediments to success. But
in new undertakings, they are as justifiable, as they are
oftentimes necessary.
There is a degree of prejudice against bounties from an
appearance of giving away the public money, without an
immediate consideration, and from a supposition, that they
serve to enrich particular classes, at the expence of the
Community.
But neither of these sources of dislike will bear a serious
examination. There is no purpose, to which public money can
be more beneficially applied, than to the acquisition of a
new and useful branch of industry; no Consideration more
valuable than a permanent addition to the general stock of
productive labour.
210
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As to the second source of objection, it equally lies
against other modes of encouragement, which are admitted
to be eligible. As often as a duty upon a foreign article makes
an addition to its price, it causes an extra expence to the
Community, for the benefit of the domestic manufacturer. A
bounty does no more: But it is the Interest of the society in
each case, to submit to a temporary expence, which is more
than compensated, by an increase of industry and Wealth,
by an augmentation of resources and independence; & by
the circumstance of eventual cheapness, which has been
noticed in another place.”211
It is with his argument in favor of the Constitutionality of his proposals
that we come to the heart of the disagreement between Hamilton and
Madison on the question of government involvement in the economy.
There is an enormous divide between the two on this issue, and each
individual’s arguments on this point show a continuation of his preferences
prior to the existence of the Constitution.

For Hamilton, one cannot

include all the details of what the federal government is permitted to do
within the Constitution itself. This is once again indicative of his willingness
to construe far, far more latitude into the Constitution regarding the
powers of the federal government.
It is his appeal to the “general welfare” clause as the source for the
Constitutionality of his proposals which so infuriated Madison, as we shall
see below. Hamilton argues, in response to objections like Madison’s, that
this is not a power for the federal government to just do whatever it wants.
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There is a limit, and it is that only actions may be taken that benefit the
United States as a whole, and not any one part or state.
It is important to note, though, that Hamilton makes essentially the
same argument as Madison, that “all” those who wrote the Constitution
were in agreement, and had clear, unambiguous expectations as to how
it would be interpreted and carried out, since as he says, it is “doubtless”
that his interpretation is the correct one.

This argument has been

commented on frequently in Madison’s case, but we see the same claim
with Hamilton as well. I find the claim by both to be dubious at best.
Neither can legitimately claim to have known the minds of all the other
individuals who took part in writing the Constitution. Neither can lay claim
to exclusive expertise in determining, once and for all, the meaning of its
many passages which admit of more than one interpretation. I argue
both had clear ideas of his own, but could not possibly be the one, final,
source regarding the expectations all the other authors had.
“A Question has been made concerning the
Constitutional right of the Government of the United States to
apply this species of encouragement, but there is certainly no
good foundation for such a question. The National Legislature
has express authority “To lay and Collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for
the Common defence and general welfare” with no
other qualifications than that ‘all duties, imposts and excises,
shall be uniform throughout the United states, that no
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion
to numbers ascertained by a census or enumeration taken on
the principles prescribed in the Constitution,’ and that ‘no tax
or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.’
These three qualifications excepted, the power to raise
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money is plenary, and indefinite; and the objects to which it
may be appropriated are no less comprehensive, than the
payment of the public debts and the providing for the
common defence and “general Welfare.” The terms ‘general
Welfare’ were doubtless intended to signify more than was
expressed or imported in those which Preceded; otherwise
numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would
have been left without a provision. The phrase is as
comprehensive as any that could have been used; because
it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union, to
appropriate its revenues shou’d have been restricted within
narrower limits than the ‘General Welfare’ and because this
necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are
susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.
It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the
National Legislature, to pronounce, upon the objects, which
concern the general Welfare, and for which under that
description, an appropriation of money is requisite and
proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt that
whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of
Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the
sphere of the national Councils as far as regards an
application of Money.
The only qualification of the
generallity of the Phrase in question, which seems to be
admissible, is this—That the object to which an appropriation
of money is to be made be General and not local; its
operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the
Union, and not being confined to a particular spot.
No objection ought to arise to this construction from a
supposition that it would imply a power to do whatever else
should appear to Congress conducive to the General
Welfare. A power to appropriate money with this latitude
which is granted too in express terms would not carry a power
to do any other thing, not authorised in the constitution, either
expressly or by fair implication.”212
In bemoaning the influence of state-centered opinions and
loyalties, Hamilton as always displays his much-more national focus for the
United States.
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“Here, however, as in some other cases, there is cause
to regret, that the competency of the authority of the
National Government to the good, which might be done, is
not without a question. Many aids might be given to industry;
many internal improvements of primary magnitude might be
promoted, by an authority operating throughout the Union,
which cannot be effected, as well, if at all, by an authority
confined within the limits of a single state.
But if the legislature of the Union cannot do all the
good, that might be wished, it is at least desirable, that all
may be done, which is practicable. Means for promoting the
introduction of foreign improvements,
though less
efficaciously than might be accomplished with more
adequate authority, will form a part of the plan intended to
be submitted in the close of this report.”213
Hamilton had even more in mind for federal government
involvement in the economy. Beyond encouraging manufacturing, he
wanted for the federal government, taking a cue from a step already
taken by individual states, to have a role in inspecting goods to ensure
their quality. Far before the creation of the federal government agencies
we take for granted today, Hamilton saw a need for consumer protection
by the federal government. These inspections would, in his view, prevent
fraud, improve quality, and more firmly establish the reputations of
American goods.
Also, he argued for a much greater involvement by the federal
government in financial exchanges, both to make such possible in the first
place, and also to ease the process by which they would occur. Hamilton
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desired an expansion in the supply of money, especially paper money,
and argued for the need for such paper to be good in every state.
“Judicious
regulations
for
the
inspection
of
manufactured commodities.
This is not among the least important of the means, by
which the prosperity of manufactures may be promoted. It is
indeed in many cases one of the most essential. Contributing
to prevent frauds upon consumers at home and exporters to
foreign countries—to improve the quality & preserve the
character of the national manufactures, it cannot fail to aid
the expeditious and advantageous Sale of them, and to
serve as a guard against successful competition from other
quarters. The reputation of the flour and lumber of some
states, and of the Pot ash of others has been established by
an attention to this point. And the like good name might be
procured for those articles, wheresoever produced, by a
judicious and uniform system of Inspection; throughout the
ports of the United States. A like system might also be
extended with advantage to other commodities.
The facilitating of pecuniary remittances from place to
place is a point of considerable moment to trade in general,
and to manufactures in particular; by rendering more easy
the purchase of raw materials and provisions and the
payment for manufactured supplies. A general circulation of
Bank paper, which is to be expected from the institution lately
established will be a most valuable mean to this end. But
much good would also accrue from some additional
provisions respecting inland bills of exchange. If those drawn
in one state payable in another were made negotiable,
everywhere, and interest and damages allowed in case of
protest, it would greatly promote negotiations between the
Citizens of different states, by rendering them more secure;
and, with it the convenience and advantage of the
Merchants and manufacturers of each.”214
Internal improvements, especially, were an issue Hamilton regarded
as needing national supervision. On their own, each state would focus
solely on its own good, and their efforts would probably be not only
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wasteful due to repetition, but also counter-productive by coming into
conflict with other states’ efforts.
“The symptoms of attention to the improvement of inland
Navigation, which have lately appeared in some quarters,
must fill with pleasure every breast warmed with a true Zeal
for the prosperity of the Country. These examples, it is to be
hoped, will stimulate the exertions of the Government and
the Citizens of every state. There can certainly be no object,
more worthy of the cares of the local administrations; and it
were to be wished, that there was no doubt of the power of
the national Government to lend its direct aid, on a
comprehensive plan. This is one of those improvements,
which could be prosecuted with more efficacy by the whole,
than by any part or parts of the Union. There are cases in
which the general interest will be in danger to be sacrificed to
the collission of some supposed local interests. Jealousies, in
matters of this kind, are as apt to exist, as they are apt to be
erroneous.”215
Hamilton showed he was in favor of, and willing to have, the
Treasury take action to help stabilize the economy when needed. This is
yet again indicative of Hamilton’s much greater vision for the federal
government’s involvement in the economy than Madison. In regards to a
potential early bank panic, he wrote to William Seton in 1792 that he was
willing to have the Treasury assist a prominent bank, in order to fend off
the effects of what he considered unprincipled economic behavior by
others.
“I feel great satisfaction in knowing from yourself, that
your institution rejects the idea of coalition with the new
project, or rather Hydra of projects.
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I shall labour to give what has taken place a turn favourable
to another Union; the propriety of which is as you say clearly
illustrated by the present state of things.
It is my wish that the Bank of New York may, by all
means, continue to receive deposits from the Collector, in the
paper of the Bank of the U States, and that they may also
receive payment for the Dutch Bills in the same paper. This
paper may either be remitted to the Treasurer or remain in
the Bank as itself shall deem most expedient. I have explicitly
directed the Treasurer to forbear drawing on the Bank of New
York, without special direction from me. And my intention is to
leave you in possession of all the money you have or may
receive ’till I am assured that the present storm is effectually
weathered.
Every body here sees the propriety of your having
refused the paper of the Bank of the United States in such a
crisis of your affairs.
Be Confidential with me. If you are pressed, whatever
support may be in my power shall be afforded. I consider the
public interest as materially involved in aiding a valuable
institution like yours to withstand the attacks of a
confederated host of frantic and I fear, in too many
instances, unprincipled gamblers.”216
Hamilton even had in mind a role for the federal government as
regards what we now call social programs, when and where those would
be necessary. In a report sent to the Speaker of the House from 1792, he
wrote:
“The establishment of one or more marine Hospitals in
the United States is a measure desirable on various accounts.
The interests of humanity are concerned in it, from its
tendency to protect from want and misery, a very useful,
and, for the most part, a very needy class of the Community.
The interests of navigation and trade are also concerned in it,
from the protection and relief, which it is calculated to afford
to the same class; conducing to attract and attach seamen
to the country.
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A fund for the purpose may, it is presumed, be most
conveniently derived from the expedient suggested in the
above mentioned Memorial, namely, a contribution by the
mariners and seamen of the United States, out of their wages
to be regulated by law.
The rate of the contribution may be ten cents per
month for each mariner or seamen, to be reserved, pursuant
to articles, by masters of vessels, and paid to the collectors of
districts, to which the vessels respectively belong. Effectual
regulations for this purpose may, without difficulty be devised.
The benefit of the fund ought to extend, not only to disabled
and decrepid seamen, but to the widows and children of
those who may have been killed or drowned, in the course of
their service as seamen.
It will probably be found expedient, besides the
reception and accomodation of the parties entitled, at any
hospital which may be instituted to authorize the granting
pensions, in aid of those who may be in condition, partly to
procure a subsistence from their own labor. There may be
cases, in which this mode of relief may be more
accommodating to the individuals, and, at the same time,
more œconomical.”217
Notice the suggestion that a tax be levied, out of individual
incomes, for the benefit of others. Now, the tax would be paid by those
within a specific profession for the benefit of others in that profession, but
this clearly shows that Hamilton thought of roles for the federal
government that far exceeded the opinions of others of his time. Some
people needed to be helped in order to be safe from want and misery,
help that government could offer.

Not only were the sailors to be

protected, but also their wives and children. However, there were limits to
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what he felt government, and he in his official capacity as Treasury
Secretary, could do.
“I regret much every embarassment which is
experienced by the Mercantile Body—whether arising from
the public operations, from accidental and unavoidable
causes, or from a spirit of enterprise beyond the Capital
which is to support it. That valuable class of Citizens forms too
important an organ of the general weal not to claim every
practicable and reasonable exemption and indulgence.
I do not perceive however that I can at the present
moment contribute to this end otherwise than by
encouraging the Bank to continue its aids as liberally as shall
be consistent with its safety under an assurance that I shall for
some time to come forbear drafts upon them as much as
shall be practicable. The deposits of the Government will
during this period be proportionably considerable.
In making this declaration, I confide in the prudence of
the Directors not to overstrain the faculties of the Bank by
which the Institution and the public Interest might both
suffer.”218
Again, the goal for Hamilton behind all of his preferences for
government involvement in the economy is the good of the people at
large. Beyond helping to create better economic conditions, he argued
government needed to be active to protect the people from various
dangers, such as the “rich and powerful,” and “caballers, intriguers, and
demagogues.” He also showed he was far more concerned about the
possibility of anarchy than tyranny. Writing as “Tully” in 1794, he said:
“If it were to be asked, What is the most sacred duty
and the greatest source of security in a Republic? the answer
would be, An inviolable respect for the Constitution and
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Laws—the first growing out of the last. It is by this, in a great
degree, that the rich and powerful are to be restrained from
enterprises against the common liberty—operated upon by
the influence of a general sentiment, by their interest in the
principle, and by the obstacles which the habit it produces
erects against innovation and encroachment. It is by this, in a
still greater degree, that caballers, intriguers, and
demagogues are prevented from climbing on the shoulders
of faction to the tempting seats of usurpation and tyranny.
Were it not that it might require too lengthy a
discussion, it would not be difficult to demonstrate, that a
large and well organized Republic can scarcely lose its liberty
from any other cause than that of anarchy, to which a
contempt of the laws is the high road.”219
In the draft he wrote for George Washington’s address, which I
include here because the document at this point does reflect only
Hamilton’s ideas, and not Washington’s, Hamilton argues it is “natural” to
have a bureaucracy dedicated to taking care of not just manufacturing,
but agriculture as well. Agriculture is so important that government “has”
to oversee it to ensure the well-being of the country.

Damage could

potentially be done to agriculture due to a lack of oversight, and further,
government action would, in Hamilton’s estimation, result in greater
strength, opulence, and happiness for the country as a whole.
I want to call attention to Hamilton’s use of that word, “opulence.”
He uses it frequently in his writings, and it shows one of the ways in which
Hamilton departed from a strictly classical understanding of the needs of
a republic.

In contrast to the classical emphasis on simplicity, even
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poverty, Hamilton argues for the need for greater wealth among the
population as a whole in order for the United States to survive and thrive.
Hamilton also argues the need for the federal government to have
a role in education, such as a national university and a national military
academy. There are other schools, but he states they simply do not have
enough money at this point to meet the needs of the nation. Also, the
national university would attract students from all over the country, which
would bring the United States closer together, as the students would
receive a common education and experience that they would take back
to their homes, and thus cause that national perspective to be more
widely diffused throughout the country. The military academy would also
provide a national point of view to those who serve in the military, rather
than retaining a state-centered view, such as with state militia-only
service.
He states his fear of a nation “subdivided,” a notion which once
again

shows

that

he,

in

marked

contrast

to

so

many

of

his

contemporaries, understood the United States to be one whole, and not a
collection of states which just happen to have been gathered into one.
As became clear over time, the view of the United States as a collection
of states gathered together, or confederated, was one which persisted for
decades, and was put to rest (for the most part) only by the Civil War.
Another point he raises, which proved to be quite controversial, is
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his call for a United States navy. After the end of the Revolutionary War,
the United States had sold off its ships. However, if the United States wants
to continue the commerce it has already established with other nations, it
needs to protect it with a navy. The United States should remain neutral
as regards the conflicts between other nations, of course, but nevertheless
needs its own navy in order to induce other countries to actually respect
that neutrality, as the United States was already learning in its attempt to
stay out of the wars between Great Britain and France. This is yet another
point on which he and Madison actually agreed more than they
disagreed.
Further, in regards to pay for public servants, Hamilton argues that
appeals to republican virtue are pointless.

If the United States wants

qualified individuals, it has to pay sufficiently well to attract and retain
them. Not paying well limits public service to the rich. Hamilton again
and again pointed out the limits of the republican virtue ideal. Humans
do have selfish motives, which cannot be overcome by high-minded
appeals alone. This is in fact quite similar to Madison’s views of human
nature in The Federalist.
Hamilton, again in reference to the United States’ relations with
Great Britain, shows his far greater focus on building up the United States,
rather than maintaining an intimate relationship with Great Britain, as Elkins
and McKitrick depict him.

He wanted to reduce the United States’
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dependence on Great Britain, something encouraging manufacturing
would help, because depending on Great Britain would be a threat to
American security.

Specifically, as regards manufacturing, war-related

industries need to be encouraged and built up to keep the United States
safe. Publicly-owned industries should be avoided, but may be necessary
if private industry cannot supply something absolutely necessary for
defense.
“That among the objects of labour and industry,
Agriculture considered with reference either to individual or
national welfare is first in importance may safely be affirmed
without derogating from the just and real value of any other
branch. It is indeed the best basis of the prosperity of every
other. In proportion as nations progress in population and
other circumstances of maturity this truth forces itself more &
more upon the conviction of Rulers and makes the cultivation
of the soil more and more an object of public patronage and
care. Institutions for promoting it sooner or later grow up
supported by the public purse—and the fruits of them when
judiciously conceived and directed have fully justified the
undertaking. Among these none have been found of greater
utility than BOARDS composed of proper characters charged
with collecting and communicating information and enabled
to stimulate enterprise and experiment by premiums and
honorary rewards. These have been found very cheap
instruments of immense benefits. They serve to excite a
general spirit of discovery & improvement to stimulate
invention to excite new & useful experiments—and
accumulating in one center the skill and improvement of
every part of the nation they spread it thence over the whole
nation at the same time promoting new discovery and
diffusing generally the knowlege of all the discoveries which
are made.
In the U States hitherto no such institution has been
essayed though perhaps no country has stronger motives to
it. Agriculture among us is certainly in a very imperfect state.
In much of those parts where there have been early
settlements the soil impoverished by an unskilful tillage yields

187

but a scanty reward for the labour bestowed upon it, and
leaves its possessors under strong temptation to abandon it
and emigrate to distant regions more fertile because they are
newer and have not yet been exhausted by an unskilful use.
This is every way an evil. The undue dislocation of our
population from this cause promotes neither the strength the
opulence nor the happiness of our Country. It strongly
admonishes our national Councils to apply as far as may be
practical by natural & salutary means an adequate Remedy.
Nothing appears to [be] so unexceptionable & likely to be
more efficacious than the institution of a Board of Agriculture
with the views I have mentioned & with a moderate fund
towards executing them. After mature reflection I am
persuaded it is difficult to render our country a more precious
and general service than by such an institution.
I will however observe that if it be thought expedient
the objects of the Board may be still more comprehensive. It
may embrace the encouragement of the mechanic and
manufacturing arts by means analogous to those for the
improvement of Agriculture & with an eye to the introduction
from abroad of useful machinery &c. Or there may be
separate Boards one charged with one object the other with
the other.
I have heretofore suggested the expediency of
establishing a national university and a Military Academy. The
vast utility of both these measures presses so seriously and so
constantly upon my mind that I cannot forbear with
earnestness to repeat the recommendation.
The Assembly to which I address myself will not doubt
that the extension of science and knowledge is an object
primarily interesting to our national welfare. To effect this is
most naturally the care of the particular local jurisdictions into
which our country is subdivided as far as regards those
branches of instruction which ought to be universally diffused
and it gives pleasure to observe that new progress is
continually making in the means employed for this end. But
can it be doubted that the General Government would with
peculiar propriety occupy itself in affording neutriment to
those higher branches of science which though not within the
reach of general acquisi[ti]on are in their consequences and
relation, productive of general advantage? Or can it be
doubted that this great object would be materially
advanced by a University erected on that broad basis to
which the national resources are most adequate & so liberally
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endowed as to command the ablest professors in the several
branches of liberal knowlege? It is true and to the honor of
our Country that it offers many colleges and Academies
highly respectable and useful—but the funds upon which
they are established are too narrow to permit any of them to
be an adequate substitute for such an institution as is
contemplated & to which they would be excellent auxiliaries.
Amongst the motives to such an institution the assimilation of
the principles opinions manners and habits of our countrymen
by drawing from all quarters our youth to participate in a
common Education well deserves the attention of
Government. To render the people of this Country as
homogeneous as possible must lend as much as any other
circumstance to the permanency of the Union & prosperity.
The eligibleness of a Military Academy depends on that
evident maxim of policy which requires every nation to be
prepared for war while cultivating peace and warns it against
suffering the military spirit & military knowlege wholly to
decay. However particular instances superficially viewed may
seem exceptions it will not be doubted by any who have
attentively considered the subject that the military art is of a
complicated and comprehensive nature, that it demands
much previous study as well as practice and that the
possession of it in its most improved state is always of vast
importance to the security of a Nation. It ought therefore to
be a principal care of every Government however pacific its
general policy to preserve and cultivate indeed in proportion
as the policy of a Country is pacific & it is little liable to [be]
called to practice the rules of the Military Art does it become
the duty of the Government to take care by proper
institutions that it be not lost. A Military Academy instituted on
proper principles would serve to secure to our country though
within a narrow sp[h]ere a solid fund of military information
which would always be ready for national emergencies &
would facilitate the diffusion of Military knowlege as those
emergenc[i]es might require.
A systematic plan for the creation of a moderate navy
appears to me recommended by very weighty
considerations. An active external Commerce demands a
naval power to protect it—Besides the dangers from War in
which a state is a party. It is a truth which our Experience has
confirmed that the most equitable and sincere neutrality is
not sufficient to exempt a state from the depredations of
other nations at war with each other. It is essential to induce
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them to respect that neutrality that there shall be an
organised force ready to vindicate the national flag. This may
even prevent the necessity of going into war by discouraging
from those insults and infractions of right which sometimes
proceed to an extreme that leave no alternative. The U
States abound in Materials. Their Commerce fast increasing
must proportionably augment the number of their seamen
and give us rapidly the means of a naval power respectable
if not great. Our relative situation likewise for obvious reasons
would render a moderate force very influential more so
perhaps than a much greater in the hands of any other
power. It is submitted as well deserving consideration whether
it will not be prudent immediately and gradually to provide
and lay up magazines of Ship Timber and to build & equip
annually on[e] or more ships of force as the developpement
of resources shall render convenient & practicable—so that a
future War of Europe, if we escape the present storm may not
find our Commerce in the defenceless situation in which the
present found it.
There is a subject which has dwelt long & much upon
my mind which I cannot omit this opportunity of suggesting. It
is the compensations to our public Officers; especially those in
the most important stations. Every man acquainted [with] the
expence even of the most frugal plan of living in our great
cities must be sensible of their inadequateness. The impolicy
of such defective provision seems not to have been
sufficiently weighed.
No plan of governing is well founded which does not
regard man as a compound of selfish and virtuous passions.
To expect him to be wholly guided by the latter would be as
great an error as to suppose him wholly destitute of them.
Hence the necessity of adequate rewards for those services
of which the Public stand in need. Without them the affairs of
a nation are likely to get sooner or later into incompetent or
unfaithful hands. If their own private wealth is to supply in the
candidates for public Office the deficiency of public liberality
then the sphere of those who can be candidates especially
in a country like ours is much narrowed and the chance of a
choice of able as well as upright men much lessened. Besides
that it would be repugnate to the first principles of our
government to exclude men from the public trusts because
their talents & virtues however conspicuous are
unaccompanied by wealth. If the rewards of the
Government are scanty those who have talents without
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wealth & are too virtuous to abuse their stations cannot
accept public offices without a sacrifice of interest which in
ordinary time may hardly be justified by their duty to
themselves and their families. If they have talents without
virtue they may indeed accept offices to make a dishonest &
improper use of them. The tendency then is to transfer the
management of public affairs to wealthy but incapable
hands or to hands which if capable are as destitute of
integrity as of wealth. For a time particular circumstances
may prevent such a course of things and hitherto the
inference has not been verified in our experience. But it is not
the less probable that time will prove it to be well founded. In
some Government men have many allurements to office
exclusive of pecuniary rewards—but from the nature of our
government pecuniary reward is the only aliment to the
interested passion, which public men who are not vicious can
expect. If then it be essential to the prosperous course of
every Government that it shall be able to command the
services of its most able & most virtuous citizens of every class,
it follows that the compensations which our Government
allows ought to be revised & materially increased. The
character & success of Republican Government appear
absolutely to depend on this policy.
Congress have repeatedly directed their attention to
the encouragement of manufactures, and have no doubt
promoted them in several branches. The object is of two
much importance not to assure a continuance of their efforts
in every way which shall appear proper & conducive to the
end. But in the present state of our Country we cannot
expect that our progress in some essential branches will be as
expeditious as the public welfare demands—particularly in
reference to security & defence in time of War. This reflection
is the less pleasing when it is remembered how large a
proportion of our supply the course of our Trade derives from
a single nation. It appears very desireable that at least with a
view to security and defence some measures more
efficacious than have heretofore been adopted should be
taken. As a general rule manufactories carried on upon
public account are to be avoided. But every general rule
may admit of exceptions. Where the state of things in our
Country leaves little expectation that certain branches of
manufacture will for a great length of time be sufficiently
cultivated—when these are of a nature to be essential to the
furnishing and equipping of the troops and ships of war of
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which we stand in need—are not establishments on the
public account, to the extent of the public demand for
supply, recommended by very strong considerations of
national policy? Ought our country to be dependent in such
cases upon foreign supply precarious because liable to be
interrupted? [If the necessary Supplies should be procured in
this mode at great expense in time of Peace—will not the
Security and independence arising from it very amply
compensate? Institutions of this Kind commensurate only with
our peace Establishments, will in time of War be easily
extended in proportion to the public exigencies. And they
may even perhaps be rendered contributary to the Supply of
our citizens at large so as greatly to mitigate the privations
arising from the interruption of trade. The idea at least is
worthy of the most serious consideration. If adopted, the plan
ought of course to exclude all those branches which may be
considered as already established in our Country, and to
which the efforts of individuals appear already as likely to be
Speedily adequate.
A reinforcement of the existing provisions for
discharging our public Debt was mentioned in my address at
the opening of the last Session. Congress took Some
preliminary steps, the maturing of which will no doubt engage
their zealous attention during the present. I will only add, that
it will afford me heartfelt Satisfaction to concur in such
auxiliary measures as will ascertain to our country, the
prospect of a Speedy extinguishment of the Debt. Prosperity
may have Cause to regret, if, from any motive, intervals of
tranquility are left unemployed, for accelerating this valuable
end.”220
There are some limits on what government should do, according to
Hamilton. There is such a thing as an “excess of regulation,” but how to
determine what is a good idea and what not? For Hamilton, one needs
the appropriate kind of administrators, men of “sound judgement,” and
NOT what Hamilton referred to as “theorists,” which as is well-known, was
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what he called Jefferson, Madison, and others who shared their opinions
on government. Hamilton enunciates an Aristotelian argument in arguing
for a “medium,” and not “general principles,” to determine how
government should act. Once the Federalists had lost the election of
1800, and Democratic-Republican policies were put into place by the
Jefferson Administration, Hamilton wrote in The Examination Number XI
from 1802:
“It is certainly possible to do too much as well as too little; to
embarrass, if not defeat the good which may be done, by
attempting more than is practicable; or to overbalance that
good by evils accruing from an excess of regulation. Men of
business know this to be the case in the ordinary affairs of life:
how much more must it be so, in the extensive and
complicated concerns of an Empire? To reach and not to
pass the salutary medium is the province of sound judgment:
To miss the point will ever be the lot of those who, enveloped
all their lives in the mists of theory, are constantly seeking for
an ideal perfection which never was and never will be
attainable in reality. It is about this medium, not about
general principles, that those in power in our government
have differed; and to experience, not to the malevolent
insinuations of rivals, must be the appeal, whether the one or
the other description of persons have judged most
accurately. Yet discerning men may form no imperfect
opinion of the merits of the controversy between them, by
even a cursory view of the distinctions on which it has
turned.”221
With James Madison what we really see is a difference of opinion
with Hamilton in degree. In so many ways, their conflicts reflected not a
vast gulf of different principles, but rather different priorities. There were
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some issues on which they differed markedly, but these are the exception.
Sadly, each interpreted the other’s actions in the worst manner possible.
Fear, rather than giving the benefit of the doubt, ruled both.

Like

Hamilton, Madison also saw the need for the federal government to have
the power to regulate trade during the time of the Articles of
Confederation. For Madison, the states simply cannot effectively regulate
trade by themselves. There needed to be a common overseer of trade
for the United States, just like other countries had.
Again like Hamilton, Madison argued that free trade with other
countries would be the ideal, but it was just not possible at that time, due
to the policies of other governments. Given that reality, the United States
needed to enact similar policies to protect itself. A tariff would be the
best option for not only controlling trade, giving the United States
leverage in negotiations with other countries, and equally important,
paying off the debt owed to other countries. To James Monroe he wrote
in 1785:
“Viewing in the abstract the question whether the power of
regulating trade, to a certain degree at least, ought to be
vested in Congress, it appears to me not to admit of a doubt,
but that it should be decided in the affirmative. If it be
necessary to regulate trade at all, it surely is necessary to
lodge the power, where trade can be regulated with effect,
and experience has confirmed what reason foresaw, that it
can never be so regulated by the States acting in their
separate capacities. They can no more exercise this power
separately, than they could separately carry on war, or
separately form treaties of alliance or Commerce. The nature
of the thing therefore proves the former power, no less than
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the latter, to be within the reason of the fœderal Constitution.
Much indeed is it to be wished, as I conceive, that no
regulations of trade, that is to say, no restrictions or imposts
whatever, were necessary. A perfect freedom is the System
which would be my choice. But before such a system will be
eligible perhaps for the U. S. they must be out of debt; before
it will be attainable, all other nations must concur in it.”222
With Madison more so than Hamilton, though, we see the notion of
using trade with other countries as a weapon.

Other than in The

Federalist, Hamilton does not mention this as an option for the federal
government. With Madison, especially in his non-official papers, this idea
occurs comes up far more often. The United States must be able to, for
instance, “extort redress” from other countries. Again to Monroe in the
same letter as above he wrote:
“What is to be done? Must we remain passive victims to
foreign politics; or shall we exert the lawful means which our
independence has put into our hands, of extorting redress?
The very question would be an affront to every Citizen who
loves his Country. What then are those means? Retaliating
regulations of trade only. How are these to be effectuated?
only by harmony in the measures of the States. How is this
harmony to be obtained? only by an acquiescence of all the
States in the opinion of a reasonable majority.”223
At first, Madison wanted amendments to be made to the Articles of
Confederation.

He did not initially want a quite different form of

government, which the Constitution eventually was.

However, the
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“machinations” of Great Britain needed to be dealt with, and only a
stronger federal government could do that.
“But let us not sacrifice the end to the means: let us not rush
on certain ruin in order to avoid a possible danger. I
conceive it to be of great importance that the defects of
the fœderal system should be amended, not only because
such amendments will make it better answer the purpose for
which it was instituted, but because I apprehend danger to
its very existence from a continuance of defects which
expose a part if not the whole of the empire to severe
distress. The suffering part, even when the minor part, can
not long respect a Government which is too feeble to
protect their interest; But when the suffering part come to be
the major part, and they despair of seeing a protecting
energy given to the General Government, from what
motives is their allegiance to be any longer expected.
Should G. B. persist in the machinations which distress us; and
seven or eight of the States be hindered by the others
from obtaining relief by fœderal means, I own, I tremble at
the anti-fœderal expedients into which the former may be
tempted.”224
Not just Great Britain needs to be dealt with, but also some
American citizens are behaving in ways contrary to the nation’s best
interest. Specifically, Madison identifies the “mercantile interest” as being
far too closely aligned with Great Britain than the United States. We saw
this above with Hamilton’s concern with the “trading interest.” Madison
identifies the continued animosity towards Great Britain as a resource
which could be made use of in order to counteract the baleful influence
of the merchants and Great Britain.
“Add to all this that the mercantile interest which has taken
the lead in rousing the public attention of other States, is in
224
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this so exclusively occupied in British Commerce that what
little weight they have will be most likely to fall into the
opposite scale. The only circumstance which promises a
favorable hearing to the meditated proposition of Congs. is
that the power which it asks is to be exerted agst. G. B, and
the proposition will consequently be seconded by the
animosities which still prevail in a strong degree agst. her.”225
The malignant influence of Great Britain is something that was
clearly much more on Madison’s mind than Hamilton’s, although Hamilton
did decry a lack of American ability to deal on more equal terms with
other countries. He was just far more concerned about BOTH France and
Great Britain than Madison was. In any case, we see again and again in
Madison’s writings a focus on dealing specifically with Great Britain, and
he hoped that the people at large would become fed up with the ways
in which Great Britain was treating the United States, thus agreeing to give
the federal government more power.

His home state of Virginia was

especially recalcitrant in Madison’s estimation, mainly due to the recovery
in the prices it was receiving for its farm exports. Madison was especially
afraid that Great Britain’s ultimate goal was to effect a disunion of the
United States. To Thomas Jefferson he wrote in 1785:
“The machinations of G. B. with regard to Commerce have
produced much distress and noise in the Northern States,
particularly in Boston, from whence the alarm has spread to
New York & Philada. Your correspondence with Congs. will no
doubt have furnished you with full information on this head. I
only know the General fact, and that the sufferers are every
where calling for such augmentation of the power of
Congress as may effect relief. How far the Southern States &
225
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Virginia in particular will join in this proposition cannot be
foreseen. It is easy to foresee that the circumstances which in
a confined view distinguish our situation from that of our
brethren, will be laid hold of by the partizans of G. B. by those
who are or affect to be jealous of Congress, and those who
are interested in the present course of business, to give a
wrong bias to our Councils. If any thing should reconcile
Virga. to the idea of giving Congress a power over her trade,
it will be that this power is likely to annoy G. B. against whom
the animosities of our Citizens are still strong. They seem to
have less sensibility to their commercial interests; which they
very little understand, and which the mercantile class here
have not the same motives if they had the same capacity to
lay open to the public, as that class have in the States North
of us. The price of our Staple since the peace is another
cause of inattention in the planters to the dark side of our
commercial affairs. Should these or any other causes prevail
in frustrating the scheme of the Eastern & Middle States of a
general
retaliation
on
G.
B.
I tremble
for
the [event]. A majority of the states deprived of a regular
remidy for their distresses by the want of a fœderal spirit in the
minority must feel
the
strongest motives
to
some
irregular experiments. The dan[ger] of such a crisis makes me
surmise that the policy of Great Britain results as much
from the hope of effecting a breach in our confederacy as of
monopolising our trade.”226
To George Washington in 1785 he expressed his conclusion that the
reason behind the states’ refusal to grant the federal government more
control over commerce came down to simple fear. Madison showed his
classical education by comparing the situation the United States was in to
that of the Greek city-states just prior to their conquest by Macedonia.
Like the Greek confederation, Madison thought the United States was in
danger because it had not granted its general government enough
power to effectively deal with foreign countries.
226
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“Your favour of the 30. Novr. was received a few days ago.
This would have followed much earlier the one which yours
acknowledges had I not wished it to contain some final
information relative to the commercial propositions. The
discussion of them has consumed much time, and though the
absolute necessity of some such general system prevailed
over all the efforts of its adversaries in the first instance, the
stratagem of limiting its duration to a short term has ultimately
disappointed our hopes. I think it better to trust to further
experience and even distress, for an adequate remedy, than
to try a temporary measure which may stand in the way of a
permanent one, and must confirm that transatlantic policy
which is founded on our supposed distrust of Congress and of
one another. Those whose opposition in this case did not
spring from illiberal animosities towards the Northern
States, seem to have been frightened on one side at the idea
of a perpetual & irrevocable grant of power, and on the
other flattered with a hope, that a temporary grant might be
renewed from time to time, if its utility should be confirmed by
the experiment. But we have already granted perpetual &
irrevocable powers of a much more extensive nature than
those now proposed and for reasons not stronger than the
reasons which urge the latter. And as to the hope of renewal,
it is the most visionary one that perhaps ever deluded men of
sense. Nothing but the peculiarity of our circumstances could
ever have produced those sacrifices of sovereignty on which
the fœderal Government now rests. If they had been
temporary, and the expiration of the term required a renewal
at this crisis, pressing as the crisis is, and recent as is our
experience of the value of the confederacy, sure I am that it
would be impossible to revive it. What room have we then to
hope that the expiration of temporary grants of commercial
powers would always find a unanimous disposition in the
States, to follow their own example. It ought to be
remembered too that besides the caprice, jealousy, and
diversity of opinions, which will be certain obstacles in our
way, the policy of foreign nations may hereafter imitate that
of the Macedonian Prince who effected his purposes against
the Grecian confederacy by gaining over a few of the
leading men in the smaller members of it.”227
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In contrast to Hamilton, where most of our sources of his ideas come
from his writings, with Madison we fortunately also have a wealth of his
thoughts given through his speeches in the Continental Congress, the
legislature of Virginia, and also the Congress of the United States.

As

regards the question of direct taxation by the federal government, even
during his service in the Continental Congress, Madison stressed the need
for the federal government to have the power of directly taxing the
people, rather than that of sending requisitions to the states, in order to
have better control of the United States’ economy.

Specifically, the

federal government needed to be able to pay the country’s debts, most
especially those owed overseas, but could only do so if it had the ability to
levy taxes without state interference.
“My honorable friend seems to think that we ought to spare
the present generation, and throw our burthens upon
posterity. I will not contest the equity of this reasoning, but I
must say that good policy as well as views of œconomy,
strongly urge us even to distress ourselves to comply with our
most solemn engagements. We must make effectual
provision for the payment of the interest of our public debts.
In order to do justice to our creditors, and support our credit
and reputation; we must lodge power some where or other
for this purpose.”228
While not stressing the issue as much as Hamilton, Madison also
expressed a greater fear of state power than federal power. This once
228
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again shows the differences between the two were quite often more ones
of degree than of differing principles.

From the same speech in the

Continental Congress as above, Madison expressed his conviction that
the federal government needed to have the ability to “suppress” state
power if necessary.
“I do not thoroughly comprehend the reasoning of my
honorable friend, when he tells us, that the federal
government will predominate, and that the state interest will
be lost; when at the same time he tells us, that it will be a
faction of seven states. If seven states will prevail as states, I
conceive that state influence will prevail. If state influence
under the present feeble government has prevailed, I think
that a remedy ought to be introduced by giving the general
government power to suppress it.”229
Both Madison and Hamilton wanted the United States to remain
neutral in the ongoing European conflicts, most notably those between
France and Great Britain.

Both argued in favor of the United States

building and maintaining a navy in order to enforce its neutrality, as both
Great Britain and France had interfered with American shipping because
the United States simply did not have a naval force with which to protect
itself. Madison, in stark contrast to Hamilton, though, did not like having to
have a standing military establishment. He nevertheless saw the need for
one, given the realities of how other countries treated the United States.
“He supposed that my argument with respect to a future war
between Great-Britain and France was fallacious. The other
229
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nations of Europe have acceded to that neutrality while
Great-Britain opposed it. We need not expect in case of such
a war, that we should be suffered to participate of the
profitable emoluments of the carrying trade, unless we were
in a respectable situation. Recollect the last war. Was there
ever a war in which the British nation stood opposed to so
many nations? All the belligerent nations in Europe, with
nearly one half of the British empire, were united against it.
Yet that nation, though defeated, and humbled beyond any
previous example, stood out against this. From her firmness
and spirit in such desperate circumstances, we may divine
what her future conduct may be. I did not contend that it
was necessary for the United States to establish a navy for
that sole purpose, but instanced it as one reason out of
several, for rendering ourselves respectable. I am no friend to
naval or land armaments in time of peace, but if they be
necessary, the calamity must be submitted to. Weakness will
invite insults. A respectable government will not only intitle us
to a participation of the advantages which are enjoyed by
other nations, but will be a security against attacks and insults.
It is to avoid the calamity of being obliged to have large
armaments that we should establish this government. The
best way to avoid danger, is to be in a capacity to withstand
it.”230
Madison’s efforts in regards to creating a stronger union through
government involvement in the economy did not stop when he helped
achieve his goal of ratifying the Constitution. As he began his service in
the House of Representatives, Madison again stressed the imperative that
the United States put its finances in order. Madison still wanted as much
free trade as possible, but given the continued reality of tariff usage by
other countries, he again argued in favor of not only the necessity, but the
utility as well, of the United States making use of tariffs.
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“The union, by the establishment of a more effective
government having recovered from the state of imbecility,
that heretofore prevented a performance of its duty, ought,
in its first act, to revive those principles of honor and honesty
that have too long lain dormant.
The deficiency in our treasury has been too notorious to
make it necessary for me to animadvert upon that subject.
Let us content our selves with endeavouring to remedy the
evil. To do this a national revenue must be obtained; but the
system must be such an one, that, while it secures the object
of revenue, it shall not be oppressive to our constituents:
Happy it is for us that such a system is within our power; for I
apprehend that both these objects may be obtained from an
impost on articles imported into the United States.
In pursuing this measure, I know that two points occur
for our consideration. The first, respects the general regulation
of commerce, which in my opinion ought to be as free as the
policy of nations will admit. The second, relates to revenue
alone, and this is the point I mean more particularly to bring
into the view of the committee.”231
Madison, in contrast with Hamilton, argued for the need to focus
more on current revenue concerns than promoting manufactures. Here is
in fact a very important point to understand in regards to the differences
the two had, and the effects those differences had on the United States.
Manufacturing was simply not as important for Madison as it was for
Hamilton. He did assume manufacturing would eventually be added to a
more diversified American economy, but in so many ways he dreaded
that eventuality, given his conviction that a more manufacturing-based
economy would be a threat to the republican virtue on which the United
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States ultimately depended.
“It was my view to restrain the first essay on this subject
principally to the object of revenue, and make this rather a
temporary expedient than any thing permanent. I see
however, that there are strong exceptions against deciding
immediately on a part of the plan, which I had the honor to
bring forward, as well as against an application to the
resources mentioned in the list of articles just proposed by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania.
I presume, that however much we may be disposed to
promote domestic manufactures, we ought to pay some
regard to the present policy of obtaining revenue.”232
Madison did consistently display his more nationalistic preferences
by urging others in the nascent Congress of the United States to focus on
the common needs of the country as a whole, rather than just the needs
of their individual states.
“I am sensible that there is great weight in the observation
that fell from the hon. gentleman from South-Carolina, (Mr.
Tucker) That it will be necessary on the one hand, to weigh
and regard the sentiments of the gentlemen from the
different parts of the United States; but on the other hand, we
must limit our consideration on this head, and
notwithstanding all the deference and respect we pay to
those sentiments, we must consider the general interest of the
union, for this is as much every gentleman’s duty to consider
as is the local or state interest—and any system of impost that
this committee will adopt, must be founded on the principles
of mutual concession.”233
While nowhere near as convinced of their importance as Hamilton,
Madison

did

not

completely

oppose

the

encouragement

of

manufacturing by the federal government, now that such power had
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been granted to Congress by the Constitution. Nevertheless, he once
again expressed his preference for a free market, rather than extensive
government control of the economy.
“There is another consideration. The states that are
most advanced in population and ripe for manufactures,
ought to have their particular interest attended to in some
degree. While these states retained the power of making
regulations of trade, they had the power to protect and
cherish such institutions; by adopting the present constitution
they have thrown the exercise of this power into other
hands—they must have done this with an expectation, that
those interests would not be neglected here.
I am afraid, Sir, on the one hand, that if we go fully into
a discussion of the subject, we shall consume more time than
prudence would dictate to spare; on the other hand, if we do
not develop it and see the principles on which we mutually
act, we shall subject ourselves to great difficulties. I beg leave
therefore to state the grounds on which my opinion with
respect to the matter under consideration is founded,
namely, whether our present system should be a temporary or
permanent one? In the first place, I own myself the friend to a
very free system of commerce, and hold it as a truth, that
commercial shackles are generally unjust, oppressive and
impolitic—it is also a truth, that if industry and labour are left to
take their own course, they will generally be directed to those
objects which are the most productive, and this in a more
certain and direct manner than the wisdom of the most
enlightened legislature could point out. Nor do I think that the
national interest is more promoted by such restrictions, than
that the interest of individuals would be promoted by
legislative interference directing the particular application of
its industry.”234
Madison also thought the federal government should take similar
steps to encourage agriculture, in which he argued the United States
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already had advantages over other countries, in order to counterbalance the advantages European countries had in manufacturing.
“In my opinion, it would be proper also, for gentlemen
to consider the means of encouraging the great staple of
America, I mean agriculture, which I think may justly be stiled
the staple of the United States; from the spontaneous
productions which nature furnishes, and the manifest
preference it has over every other object of emolument in this
country. If we compare the cheapness of our land with that
of other nations, we see so decided an advantage in that
cheapness, as to have full confidence of being unrivaled;
with respect to the object of manufacture, other countries
may and do rival us; but we may be said to have a monopoly
in agriculture. The possession of the soil and the lowness of its
price, give us as much a monopoly in this case, as any nation
or other parts of the world have in the monopoly of any
article whatever; but, with this advantage to us, that it cannot
be shared nor injured by rivalship.
If my general principle is a good one, that commerce
ought to be free, and labour and industry left at large to find
its proper object, the only thing which remains, will be to
discover the exceptions that do not come within the rule I
have laid down. I agree with the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, that there are exceptions, important in
themselves and claim the particular attention of the
committee: Altho the freedom of commerce would be
advantageous to all the world, yet, in some particulars, one
nation might suffer, to benefit others, and this ought to be for
the general good of society.”235
In addition to actions he believed the federal government needed
to take to involve itself in the economy due to the policies of other
governments, Madison argued there were other exceptions to an overall
policy of free trade that would be necessary. Tariffs are one, but also
where tariffs have been used to help create businesses, the federal
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government needs to continue to protect them, since they are
dependent upon government aid. In keeping with his republican virtue
focus, Madison also sees a role for sumptuary laws, in order to encourage
appropriate civic virtue amongst the citizens. Embargoes during war are
another case, as well as protections for defense-related industries.
But, in contrast to Hamilton, Madison argued these sorts of
protections are not as important as many think.

The experiences the

United States had during the Revolutionary War are not as clear a lesson
for Madison as for Hamilton. Mainly, he was not as convinced of the need
for federally-protected defense-related industries if they were too
expensive. He argued that, even in war, the United States would be able
to obtain supplies from abroad. Finally, Madison introduces an incomebased argument in favor of tariffs, as being a just way to tax the rich
instead of the poor, since the amount of tax paid would be in proportion
to the differing levels of consumption by those two groups.
“Duties laid on imported articles may have an effect
which comes within the idea of national prudence; It may
happen that materials for manufactures may grow up
without any encouragement for this purpose; it has been the
case in some of the states, but in others, regulations have
been provided and have succeeded in producing some
establishment, which ought not to be allowed to perish, from
the alteration which has taken place: It would be cruel to
neglect them and divert their industry to other channels, for it
is not possible for the hand of man to shift from one
employment to another, without being injured by the
change. There may be some manufactures, which being
once formed, can advance toward perfection without any
adventitious aid, while others for want of the fostering hand of
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government will be unable to go on at all. Legislative
attention will therefore be necessary to collect the proper
objects for this purpose, and this will form an other exception
to my general principle.
I observe that a sumptuary prohibition is within the view
of some of the proposed articles and forms another
exception; I acknowledge that I do not in general think any
great national advantage arises from restrictions passed on
this head, because as long as a distinction in point of value
subsists, sumptuary duties in some form or other will prevail
and take effect.
Another exception is embargoes in time of war; these
may necessarily occur and shackle the freedom of
commerce; but the reasons for this are so obvious, that it
renders any remark unnecessary.
The next exception that occurs, is one on which great
stress is laid by some well informed men, and this with great
plausibility. That each nation should have within itself, the
means of defence independent of foreign supplies: That in
whatever relates to the operation of war, no state ought to
depend upon a precarious supply from any part of the world:
There may be some truth in this remark, and therefore it is
proper for legislative attention. I am though, well persuaded
that the reasoning on this subject has been carried too far.
The difficulties we experienced a few years ago, of obtaining
military supplies, ought not to furnish too much in favour of an
establishment which would be difficult and expensive;
because our national character is now established and
recognized throughout the world, and the laws of war
favor national exertion more than intestine commotion, so
that there is good reason to believe that when it becomes
necessary, we may obtain supplies from abroad as readily as
any other nation whatsoever. I have mentioned this because
I think I see something among the enumerated articles that
seems to favor such policy.
The impost laid on trade for the purpose of obtaining
revenue, may likewise be considered as an exception; so far
therefore as revenue can be more conveniently and certainly
raised by this, than any other method without injury to the
community, and its operation will be in due proportion to the
consumption, which consumption is generally proportioned to
the circumstances of individuals, I think sound policy dictates
to use this mean; but it will be necessary to confine our
attention at this time peculiarly to the object of revenue,
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because the other subject involves some intricate questions,
to unravel which we perhaps are not prepared.”236
Again, though, Madison did argue there were exceptions to his
preference for free trade, but how to identify them would be left up to an
examination of whether or not they were necessary for the common
good. Specifically, any tariff, being a tax, should be apportioned to the
ability of those affected by it to actually pay.

He identified different

effects of tariffs on variously the poor and the rich, and decried what he
considered unjust amounts expected out of either.
“In the first point of view we may consider the effect it will
have on the different descriptions of people throughout the
United States, I mean different descriptions as they relate to
property. I readily agree, that in itself a tax would be unjust
and oppressive that did not fall on the citizens according to
their degree of property and ability to pay it; were it therefore
this single article which we were about to tax, I should think it
indispensible that it should operate equally agreeably to the
principle I have just mentioned. But in order to determine
whether a tax on salt is just or unjust, we must consider it as
part of a system, and judge of the operation of this system as
if it was but a single article; if this is found to be unequal it is
also unjust. Now, examine the preceding articles, and
consider how they affect the rich, and it will be found that
they bear more than a just proportion according to their
ability to pay—by adding this article we shall rather equalise
the disproportion than encrease it, if it is true, as has been
often mentioned, that the poor will contribute more of this tax
than the rich.”237
It was the differences among the states as regards economic
regulation that led Madison to consider it necessary for the federal
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government to step in.

In some cases, the states did not have any

regulations at all on various points, such as tariff collection, while others
specifically prohibited any state official from enforcing federal regulations.
So, it became necessary in Madison’s opinion for the federal government
to establish its own means, and the officials to carry them out, in order for
any tariff to be collected. Thus, it is in this case precisely the states’ refusal
to take action that caused the federal government to establish a
bureaucracy it might not have had to otherwise, had it been able to rely
on state officials to collect the tariff.
However, Madison clearly mentions below a major point of
disagreement with Hamilton, that of encouraging manufacturing by the
federal government.

Far from there being a pressing need for such

action, Madison specifically identified any such decision as “premature.”
In a letter to Edmund Pendleton from 1789 he wrote:
“The House of Reps. is still occupied with the impost. It is a
subject which is not very simple in itself; and is rendered not a
little difficult by the diversity of State regulations—by the total
want of regulations in several States—by the case of R. Island
and N. Carolina; and by the law of Virginia disqualifying State
officers, Judiciary as well as others, from executing federal
functions. The latter circumstance seems to threaten
additional delay, since it may require some special provision
of a Judiciary nature for cases of seizure &c; until the
Judiciary department can be systematically arranged; and
may even then oblige the fedl. Legislature to extend its
provisions farther than might otherwise be necessary. In
settling the rate of duties the ideas of different quarters Nn. &
Southn. Eastern & Western, do not entirely accord: but the
difficulties are adjusted as easily as could be well expected. If
the duties should be raised too high, the error will proceed as
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much from the popular ardor to throw the burden of revenue
on trade, as from the premature policy of stimulating
manufactures.”238
Elkins and McKitrick, in their The Age of Federalism, have, as I have
discussed in the Introduction to this work, characterized the main
difference between Hamilton and Madison as following from the different
preferences each had as regards France and Great Britain, the two
“superpowers” of the day. I have taken issue with that, but there is some
evidence that, at least in Madison’s case, he did indeed have a
preference for France, but only up until the time Napoleon took over. This
preference for France was at first based on gratitude for help during the
Revolution, but then after the French Revolution it was based on support
for a kindred republican state.

The effect of this support did, while it

lasted, give him a reason to support federal government involvement in
the economy in favor of relations with France. For Madison, this was in
part supported by his conviction that the public at large wanted France
to have privileges other countries did not.
“Some gentlemen have seemed to call in question the policy
of discriminating between nations in commercial alliance with
the United States, and those with whom no treaties exist; for
my own part, I am well satisfied that there are good and
substantial reasons for making it; in the first place, it may not
be unworthy of consideration, that the public sentiments of
America will be favourable to such discrimination. I am sure
with respect to that part from which I came, it will not be a
pleasing ingredient in your laws, if they find foreigners of every
nation put on a footing with those in alliance with us. There is
238
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another reason which perhaps is more applicable to some
parts of the union than to others; one of the few nations with
which America has formed commercial connections has
relaxed considerably in that rigid policy it before pursued, not
so far to be sure as America could wish, with respect to
opening her ports to our trade, but she has permitted our
ready built ships a sale, and entitles them to the same
advantage, when owned by her own citizens, as if they had
been built in France, subjecting the sale to a duty of 5 per
cent. The British market receives none; the disabilities of our
ships to trade with their colonies continue even if they are
purchased by the subjects of Great-Britain. Of consequence
they cannot be sold without a considerable loss; nay so
cautious are they to prevent the advantages we naturally
possess, that they will not suffer a British ship to be repaired in
America, beyond a certain proportion of her value; they
even will not permit our vessels to be repaired in their
ports.”239
Sometimes

for

Madison,

the

need

for

federal

government

involvement in the economy comes from, as in the case with Great
Britain, where the free market has not resulted in the optimal situation, due
to previous political influences. In the case of these “unnatural” situations,
it is appropriate for the federal government to correct the situation by
various means. These “political advantages” given to some but not other
countries will, in Madison’s estimation, lead to greater economic
exchange in those instances, correcting what he argues was a
disproportionate amount of influence by Great Britain. Also, it would lead
to other nations being more willing to make favorable trade agreements
with the United States, in order to increase the amount of business with the
United States.
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“There are also other considerations which ought to be taken
into view. From artificial or adventitious causes the commerce
between America and Great Britain exceeds what may be
considered its natural boundary. I find from an examination of
the accounts of tonnage for the three large states of
Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina, that the tonnage
of nations in alliance with us holds no proportion with that of
Great Britain, or of the United States. This is a proof, that a very
small direct commerce takes place between those countries
and this; that there is less of direct intercourse than would
naturally be if those extraneous and adventitious causes did
not prevent it; such as, the long possession of our trade, their
commercial regulations calculated to retain it, their similarity
of language and manners, their conformity of laws and other
circumstances, all these concurring has made their
commerce with us more extensive than their natural situation
would require it to be. I would wish therefore to give such
political advantages to those nations as might enable them
to gain their proportion of our direct trade from the nation
who has acquired more than is naturally her due. From this
view of the subject, I am led to believe it would be good
policy to make the proposed discrimination between them. Is
it not also of some importance, that we should enable nations
in treaty with us to draw some advantage from our alliance,
and thereby impress those powers that have hitherto
neglected to treat with us, with the idea that advantages are
to be gained by a reciprocity of friendship? If we give every
thing equally to those who have or have not formed treaties,
surely we do not furnish to them any motive for courting our
connection.”240
The United States simply cannot have an overall, blanket policy of
free trade, at least at this point in its history, according to Madison. The
other countries of the world just do not follow that line of reasoning, and
so the US must behave in a similar manner. When it is in the United States’
interest, it can follow a free market approach, but when it is not, it must
nevertheless follow its interest, and not the principle of free trade.
240
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“I am a friend to free commerce, and at the same time a
friend to such regulations as are calculated to promote our
own interest, and this on national principles. The great
principle of interest is a leading one with me, and yet my
combination of ideas on this head, leads me to a very
different conclusion from that made by the gentleman from
New-York (Mr. Lawrance). I wish we were under less necessity
than I find we are to shackle our commerce with duties,
restrictions and preferences; but there are cases in which it is
impossible to avoid following the example of other nations in
the great diversity of our trade.”241
In some ways, though, Madison wanted to have the federal
government direct commerce just as much as Hamilton, but in a different
direction.

He argued for the need to have the federal government

counteract powerful interests and individuals in society. Especially, the
federal government needed to behave in ways to overcome established
wealth, which would lead to greater equality amongst citizens.
“I beg leave to remark in answer to a train of ideas which the
gentleman last up has brought into view, that although
interest will in general operate effectually to produce political
good, yet there are causes in which certain factitious
circumstances may divert it from its natural channel, or throw
or retain in an artificial one. Have we not been exercised on
this topic for a long time past? Or why has it been necessary
to give encouragement to particular species of industry, but
to turn the stream in favor of an interest that would not
otherwise succeed? But laying aside the illustration of these
causes so well known to all nations, where cities, companies,
or opulent individuals engross the business from others, by
having had an uninterrupted possession of it, or by the extent
of their capitals being able to destroy a competition; let us
proceed to examine what ought to be our conduct on this
principle, upon the present occasion. Suppose two
commercial cities, one possessed of enormous capitals and
long habits of business, whilst the other is possessed of superior
241
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natural advantages, but without that course of business and
chain of connections which the other has, is it possible in the
nature of things, that the latter city should carry on a
successful competition with the former? Thus it is with nations;
and when we consider the vast quantities of our produce
sent to the different parts of Europe, and the great
importations from the same places, that almost all of this
commerce is transacted thro’ the medium of British ships and
British merchants, I cannot help conceiving that, from the
force of habit and other conspiring causes, that nation is in
possession of a much greater proportion of our trade than she
naturally is intitled to. Trade then being restrained to an
artificial channel, is not so advantageous to America as a
direct intercourse would be; it becomes therefore the duty of
those to whose care the public interest and welfare are
committed, to turn the tide to a more favorable direction.”242
In an argument similar to one of Hamilton’s in favor of encouraging
manufactures, Madison argues the federal government needs to
counteract old habits leading to more trade with some countries than
with others.
“I cannot, from this view of the subject, be persuaded to
believe that every part of our trade flows in those channels
which would be most natural and profitable to us, or those
which reason would dictate to us, if we were unincumbered
of old habits, and other accidental circumstances that hurry
us along.”243
Madison did agree with Hamilton on the need for a navy, given the
United States’ interest in foreign commerce via its own ships. Otherwise,
the United States would have to rely on the ships of other countries, and
would lose out on much of the wealth flowing from that business. Also, he
argued it would be a good thing for the United States to have its own
242
243
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commercial ships, because they would supply the sailors it would need for
a navy in case of a war. Overall, giving preferences to some but not
other countries, combined with merchant shipping, would lead in
Madison’s opinion, to greater safety for the United States.
“The more the subject has been examined the greater
necessity there appears for discrimination. If it is expedient for
America to have vessels employed in commerce at all, it will
be proper that she have enough to answer all the purposes
intended; to form a school for seamen, to lay the foundation
of a navy, and to be able to support itself against the
interference of foreigners. I do not think there is much weight
in what has been observed relative to the duty we are about
to lay in favor of American vessels, being a burthen on the
community, and particularly oppressive to some parts; but if
there were, it may be a burthen of that kind which will
ultimately save us from one that is greater.
I consider that an acquisition of maritime strength is
essential to this country; if ever we are so unfortunate as to be
engaged in war, what but this can defend our towns and
cities upon the sea-coast? Or what but this can enable us to
repel an invading enemy? Those parts which are said to bear
an undue proportion of the burthen of the additional duty on
foreign shipping, are those that will be the most exposed to
the operations of a depredatory war, and require the
greatest exertions of the union in their defence; if therefore
some little sacrifice is made by them to obtain this important
object, they will be peculiarly rewarded for it in the hour of
danger. Granting a preference to our own navigation will
insensibly bring it forward to that perfection so essential to
American safety; and though it may produce some little
inequality at first, it will soon ascertain its level, and become
uniform throughout the union. A higher duty will become
necessary on these principles, as well as on those of
discrimination; the preference we give to foreign nations in
alliance over those not in treaty, will tend to encrease the
trade of our allies, but it will also enable our own shipping to
carry on lower terms, than that nation who is in possession of
such an unnatural proportion of commerce.”244
244
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Madison ties the importance of republican virtue to the idea of a
free market, which is actually a departure in many ways from earlier
writers on the subject. For Madison, though, a free market is in his view
essential for the success of the United States’ experiment in republican
government. However, the farming lifestyle is the best, indeed essential,
way of making a living to help create the republican virtues needed.
Manufacturing can only be done in cities, which are anathema to the
independence and self-reliance necessary for a republican lifestyle.
Writing for the National Gazette in 1792, he said:
“A PERFECT theory on this subject would be useful, not
because it could be reduced to practice by any plan of
legislation, or ought to be attempted by violence on the will
or property of individuals: but because it would be a monition
against empirical experiments by power, and a model to
which the free choice of occupations by the people, might
gradually approximate the order of society.
The best distribution is that which would most
favor health,
virtue,
intelligence and
competency in
the greatest number of citizens. It is needless to add to these
objects, liberty and safety. The first is presupposed by them.
The last must result from them.
The life of the husbandman is pre-eminently suited to
the comfort and happiness of the individual. Health, the first
of blessings, is an appurtenance of his property and his
employment. Virtue, the health of the soul, is another part of
his
patrimony,
and
no
less
favored
by
his
situation. Intelligence may be cultivated in this as well as in
any other walk of life. If the mind be less susceptible of polish
in retirement than in a croud, it is more capable of profound
and comprehensive efforts. Is it more ignorant of some
things? It has a compensation in its ignorance of
others. Competency is more universally the lot of those who
dwell in the country, when liberty is at the same time their lot.
The extremes both of want and of waste have other abodes.
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’Tis not the country that peoples either the Bridewells or the
Bedlams. These mansions of wretchedness are tenanted from
the distresses and vices of overgrown cities.”245
Again and again Madison emphasized that agriculture, rather than
manufacturing, was the path to the independence, happiness and public
liberty for everyone that classical republican virtue offered.

To help

achieve this goal, he did approve of government involvement in the
economy. For Madison, there was no need to promote manufacturing,
with its baleful effects on virtue, but government could employ itself
profitably by promoting farming.
“The class of citizens who provide at once their own
food and their own raiment, may be viewed as the most truly
independent and happy. They are more: they are the best
basis of public liberty, and the strongest bulwark of public
safety. It follows, that the greater the proportion of this class to
the whole society, the more free, the more independent, and
the more happy must be the society itself.
In appreciating the regular branches of manufacturing
and mechanical industry, their tendency must be compared
with the principles laid down, and their merits graduated
accordingly. Whatever is least favorable to vigor of body, to
the faculties of the mind, or to the virtues or the utilities of life,
instead of being forced or fostered by public authority, ought
to be seen with regret as long as occupations more friendly to
human happiness, lie vacant.
The several professions of more elevated pretensions,
the merchant, the lawyer, the physician, the philosopher, the
divine, form a certain proportion of every civilized society,
and readily adjust their numbers to its demands, and its
circumstances.”246
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Madison was not always entirely consistent on this point, though. He
did

sometimes

support government actions

taken on behalf of

manufacturing. If it came down to the continued existence of an already
established industry, he was willing to make exceptions.
“Mr. Madison thought it was worthy of consideration, whether
it would not be expedient to make an exception in favour of
white cotton goods. He understood there was a manufactory
of some consequence established in this country, whose
business it was to print these white cottons, and if this
exception was not made, this additional duty might go to the
destruction of it. Indeed as the printing of this article added
as he was informed, two-thirds to its value, it might be
considered as a raw material. He believed this manufactory
was carried on by persons who came from foreign countries.
If their manufactory succeeded, it might induce others to
follow them, to exercise their several professions amongst us,
which could not fail to be of advantage to the country; but if
the present manufactory should be destroyed by one of our
laws bearing hard upon its proprietors, it would have quite a
contrary effect. He owned he was not much acquainted with
the manufactory in question, nor had he made much
calculation upon the subject; but, from the face of it, it
seemed to require an exception. He therefore made the
motion.”247
Even though, as I have shown above, Hamilton and Madison did
have underlying differences in their expectations for the United States,
specifically in this case on what, if any, role the federal government would
have in the economy, in more ways they were actually quite similar rather
than having dramatic differences of opinion. As I mentioned above, it
really is just too bad that all the individuals from that time that I am have
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read just did not give each other the benefit of the doubt, and
immediately attributed the different preferences each had to some kind
of betrayal of the American Revolution, rather than just understanding
that intelligent people of good will can and do quite often come to
different conclusions regarding the questions of the day.
Between the two, Madison is more hesitant than Hamilton to have
the federal government involve itself extensively in the economy, but this
is a difference in degree, and not principle. Both wanted the new federal
government to correct the problems that had occurred under the Articles
of Confederation. Just how to do so, and what underlying Constitutional
support for any actions taken, were the areas on which they differed.
Both agreed on the need for tariffs, but Madison was, as we have
seen, much more interested in using these to achieve not only the goal of
revenue for the federal government, but also as a tool for use in foreign
relations. He clearly wanted to shift the United States’ economy away
from primary trade with Great Britain towards a much more diversified
situation, especially by giving France greater benefits. Hamilton seemed
much more content with the trade situation with Great Britain, but clearly
wanted the United States to become more independent over time
through expanding its own manufacturing base.
The goal both had at all times, though, does show them to have
been in essential ways far more similar than different.

Each was
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concerned with, and proposed policies based on, the good of the
American people as a whole. That they were unable to see this in each
other, and give each other the benefit of the doubt, is an all-too-common
tragic reality in American life which continues still to this day.
Republicanism

for

both

Hamilton

and

Madison

mandated

government focus on the common good. However, they had different
ideas about whether, to what extent, and what kinds of federal
government activity were necessary to help the American republican
experiment succeed.

For Hamilton, that focus on the common good

required the federal government take a widespread active role in the
economy in order to provide a good standard of living for the American
people. That way, the people would accept, and continue to support,
the American republic.

Further, this necessary, and good, federal

government involvement in the economy required taxation. It would be
through taxes that the United States could be effectively protected from
threats at home and abroad, plus it would achieve respectability with
other countries. For Hamilton, these need to be addressed for any kind of
country, including a republic, to succeed.
Very different from Madison, Hamilton again and again included
“Greatness” as one of his goals for the United States. Indeed, he listed
greatness as one of the absolute vital necessities in order for the American
republican experiment to succeed.

Only in a large, wealthy, great
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republic could America survive and thrive. This is of course a departure
from classical republican theory on Hamilton’s part, but as we have seen,
both departed from classical theory at various times.
With Madison, we see such a departure in his emphasis on a free
market, with as little government regulation as possible, as necessary for
the American republican experiment to succeed. Also, Madison did see
a good, indeed vital, role for the federal government in the economy, but
to encourage agriculture, not manufacturing as Hamilton wanted. The
agricultural life was, far more for Madison than Hamilton, the best way to
encourage the kind of civic virtue among citizens which would help the
American republic succeed.
Interestingly, both Hamilton and Madison saw an important role for
the federal government in the economy in order to counteract powerful
economic interests within the United States itself with goals contrary to the
common good. Hamilton identified the “trading interest,” while Madison
spoke of the “mercantile interest” as not having interests always in
accordance with the good of the United States as a whole. That both
agreed on the value of federal government involvement in the economy
on this subject shows that their differences were not absolute, and it is
simply too bad they could not see they had points on which they were in
agreement.
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Conclusion
“The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and
strongest kind of fear is fear of the unknown.” – H.P. Lovecraft248
As I conclude this dissertation I will focus on the overall implications for
republicanism of the differing points of view Hamilton and Madison had. As I
mentioned above, there is no one definitive definition of the word “republic,”
and so what it means for the United States to be a republic has been a source
of constant debate throughout its history.

The differences Hamilton and

Madison had will help highlight that debate, as both were pivotal figures in the
early history of the United States, and their influence has continued to this day.
This dissertation has expanded the comparison of Hamilton and Madison into
new areas that have not been as fully explored before. As I stated before, this is
my original contribution to the literature on Hamilton, Madison, Constitutional
interpretation, and the early history of the United States republic.
In Chapter One, I reviewed the history of the idea of a republic, beginning
with Polybius and continuing up until the time of Hamilton and Madison. My
approach followed, for the most part, the presentation from J.G.A. Pocock’s
The Machiavellian Moment.

My approach differed slightly from his, though, in

that I included some individual thinkers he does not.
In Chapter Two I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of slavery.
Hamilton was a documented opponent of slavery since service in the Army
Lovecraft, H.P. “Supernatural Horror in Literature,”
http://www.hplovecraft.com/writings/texts/essays/shil.aspx, accessed November 1, 2015.
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during the Revolution. He also was active in the New York Manumission society
to the end of his life. Madison, on the other hand, while he disliked slavery, and
even expressed a desire to have as little to do with it as possible, did not take
any overt action to oppose slavery throughout his life. Only late in life did he
offer a rather tepid support for the idea of resettling voluntarily freed slaves in
Africa. Also, Hamilton did not display any bias towards blacks, considering them
to be to be just as competent as whites. He did not express any reservations or
fears regarding freed slaves living alongside other Americans. Madison, though,
was convinced to the end of his life that blacks and whites could not life
together successfully.
In Chapter Three I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of how
the United States should position itself between the two major powers of the
early period of American history, France and Great Britain.

As I showed,

Hamilton had a staunch focus on the well-being of the United States. He was
concerned about the influence of both major powers, and the influence of
Europe in general, rather than having a preference for one over the other.
Madison, though, was more attached to republicanism, as he understood it,
than to France.

He supported connections with France as a way of

counterbalancing the influence of Great Britain, but once France had left its
experiment in republicanism behind for the rule of Napoleon, he treated France
no differently than any other foreign country.
In Chapter Four I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of
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Constitutional interpretation. Their differences of opinion existed even during the
time they worked together on The Federalist, as Hamilton and Madison’s
opinions during that time showed sharply different expectations.

Neither

departed from the other in later years, because neither understood they had
conflicting views all along. That they did not realize this only shows that they
simply did not have an in-depth discussion of their expectations for the future of
the United States.
In Chapter Five compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of religion.
Madison, as is well known, was an ardent defender of individual religious
freedom throughout his adult life. He did not express any strong religious beliefs
of his own at any point in his life. His focus was not on personal piety, but rather
on freedom from religion. He even tried to have the protections from official
religion in the United States Constitution extended to limit the state governments
as well as the federal government during the time Congress was writing the Bill
of Rights. Hamilton was similarly not given to religious expressions during most of
his life, but he did show some religious reflections when young and still living in
the Caribbean. However, as he aged, especially after leaving public office, he
showed greater and greater interest in religion. He expressed his thoughts on
Christianity in writing more and more during the late 1790s and early 1800s.
Finally, as he lay dying, he wanted to receive Communion.
In Chapter Six I compared Hamilton and Madison on the issue of federal
government involvement in the economy. Both showed their later preferences
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before the Constitution was ratified, so again, neither genuinely departed from
the other in later years. Hamilton showed his strong preference for government
regulation of various aspects of the economy all along, and Madison, while
favoring regulation in some ways, was nowhere near as eager to involve the
federal, rather than state, government in economic matters.
Overall, the conflict between Hamilton and Madison is just one example
of the difficulty in even defining the word “republic” precisely. I mentioned John
Adams’ letter to Mercy Warren in my Introduction, and how many different
types of governments have been described as republics over history, and so it is
not really possible to clearly identify any one kind of government as “the” one
and only way to think of what a republic should be like. The problem Adams
identified has not changed in the years since, so what can we take away from
the material I have presented here?
First it is important to understand that both Hamilton and Madison
considered themselves republicans, and both were unalterably committed to
the success of the United States as one, unified nation. Clearly, though, they
had different ideas of what the United States would be like. I included the
quote from H.P. Lovecraft at the beginning of this Conclusion, though, to begin
to present my main contention as to what I think is the single most important
implication for republicanism to take away from Hamilton and Madison’s
disagreements.
Both Hamilton and Madison considered their expectations for the United

226

States as “the” one, correct and best vision for the United States. That they
could not give each other the benefit of the doubt when their differences
became apparent is, I argue, the result of the “fear of the unknown” Lovecraft
cited. The United States was a very young country, that no one knew for sure
whether or not it was going to succeed, and neither could accept the reality of
anyone having a conflicting point of view of their own. Still to this day there is
the completely unreasonable expectation among people of many different
ideologies that theirs is the only possible way for the United States to survive and
thrive. In that regard, sadly, nothing has changed since Hamilton and Madison.
The simple reality is, there have demonstrably been a wide variety of
different visions for the United States over time, and with the single exception of
the issue of slavery, the United States has managed to survive, and thrive
enormously, for over two centuries, without any major internal conflict or
bloodshed. This desire for unanimity is simply unreasonable, counter-productive,
and unattainable.

There are many different ways of thinking about what a

republic should be, and many different ways a country can find to survive and
thrive. The United States has not finished, if that is even possible, defining the
meaning of a republic, at least in its own case. The political process, which
again has worked in almost all eras of the history of the United States without
major violence and bloodshed, is the only peaceful alternative, so why not
simply continue to make use of that in order to “define the republic?”
Far too many look to the Founders for a coherent vision for the United
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States.

If nothing else, this dissertation will, I hope, help to dispel that

misconception.

So many want the Founders to have had a coherent

understanding of, and vision for, the United States, as a group. They simply did
not. However, the influence of the Founders is vast, though not in regards to
their agreements. Rather, it is their disagreements that have proven to be of
lasting influence, which for instance initially resulted in the first two political
parties in the United States, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans.
The notion of having different political parties, to express and represent different
underlying expectations for the United States, has not gone away, and why
should it?
I entitled this dissertation “Defining the Republic” initially because each of
Hamilton and Madison had, in his own way, a definition.

Their definitions

differed, though, as I have shown. Such disagreements are inevitable. Humans
are simply not capable of unanimity. In order for any country to succeed, it
must find ways to resolve those differences of opinion, at least for a period of
time, in a peaceful manner. While not perfect, if indeed any such standard of
perfection is possible, the political process is far preferable to violence and
bloodshed. It is to the political process that I argue the United States needs to
look to “define the republic,” at least for any one moment in time.
Hamilton and Madison’s fear of each other, though, is an example of the
major impediment to meaningful resolution, for any period of time, of
disagreements over what the republic of the United States should be like. If
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people cannot recognize that disagreements do NOT mean the other person, or
group, is going to destroy the country through the potential enactment of their
policy preferences, conflicts like the Civil War are the only option left to provide
a resolution. Fear simply cannot be allowed to govern the nation’s political
choices in all but a few circumstances.
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The “Great Divergence” between Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison is one of the most well-known events in the early history of the United
States. Together, Hamilton and Madison wrote most of The Federalist, and each
was pivotal in securing the acceptance of the Constitution in their state ratifying
conventions. That within just a few years of the establishment of the new form of
government each had worked so hard to achieve, they became bitter political
enemies, is an often remarked upon, but little studied event.
In this dissertation I compare Hamilton and Madison on several different
topics, and show they all along had underlying differences of opinion as to what
they expected the United States would eventually be like. That they “diverged”
is not the result of a change by either individual after the Constitution was
ratified, but rather the result of unspoken and unexplored assumptions each had
long before they worked together on The Federalist.
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